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Abstract 
 
Costly ‘altruistic’ punishment, where an individual intervenes to punish someone for 
behaving unfairly towards another or for violating a social norm, seems to be vital for large-
scale cooperation. However, due to the costs involved, the evolution of this behaviour has 
remained a puzzle. The thesis initially describes why punishment is costly and explains why 
current theories do not sufficiently explain its evolution in the context of these costs. The 
thesis then offers a solution to this puzzle in the form of a dominance-based theory of the 
evolution of punishment. The theoretical underpinnings of this theory are discussed in 
reference to the previous literature, specifically how a dominant position provides sufficient 
heterogeneity in the cost and benefits of punishment to allow the behaviour to evolve at the 
individual-level of selection. 
Across 10 studies, the thesis empirically investigates the role dominance is theorised to play 
in costly punishment behaviour. First, the judgements observers make about punishers are 
investigated. It is demonstrated that punishers are perceived as dominant but, unlike 
individuals who engage in other aggressive behaviours, punishers are also well liked. While 
successful punishers are judged to be of the highest rank in a social group, the wider social 
judgements of punishers are dependent on the attempt at punishment only; successful and 
unsuccessful punishers are seen as equally dominant and well liked, suggesting that the 
willingness to attempt punishment can honestly signal both dominance and ones pro-
sociality. However, additional studies show that observers a) perceive subordinate punishers 
will face a great deal of retaliation, b) show surprise when subordinates attempt to punish, 
and c) expect that dominants will punish and be successful, whereas subordinates are 
expected to never punish. Thus, while there are reputational benefits from punishment, only 
dominant individuals can actually access them. 
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Second, the effect of a dominant position on punishment behaviour is investigated. Two 
studies sought to simulate the greater access to resources that dominants enjoy, and 
demonstrate that individuals who receive more resources from group-level cooperation will 
punish free-riding more frequently and more severely than those who receive less resources. 
Moreover, individuals who are in a stable dominant position, i.e. who can continually benefit 
to a greater degree than others from group cooperation, punish even more frequently and 
severely than when individuals receive additional resources alone. The results show that 
individuals only punish when it is cheap for them to do so and when investment in the public 
good (by punishing) can produce higher future returns for them. A dominant position 
provides the opportunity for both of these. Further studies demonstrate that individuals at the 
centre of a social network, an example of a ‘real life’ informal dominant position, are more 
sensitive to unfairness when making punishment decisions compared to those at the periphery 
of a group. However, when punishment decisions are public, and there are no economic 
incentives to punish, individuals behave in a similar manner regardless of social position. 
Taken together, the results of the empirical studies support the proposed dominance-theory of 
costly punishment. The theoretical implications of the dominance-theory of punishment are 
discussed in reference to both the proximate occurrence of punishment and its evolutionary 
origins in dominance and dominant behaviours. The practical implications of this theory will 
also be discussed, specifically in regard to when and why individuals will act in defence of 
the public good. While further investigation is necessary, a dominance-theory of punishment 
explains both results of this thesis and the findings of the wider literature, and as such 
provides a coherent and compelling explanation for the evolution of costly punishment and 
its associated emotions. 
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1 Chapter 1: literature review 
It is a (very) common sight on the motorways of the UK to see signs warning that the lane 
ahead is closed for maintenance and that drivers should change into an inner one. Most 
comply after the first few signs, but there are always some individuals who drive right to up 
the actual ‘closed’ barriers, passing the slower queuing traffic as they go, then expect to be 
allowed to change lanes at this last moment. However, this wish is rarely granted. Other 
drivers will go to great lengths, often risking a collision, to ensure such defectors remain 
stuck while the traffic they so arrogantly tried to get ahead of steadily rolls past. As any 
motorist will attest, there is an undeniable sense of joy that comes from passing such a scene. 
The above is just a small example of what is referred to as ‘moralistic’ or ‘costly’ 
punishment, where an individual or individuals punish a violation of an established social 
norm in defence of the public good (as above), or punish an act of unfairness committed 
against an unrelated other. Importantly, such punishment is greatly beneficial to a group and 
to society at large, as it deters harmful social defections and encourages pro-social behaviour 
such as cooperation. In fact, while there are a number of mechanisms that can enforce pro-
social behaviour between a small number of individuals, for example kin selection Hamilton 
(1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), or reputation building (Bird & Smith, 2005a), no 
mechanism has been as effective at encouraging cooperation as punishment for non-
cooperation (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011): if “covenants, without the sword, are but 
words and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes, 1651/1996, Chapter 17, para 2), 
then  punishment can be seen as just such a sword.  
Furthermore, an environment of “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968, p. 
163) is also something that we actively want. A novel example appeared in 1993, when a rape 
occurred… in cyberspace [sic], in a text-based precursor of a modern online-game, when a 
player ‘took control’ of the avatars of several other players (Dibbel, 1999, Chapter 1). While 
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prior to this incident the community had been ardently against any form of control or codes of 
conduct, and although the act itself amounted in real terms to little more than a few lines of 
text, the outrage was palpable. Suddenly, when faced with a defector, there were calls for the 
ability to delete, exclude or otherwise remove players who violated hastily generated rules. 
More scientifically, it has been consistently experimentally demonstrated that participants 
become outraged at perceived unfair or uncooperative behaviour (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 
2005; Trivers, 1971), and actively prefer environments where punishment is possible 
(migrating to them, Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006;  or voting for them, Noussair 
& Tan, 2011). Outrage at acts of unfairness and anti-social behaviour, and the desire to 
punish those who behave in such a manner, seems to be a uniquely human trait (not shared by 
are nearest extant relatives, Chimpanzees, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2013; Riedl, Jensen, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2012), and one that is likely responsibility for our highly cooperative 
behaviour. 
However, it remains controversial how a tendency to perform such punishment could have 
evolved as it is costly to the punisher but is beneficial to the group as a whole. The apparent 
group-beneficial but individual-deleterious nature of punishment seems to put the behaviour 
at odds with prevailing evolutionary theory (as presented, for example, by Dawkins, 1976). 
Because of this, there is great disagreement as to how costly punishment, and the associated 
moral outrage, could evolve.  
This thesis aims to offer a possible solution to this puzzle. 
First however it will be important to explain in more detail why the evolution of punishment 
is such a puzzle.  This chapter will discuss what the proximate costs to punishment are, and 
how the current theories have attempted to explain the evolution of punishment in light of 
these costs. The following chapter (Chapter 2) will then set out an alternative explanation for 
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the evolution of punishment, with the rest of the thesis devoted to empirically testing this 
explanation.  
The nomenclature of punishment has fluctuated over the years, between ‘altruistic’ (for 
example, Fehr & Gächter, 2002), ‘costly’ (for example, Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006) or 
simply ‘third party’ (for example, Fehr, 2004) punishment. While the latter two are nominally 
interchangeable, ‘altruistic’ has fallen out of favour because the behaviour is no longer 
regarded as being so in the Hamilton (1964b) sense (Barclay, personal communication). 
However, on a proximate and mechanistic level, a distinction can made between situations 
where a 'disinterested' third party intervenes in an unfair dyadic conflict (see, Fehr, 2004; 
Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013) and when punishment is directed against defector 
from the  public good (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Strictly speaking, only the former can be 
referred to as ‘third party punishment’ while the latter has been referred to as ‘altruistic’, 
‘moralistic’ or ‘costly’, and more recently as ‘second-party functional  punishment’ (Jensen, 
2010, p. 2639). This is because while the punisher in the latter was not directly harmed by the 
defection, they suffered because a defection lowers the group product: punishers in such 
public good situations are therefore not disinterested. It should be noted though that in the 
anthropological (see Mathew & Boyd, 2011), and the non-human animal literature (for 
example, Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010), punishment of defections against the group has 
been referred to as ‘third party punishment’ despite the punishers not being disinterested. 
Thus even the above distinction is not absolute. 
Nevertheless, research on both punishment by disinterested third parties and ‘altruistic’ group 
members is interpreted as suggesting that humans have a unique desire to punish those who 
behave ‘unfairly’ (see Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Marlowe et al., 2008). The interpretation of 
data from both situations is comparable, if not identical, in terms of what it says about human 
behaviour. Thus, one is tempted to argue that ‘third party punishment’ can adequately cover 
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any instance of punishment where a punishing individual chooses to intervene, be it as a 
disinterested bystander or someone willing to confront a defection ‘for the good of the 
group’.  
However, in a recent critique of the field, Guala (2012) referred to punishment in both 
disinterested and intra-group situations under the umbrella term ‘costly punishment’. 
Therefore, in this thesis, costly punishment will be used throughout to describe the act of 
punishing an anti-social, unfair, or otherwise norm-violating behaviour. However ‘altruistic’ 
will occasionally be used to express the idea that punishment, in the specific context under 
review, is implied to be truly altruistic in nature. ‘Third party’ will also occasionally be used 
when referring specifically to a situation where the punisher is deemed to be 
disinterested.  Finally, costly punishment will occasionally be shortened to ‘punishment’, and 
this will always mean costly punishment; other forms of punishment (for example second 
party punishment) will always be labelled with their full title.  
1.1 Cost of punishment 
Individuals react very negatively to free-riding and unfair behaviour, and this reaction is a 
strong predictor of punishment (Falk et al., 2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; O'Gorman, Wilson, 
& Miller, 2005). Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, Tabibnia, and Robbins (2010) showed that the 
punishment of defectors is an immediate and impulsive act, and is both pleasurable to witness 
(Singer et al., 2006) and to do oneself  (de Quervain et al., 2004). There have been a number 
of suggestions as to why such costly punishment occurs, and these have centred around the 
idea that humans are averse to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 
2011), or show an other-regarding preference (Camerer & Fehr, 2006) that compels us to 
punish those who behave in an anti-social manner towards others, or in a way that negatively 
affects the group as a whole.  
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It should be noted here that ‘unfair’, ‘defector’, ‘free-rider’ or ‘norm violator’ all refer to an 
individual who has behaved in an anti-social manner, and will be used interchangeably as 
appropriate. For example someone who does not contribute to the public good is punished for 
free-riding in a public goods game (for a review of public goods games, see, Casari, 2005), 
whereas in a third party punishment game (see, Fehr, 2004), punishment is directed at those 
who have made an unfair/unequal resource division. 
Nevertheless, despite the ‘moral outrage’ (Trivers, 1971) felt at unfair behaviour, costly 
punishment, as one may expect from the name, is strongly affected by the proximate cost to 
the punisher, i.e. the amount of resources they must spend to punish (McCullough, Kurzban, 
& Tabak, 2013), with the majority of individuals punishing only when the cost is low. As 
shown by Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, and Nowak (2008), the costs of punishment presents a 
problem for any theory attempting to explain the evolution of punishment, as the costs 
provide a strong selection pressure against the behaviour. The sections below represent a 
description of the proximate costs of punishment, and focuses on the costs only; how the 
evolution of punishment can be explained in the light of these costs will be discussed in 
Section 1.2. 
1.1.1 Effectiveness of punishment  
In 2000, an Israeli day-care centre, tired of parents being consistently late in picking up their 
children, decided to impose a small fine on parents who were late by more than 10 minutes. 
However rather than reducing lateness, the fine dramatically increased it. Whereas lateness 
had previously been seen as violating a social norm as it inconvenienced the staff, now that 
inconvenience was seen as a service, and one that busy parents were happy to pay for 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a). This nicely demonstrates that in order for punishment to 
successfully deter free-riding and defection, it must inflict sufficient costs upon the target as 
to make these behaviours untenable (for example, Andreoni, 1988; Gächter, Herrmann, & 
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Thoni, 2005; Gardner & West, 2004a; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). Changing the 
behaviour of free-riders is certainly a motive behind punishment (Masclet, 2003) and 
explains why there is more punishment when groups are fixed and when there are additional 
resources at stake (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2010; Fehr & Gächter, 2000); as 
shown by Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura (2004)  if one must continually interact with a 
defector, it pays to alter their behaviour.  
Ever since the earliest work in the area of punishment (see Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 
1992; Yamagishi, 1988), experimenters have ensured that punishment inflicts sufficient costs 
on the target by making it ‘effective’; that is, making the ratio between the resources spent on 
punishment and the damage inflicted on the target sufficiently large. This has the added effect 
of making it very cheap for individuals to punish. In their seminal work, Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) used a punishment system that slowly escalated in effectiveness (from 1 point spent 
by the punisher removing 1 of the targets points, to 10 points spent by the punisher removing 
30 from the target), but most subsequent studies have used a fixed ratio of  1:3 (for a review 
see, Balliet et al., 2011; see also, Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; 
Masclet & Villeval, 2008). In their comparative analysis of different punishment ratios, 
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) demonstrated a 1:3 ratio to be the optimum for encouraging 
punishment (and therefore cooperation) insomuch as above a 1:3 ratio (e.g. 1:4) cooperation 
is not significantly greater and the cost to the social product, i.e. the amount of resources 
destroyed by punishment, is excessive. This ratio has become standard for both public goods 
games and other punishment-based study designs (for example, Fehr, 2004; Pedersen, 
Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013). 
In fact, the cooperation enhancing effect of effective punishment is maintained even when 
there is heterogeneity in the ability to punish (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011);  for example if 
only a single group-member can punish effectively (Nikiforakis, Normann, & Wallace, 2009) 
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or at all (O'Gorman, Henrich, & Van Vugt, 2009). As long as there is some possibility of 
being punished cheaply and effectively, individuals will be more cooperative. This is either 
because free-riders fear being punished (Andreoni, 1988) or, as suggested by Fischbacher, 
Gächter, and Fehr (2001),  because the knowledge that potential defectors will be deterred 
encourages others to cooperate as it lessens the fear of being taken advantage of. Equally, it is 
important to note that most, if not all, models of third party or costly punishment depend on 
effective punishment for the for behaviour to be evolutionarily stable (Boyd & Richerson, 
1992; de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Gardner & West, 2004a; Roberts, 2013; and many 
others). This is the case even when other possible mechanisms for the evolution of 
punishment are being investigated, for example reputation (Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 
2011) or group-level selection (Gintis, 2000). 
A question that arises therefore is how and why individuals could punish effectively outside 
the laboratory. One solution is ostracism. For any group-living animal, ostracism from a 
group tends to result in death (Cant, Hodge, Bell, Gilchrist, & Nichols, 2010; Wilson, 1980, 
p. 142) and Bowles and Gintis (2004) demonstrated that ostracism, while very costly to the 
target, can be considered cost-free to the punisher. As shown by Masclet (2003), even if 
ostracism is costly  it can still enforce cooperation in an experiment, although the effects are 
not as strong as those seen when an actual monetary cost is inflicted on the target. Still, 
perhaps because of the threat from ostracism, Ostrom et al. (1992) and  Masclet, Noussair, 
Tucker, and Villeval (2003) found that individuals do respond to verbal admonishments. 
Such an effect also occurs for other non-monetary sanctions; Barr (2001) found that shame, 
and the potential for shaming, act as punishment  (see also, Jaffe, 2008), and others have 
found a similar effect for the threat of being gossiped about (Bazzan & Dahmen, 2010; 
Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007).  
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However, there is a darker side to effective punishment; it encourages a great deal of anti-
social and counter-punishment/retaliation. While the latter will be discussed in more detail 
below (1.1.3), anti-social punishment, where individuals punish high co-operators, seems 
especially to go against the common suggestion that costly punishment is an act of public 
good  (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Anti-social punishment regularly 
occurs in economic games (Barclay, 2006; Ostrom et al., 1992; Ottone, 2008), has been 
observed cross-culturally (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gächter, 2008), and can curtail the evolution 
of punishment in theoretical models (Dreber & Rand, 2012; Rand, Armao, Nakamaru, & 
Ohtsuki, 2010). Because of the frequency of anti-social punishment it has been suggested that 
a great deal of punishment might have a spiteful motive behind it (see 1.2.3). Interestingly 
however, Falk et al. (2005) have found that when the cost of punishment to the punisher rises, 
anti-social punishment all but disappears; only cooperative individuals are willing to punish 
at great cost to themselves (see also, Dawes et al., 2007; Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis & 
Normann, 2008; Sigmund, 2007).  
1.1.2 Resources and the net-cost of punishment 
Effective punishment is not the only way in which the cost of punishment can be reduced. An 
alternative mechanism is for individual punishers to have higher overall resources available 
to them, so that while the absolute cost of punishment remains the same, the net cost would 
be lower for these individuals (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996). In fact, de Weerd 
and Verbrugge (2011) suggested that the cost to the punisher might be a more important 
factor in explaining the evolution of costly punishment than the effect on the target. 
Although the effect of heterogeneity in resources has been little studied in relation to 
punishment, it has been investigated in relation to contributions to the public good. Results 
are mixed. Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller (1999) found that participants with greater 
resources contribute more to the public good, but Buckley and Croson (2006) found the 
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opposite (for a review, see Ostrom, 2006). These studies did not include a punishment 
mechanism, but when punishment is possible the results are equally mixed. Generating 
resource heterogeneity by providing certain participants with higher initial endowments in a 
public good game, Burns & Visser (2006) found that participants who received lower 
endowments contributed more to the public good, whereas Reuben & Riedl (2013) found that 
those who received higher endowments contributed more. The same is also true for studies 
that provided different marginal returns from group cooperation; Reuben & Riedl (2013) and 
Tan (2008) found no difference in contributions between high and low earners, while Nikos 
Nikiforakis, Noussair, & Wilkening, (2012) and Reuben & Riedl (2009) found that high 
earners contribute more, but only when punishment was not possible.  
Of the studies above, only Tan (2008) found that participants with more resources punished 
to a greater degree than those with fewer. The other studies did not report any differences in 
punishment behaviour between the different levels of resources held by participants. 
Resource level did not affect punishment most likely because punishment was effective, at 
least a 1:3 ratio (Reuben & Riedl, 2009) and up to a 1:5 ratio (Burns & Visser, 2006) being 
used; in the case of Nikiforakis et al. (2012) a small initial price allowed an unrestricted 
amount of punishment. In the Tan (2008) study, punishment was relatively ineffective (1:2). 
Therefore, in the majority of previous studies, punishment was still cheap, even for 
participants who received fewer resources; indeed, in the case of Burns and Visser (2006), 
low earning participants proved very willing to spend their resources to reduce the income of 
higher earners regardless of the latter’s contributions to the public good.  
Finally, an additional mechanism for lowering the net cost of punishment would be to 
distribute the cost amongst many individuals. Ostrom et al. (1992) found that when 
coordination was possible prior to beginning the experiment, there was no actual need for 
punishment as no participants defected. Equally, while all the research previously discussed 
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employed a peer-sanctioning mechanism whereby all members of a group can punish (for a 
review see, Casari, 2005), Traulsen, Röhl, and Milinski (2012) employed a pool-punishment 
system, whereby all participants could contribute to an additional punishment pool. When a 
threshold of resources was reached the pool would punish low contributors to the public 
good. Despite being more costly (if no-one free-rode, the contributed resources were lost) 
participants actually preferred the pool-punishment system, essentially a system where 
punishment was coordinated by a central authority. Finally, a model by Boyd, Gintis, and 
Bowles (2010) found that as long as a) potential punishers could signal to one another and b) 
punishment only occurred when a certain threshold of signallers was reach, a small initial 
number of punishers could lead to punishment being evolutionary stable. However, an issue 
raised by Boyd et al. (2010) is that such a mechanism may allow an individual to trigger 
punishment but not take part, and Peterson (2011) found that moral outrage can indeed be 
used in such a way. The emergence of coordination signals might therefore be problematic, as 
when there is a possibility for deception, ‘cheap talk’ is best ignored (Duffy & Feltovich, 
2002). 
1.1.3 Retaliation 
Despite the relative paucity of work conducted on it, perhaps the greatest cost to punishment 
is from retaliation (Dreber & Rand, 2012). Also known as counter-punishment, retaliation 
occurs when an individual who has received punishment responds in kind. Simply put, 
individuals do not happily accept being punished, regardless of whether they deserved it due 
to their actions. To use an example from Janssen and Bushman (2008), there is a reason the 
police wear body armour when arresting criminals.  Individuals do show a great desire to 
retaliate when punished (Falk et al., 2005) and even early studies into costly punishment 
reported that individuals seems to punish in response to having been punished themselves 
previously (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1992). Indeed Gächter et al. (2005) 
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suggested that much ‘anti-social’ punishment, where high contributors are punished, can be 
seen as defectors pre-empting the punishment for their own behaviour, essentially retaliating 
first. When allowed to actually engage in retaliation, i.e. given the ability to selectively target 
‘their’ punishers, Nikiforakis (2008) found that individuals retaliate to such a degree that 
punishment no longer occurs. Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2006) suggested that 
retaliation could be beneficial, as it would allow altruistic individuals to punish anti-social 
punishers, but in practice it was primarily used to exact revenge for being punished in a 
previous round. Furthermore, when retaliation has been introduced into evolutionary models, 
it prevents the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, as the latter is now too costly 
(Janssen & Bushman, 2008; Sigmund, 2007; Wolff, 2012). 
Individuals seem to take the effect of retaliation into account when investing in punishment. 
In the laboratory, when retaliation is possible, participants either will not punish at all 
(Nikiforakis, 2008), or, as shown by Rockenbach and Milinski (2011), will punish defectors 
and then actively conceal their punishment. The desire to punish unfairness still exists, but 
retaliation poses too much of a cost for it to be translated into action. Furthermore, in non-
economic studies, the effects of retaliation are also apparent. Jenson and Peterson (2011) 
found participants reported being less willing to confront a formidable defector, and  
Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, and Dovidio (2009) found that in their confederate-based study, 
participants were unwilling to confront anyone for violating social norms. In fact, the lack of 
retaliation might be why laboratory experiments have been accused of hugely overestimating 
the willingness of participants to punish defectors (Guala, 2012), which draws into questions 
some of the theories derived from such methods.  
Outside the laboratory, individuals will also actively hide punishment behaviour; Acheson 
(1988) described how fisherman would secretly cut the lines of others they believed to be 
violating fish quotas (see also, Ostrom, 1990), and the main reason crimes are not reported to 
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the police, an otherwise ‘cost free’ action, is the threat of retaliation (Miller, 2010; Tarling & 
Morris, 2010). Even when faced with a costly defector, individuals in pre-state societies are 
still very unwilling to engage in punishment;  Mathew and Boyd (2011) for example describe 
the long process by which any decision to punish in one such society is reached, and this is 
not surprising given how ubiquitous retaliation and counter-retaliation is within such societies 
(Chagnon, 1988; Diamond, 2012; Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009). According to Hill et al. 
(2009) the prevalence of retaliation, coupled with the lack of any formal sanctioning 
institutions, might be why there is very little evidence of costly punishment in non-state 
societies (see also, Marlowe et al., 2008).  
Retaliation is a ubiquitous part of human behaviour, and as demonstrated by feuds 
(Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001), one act of confrontation is always seen as 
deserving another. Given the human, and indeed non-human primate (Kazem & Aureli, 
2005), propensity to take revenge for any perceived slight  (Felson, 1982; Marlowe et al., 
2010; and for a review, see McCullough et al., 2013), even the ‘cost free’ social punishments 
mentioned in 1.1.1 are potentially much more costly when retaliation is considered. As shown 
by Levine, Taylor, and Best (2011), even third parties attempting to reconcile belligerents 
rather than punish them are not immune from attack, and it is a sad fact that have-a-go-hero 
stories in the press end with ‘fatally wounded’ as often as they do ‘chased away the 
perpetrator’ (for example, intervention by armed bystanders, Branas, Richmond, Culhane, 
Ten Have, & Wiebe, 2009; Goodman, 2014). Fundamentally, it appears that humans do not 
like being punished regardless of whether we ‘deserved it’, so any attempt to understand the 
evolution of costly punishment behaviour must take into account the cost of retaliation.  
1.1.4 Second-order free-riding 
The final cost of punishment is in essence a result of all of the previously discussed costs. 
While an individual might be able to punish cheaply because their punishment is effective, 
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because they have relatively greater resource-levels than others,  and have managed to avoid 
retaliation from the target of punishment, an individual who has spent any resources on 
punishment will lose out to second-order free-riders (Dreber et al., 2008; Kiyonari & Barclay, 
2008). First identified as a potential problem by Yamagishi (1988), second-order free-riders 
are cooperative in that they contribute to the public good, but they do not invest in costly 
punishment. Therefore while all individuals benefit from cooperation, second-order free-
riders do so more than the punishers because they have not paid the cost of punishment. As a 
result, over evolutionary time punishers are outcompeted and defectors can re-emerge 
(Helbing, Szolnoki, Perc, & Szabó, 2010) and while punishment of second-order free-riders 
has been suggested, this would lead to an infinite-order free-rider problem and yet more costs 
for the punisher (Sigmund, 2007).  
Thus, any theory attempting to explain the evolution of costly punishment should take into 
account the costs above; how individuals as a whole or an individual singular can punish 
effectively, whether they have a lower net-cost of punishment, how punishers can avoid 
retaliation, and how any cost of punishment can be recovered in the face of second-order 
free-riding. As acknowledged in the opening section, the above represent the proximate costs 
of punishment only. The question for any theory, however, is how, in the face of such costs, 
the willingness to punish unfairness has evolved in humans. 
1.2 Current theoretical explanations 
1.2.1 Indirect Reciprocity 
One solution to the costs of punishment is to assume that they cannot be directly overcome, 
and instead that any cost will be overcome through indirect reciprocity,  whereby an actor’s 
behaviour leads to a change in the future behaviour of conspecifics towards the actor, such as  
greater inclusion in cooperative activities or an increase in altruism directed towards the actor 
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(Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). While, as described by Johnstone and Bshary (2004), there is 
evidence that many animals take note of the behaviours of conspecifics,  due to our greater 
social cognition humans are especially adept at image-scoring, i.e. tracking the behaviour of 
others we observe (Melis & Semmann, 2010; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, 2005). From these 
‘scores’, a reputation emerges. Indirect Reciprocity theory therefore proposes that those with 
a reputation as a punisher receive special benefits from others in the group.    
The effects of reputation, and the human interest in maintaining our reputations, are well 
documented. Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) demonstrated that we are so sensitive to 
being observed that even subtle cues it is occurring, such as exposed to eye-like images, is 
enough to trigger pro-social behaviours (see also, Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2010; 
Haley & Fessler, 2005). Our sensitivity to being watched is great enough that Levitt and List 
(2007) and Hilbe and Sigmund (2010) have questioned whether any decision taken in a lab 
experiment can be perceived as truly anonymous by participants. Furthermore, such is the 
effect of reputation that Kiyonari and Barclay (2008), and Rand, Ohtsuki, and Nowak (2009), 
have argued that indirect reciprocity from cooperative or altruistic acts alone can potentially 
support cooperation without punishment. However many others disagree (Gürerk et al., 2006; 
Herrmann & Gächter, 2009; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; Sigmund, Hauert, & Nowak, 
2001), arguing that rewarding individuals for cooperation must take place continuously, 
whereas little actual punishment can be needed to ensure cooperation. For example, Ostrom 
et al. (1992) and others have found that after the first few rounds of a public goods game, no 
punishment is actually needed as no one defects. 
A number of models have suggested that if punishers gain indirectly from their actions, 
specifically if they receive greater levels of altruism or cooperative offers from observers, 
then punishment can be evolutionarily stable (Frank, 2003; Gardner & West, 2004a; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Santos et al., 2011), and Tennie (2012) suggested that we do 
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image-score for actual punishment behaviour. Indeed, Barclay (2006) and Fessler and Haley 
(2003) found that punishers are treated more altruistically than non-punishers  and a number 
of studies have found that punishers themselves are sensitive to the presence of an audience 
(Bering, 2008; Kurzban, Descioli, & O'brien, 2007; but see Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011), 
which suggests that some sort of reputational gain is expected.  
However, Indirect Reciprocity as a general theory does not make any assumptions about what 
sort of reputation is being gained per se, only that certain behaviours by an actor could lead to 
subsequent changes in the behaviour of eavesdropping conspecifics. Yet reputation is only 
useful so long as it allows individuals to make future predictions about the behaviour of 
conspecifics. So one question is, what does engaging in costly punishment predict about 
future behaviour of a punisher that warrants a positive change in behaviour towards them? 
The next two sections will discuss two theories that might provide an answer.  
1.2.2 Costly Signalling 
Costly Signalling Theory posits that individuals engage in immediately costly behaviours to 
honestly signal visually hidden qualities, such as genetic fitness.  Perhaps the best known 
example is the handicap principle (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), according to which organisms 
produce ornaments that negatively impact their survival, but Costly Signalling can also be 
seen in ‘show off’ behaviour (Hawkes, 1991), i.e.  purposely energetically and/or materially 
wasteful behaviour (Bird & Smith, 2005b; Bird, Smith, & Bird, 2001; Iredale, Van Vugt, & 
Dunbar, 2008) or behaviour that is especially risky (Farthing, 2005). Finally, costly signalling 
also includes conventional signalling (Maynard-Smith, Harper, & Brookfield, 1988), where 
the behaviour or ornament is itself cost-free, but the honesty of the signal is ensured by the 
cost-imposing behaviour it provokes in conspecifics. 
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Barclay (2006) and Nelissen (2008) have suggested that costly punishment might be a signal 
of one’s pro-sociality. Generally speaking, individuals who punish are more cooperative than 
non-punishers (Barclay, 2006; Falk et al., 2005) and Egas and Riedl (2008) found this 
association to be especially apparent when the cost of punishment was high. Punishers are 
trusted more than non-punishers (Fessler & Haley, 2003), are seen as more group focused and 
‘nice’ (Barclay, 2006), and are preferred choices for social partners (Farthing, 2005). 
Importantly, Nelissen (2008) demonstrated that the indirect rewards of punishment do seem 
to correlate positively with the actual cost of the behaviour, as one would expect from a 
costly signal.  Thus, by signalling their trustworthiness by punishing, punishers can reap the 
indirect benefits of such sentiment in future dyadic interactions (Albert, Guth, Kirchler, & 
Maciejovsky, 2007; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Gächter, Herrmann, & Thoni, 2004; 
Rotter, 1980).  
Furthermore by punishing an act of unfairness, punishers are (potentially) sacrificing the 
option to engage in selfish behaviour themselves, and this can be seen as further cost to 
punishment. While individuals react negatively to defections in dyadic interactions (for 
example, Fehr, 2004), there is seems to be a special disdain reserved for hypocrisy (Kurzban, 
2012; Ohtsubo, Masuda, Watanabe, & Masuchi, 2010), as can be seen by the outrage that 
greets any authority figure caught violating even a relatively minor norm (for example, 
avoiding driving points, Laville, 2012). It appears that by ‘moralistically’ punishing certain 
behaviours, an individual is signalling they will not undertake such behaviours themselves 
(Peterson, 2011). Punishers might therefore be preferred social partners not because they 
themselves are trustworthy per se (indeed cooperative non-punishers are more well liked than 
punishers: Barclay, 2006), but because they have demonstrated a commitment to public 
fairness.   
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As shown by Fischbacher et al. (2001), cooperation is conditional: we want to cooperate but 
fear others will defect and, by punishing, punishers provide an environment whereby 
cooperation can take place because the threat of defection is lower. Despite the threat of anti-
social punishment, Rockenbach and Milinski (2006) found that participants are very willing 
to migrate to environments where punishment is possible. Furthermore, individuals are more 
willing to condemn social norm violations when punishment is possible (Mulder, Verboon, & 
De Cremer, 2009) and, interestingly, Kim, Smith, and Brigham (1998) found the mere 
presence of a concerned third party makes individuals more willing to challenge unfairness 
themselves. As a result, punishers might find it easier than others to recruit social allies, 
something that would be vital given the role coalitions have likely played in human evolution 
(Gavrilets, Duenez-Guzman, & Vose, 2008; Pietraszewski, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014), and 
suggests that punishment might be related to wider group dynamics rather than just signalling 
an individual punisher’s ‘niceness’. 
A model by Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2001) suggested that while punishment could be 
evolutionarily stable as a costly signal, what it signals need not be pro-social tendencies or 
result in group-beneficial behaviours (see, Boyd & Richerson, 1992). Engaging in costly 
punishment might send a very different signal, that the punisher themselves is formidable and 
not to be treated unfairly in future interactions. For example, Brandt, Hauert, and Sigmund 
(2003) found that participants were less likely to cheat a punisher out of fear of retribution, 
and Barclay (2006) also suggested that the increase in pro-social behaviour directed to  
punishers might be a due to this fear rather than positive regard. In fact, an alternative 
explanation for the paucity of costly punishment in non-state societies offered by Marlowe et 
al. (2008) is that, in such small communities, a reputation for formidability and for not 
allowing oneself to be treated unfairly can be established easily through eavesdropping on 
dyadic encounters. Costly punishment can instead therefore be seen as another form of 
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aggressive behaviour designed to signal the ferocity of the actor (Griskevicius et al., 2009), 
with any benefits being the result of that fear.  
These two variants of a Costly Signalling theory approach to punishment are not mutually 
exclusive. It is perfectly possible that costly punishment could signal both formidability and 
that an individual is trustworthy and ‘nice’. Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides (2009) suggested that 
when making welfare decisions about individuals, both their ability to inflict cost 
(formidability) and their potential usefulness is taken into account, and Petersen, Sell, Tooby, 
and Cosmides (2012) found this to be the case when making criminal-justice punishment 
decisions. Indeed, given the prevalence of inter-group conflicts in human societies  
(Chagnon, 1988; Keeley, 1996; Stanish & Levine, 2011) and in our evolutionary history 
(Choi & Bowles, 2007; Gavrilets et al., 2008; Mitani, Watts, & Amsler, 2010; Wilson & 
Wrangham, 2003), a formidable individual would be a very useful ally to have. However, 
Benard (2013) and Melis and Semmann (2010) found that we dislike aggression and 
aggressive individuals in general, and Hawley, Little, and Card (2008) suggested that we will 
not associate with such an individual unless they are also skilful and likable. While 
formidable males are preferred as sexual partners (Farthing, 2007; Penton-Voak & Perrett, 
2000), Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, Todd, and Finch (1997) found this only to be the case if 
these  individuals are also seen as likable. As proposed by Silk (2003), aggression has its uses 
but makes later pro-social associations difficult. Therefore costly punishment might be an 
effective way to signal formidability without the negative consequences associated with 
aggressive behaviour, but this this has not been empirically tested (a test of this is described 
in Chapter 4).  
Thus Costly Signalling theory suggests that engaging in punishment acts as an honest signal, 
either of an individual’s trustworthiness and honesty or as someone who is formidable and 
not to be cheated in the future. In this account, the costs of punishment are an integral part of 
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the behaviour rather than something to be overcome. However, the benefits from costly 
signalling via punishment as described above do not have to be specific to costly punishment; 
as stated by Barclay (2006), as long as conspecifics in our evolutionary past did respond 
positively to those who punish unfairness, then there was selection pressure in favour of 
individuals who punished an act of defection or unfairness. However, Costly Signalling 
theory does not explain why we would be adverse to unfairness in the first place, i.e.  why we 
implicitly believe that punishment of defectors is a good thing and why we are angered by 
defections (Falk et al., 2005) and enjoy seeing defectors punished  (de Quervain et al., 2004; 
Singer et al., 2006), especially when our closest extant relatives have no such compulsion 
(Jensen et al., 2013; Riedl et al., 2012).   
1.2.3 Spite 
An alternative theory for the evolution of costly punishment that may answer these questions 
has been suggested in the form of spite. Spite can be defined simply as the willingness of an 
individuals to harm another at their own immediate expense (Gardner & West, 2004b; 
Jensen, 2010; West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007), which fits nicely with the proximate realities 
of costly punishment. Importantly, a spiteful explanation for punishment suggests a potential 
evolutionary origin of our apparent aversion to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 
1998), which Costly Signalling theory cannot explain.  
1.2.3.1 Spite and inequality aversion 
Much work on spite has been conducted in the light of the ultimatum game (Camerer, 2003). 
Here, one player, the proposer, can split a stake any way they choose and send a share to 
another participant, the responder. The responder can either refuse or accept the decision, 
with the refusal resulting in a ‘zero’ score for both participants. While studies differ in their 
specifics, for example comparing the sex of participants (Eckel & Grossman, 2001), their 
personality (Osumi & Ohira, 2010) or the heritability of behaviour (Wallace, Cesarini, 
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Lichtenstein, & Johannesson, 2007), proposers consistently send almost equal splits of any 
stake, and participants consistently reject low offers (Henrich et al., 2005; but see, Lamba & 
Mace, 2013). While the rejection of any offer above zero is economically irrational in the 
immediate term, as long as others are watching it is best to reject low offers, lest one receive 
more unequal offers in the future (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000; Skyrms, 1996). In fact, as 
shown by Rand, Tarnita, Ohtsuki, and Nowak (2013), from a proposer/dictator point of view, 
all offers should be equal unless an individual has a reputation for accepting unequal offers.  
Individuals do seem sensitive to such outcomes as, for example, participants showed a very 
negative reaction to unfair offers when they believed they were playing with a fellow human, 
but not when their co-player was believed to be a computer (Van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & 
Aleman, 2006).  
Therefore, it has been argued that the recognition of fairness is beneficial for group-living 
animals as it allows an individual to prevent future exploitation (Brosnan, 2011), and as a 
result punitive responses to inequality, regardless of the immediate costs, would be under 
positive selection pressure (Johnstone & Bshary, 2004). Still, it should be noted here that 
while such spiteful behaviour might get an individual a reputation for formidability, its 
primary aim is to ensure that the initial unfair actor does not benefit from their actions; the 
emotional response to such actions appears to be due to the pleasure of punishment, rather 
than injustice at the offer (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Thus 
evolutionary pressure is acting as much on individuals to behave fairly lest they lose 
everything to a spiteful response, and evolution has acted to coordinate both ‘proposer’ and 
‘responder’ behaviours (Rand et al., 2013; Skyrms, 1996).  
To put it in another more general way, if the actor loses out to others by some means (for 
example an unfair distribution of resources) it is in their long-term interest to lower the 
fitness gradient of their population through an immediate spiteful response (Gardner & West, 
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2004b). Nevertheless it has been suggested that such spiteful rejection of unfairness can 
account for the evolution of cooperation and punishment only if there is sufficient reputation 
building/indirect reciprocity (Gardner & West, 2004b; Johnstone & Bshary, 2004; Levine, 
1998; Marlowe et al., 2010). However, in comparison to Costly Signalling, the reputation 
formed from Spite can be considered inadvertent. The actor is punishing to level the fitness 
gradient, and conspecifics are image-scoring the actor through eavesdropping (see Johnstone, 
2001), whereas in the case of Costly Signalling, punishment is intended for observing 
conspecifics; as modelled by Rand et al. (2013) Spiteful behaviour is concerned with harming 
the target, it is simply also advantageous to know who will behave spitefully. 
1.2.3.2 Envy and costly punishment 
Spiteful behaviour therefore may have led to inequality aversion (Levine, 1998), as it was 
beneficial for individuals to respond to unequal allocation of resources and to ensure they 
themselves avoided such spiteful responses. Punishment might therefore be the result of a 
general aversion to inequality being extend out to interactions between conspecifics 
(Brosnan, 2011), resulting in what appears to be altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 
2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).  
However, the motivation to punish might not be an aversion to inequality per se, but to 
disadvantageous inequality, where we ourselves are worse off, in which case it is properly 
referred to as envy. While I am not suggesting envy to be the same as spite per se, it can 
potentially be a sub-category of it. Certainly the patterns of behaviour associated with envy 
suggest equivalent motivations, i.e. the desire to reduce the fitness of others. For example, in 
public goods games, high earners are the primary targets of punishment regardless of their 
behaviour (Burns & Visser, 2006; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Also, Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 
(2008, 2011), using a third party punishment game, found that punishment occurs even if the 
target made the most egalitarian decision possible. That resource disparity, not the ‘fairness’ 
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of behaviour, is the motivation for punishment was further demonstrated by Pedersen et al. 
(2013), who found that punishment was almost entirely motivated by envy of resources rather 
than actual anger. In fact, even bystanders, individuals who had no say in resources 
distribution, are punished if they are ‘better off’ than the punisher (Leibbrandt & López-
Pérez, 2008).  
Interestingly, it has been suggested  that disadvantageous inequality aversion might explain 
the flat dominance hierarchies of non-state societies (see, Boehm, 1997). As argued by 
Gavrilets (2012), dominant individuals can monopolise resources and behave in a coercive 
manner, and so it is within an individual’s best interest to notice this and spitefully attack 
better off individuals even if the punisher is not affected by the target’s behaviour. Spiteful 
motivation behind inequality aversion  may explain why ‘moral outrage’ is greater when the 
defector is formidable (Jenson & Peterson, 2011) or when the outraged individual is weak 
(Peterson, 2012); those unable to behave in an unfair or unequal way want to prevent others 
from doing so.  
Costly punishment might therefore be grounded in this envious/spiteful sentiment. Indeed, 
while other primates, specifically chimpanzees, do not demonstrate any concern for others 
(Riedl et al., 2012), they do show negative responses to being disadvantaged themselves 
(Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2010). Thus, according to a spiteful 
account of the evolution of punishment, the initial aversion to inequality evolved to recognise 
exploitation in dyadic interactions (Johnstone & Bshary, 2004; Nowak et al., 2000) and as 
human social and coalitional psychology became more complex (Gavrilets, 2012; Gavrilets et 
al., 2008), spiteful punishment evolved as a more complex social tool to ensure others could 
not become too powerful. Indeed, as shown by Van De Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2010), 
the fear of being envied alone can promote generous behaviour by better-off individuals. That 
such targeted envious punishment, or the threat thereof, results in a reduced disparity in 
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resources between individuals that benefits the group as a whole (see Frank, 2003) is entirely 
accidental. 
It should be noted that a great deal of spiteful punishment occurs even when the punisher is in 
an advantageous position (Falk et al., 2005; Fehr, 2004), and this is contrary to the idea that 
punishment is motivated by envy. However, this may partly be due to methodological 
difference in the different studies described. The studies that specifically demonstrate that 
punishment is motivated by envy make use of third party punishment games (for example, 
Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008, 2011; Pedersen et al., 2013), where the punisher is an 
disinterested observer to the allocation of resources, and the simple mechanism (observing a 
split of resources) makes calculating any disadvantage easy. Studies that show general anti-
social/spiteful behaviour are public goods games (as mentioned in 1.1.1, the majority of 
public goods game show spiteful behaviour) where any calculation is more complex. This 
complexity (coupled with a time-limit in most experiments) may explain why in the latter 
games individuals often appear to altruistically target free-riders. Public goods games 
generate a cooperative dilemmas due to the benefit of free-riding, thus even if identifying 
individuals who actually are better off than us might not be possible because, for example, 
there is a lack of full information (for example, Kamei & Putterman, 2012), it is possible that 
free-riders probably are better off. Indeed, as shown by Masclet and Villeval (2008), 
participants punishment of free-riders increases positively with the deviation of the target’s 
contribution from their own. Envy suggests we punish ‘successful’ individuals rather than 
‘unfair’ individuals; it is simply that, in public goods dilemmas, the two positively correlate. 
Ultimatum-like games might show an inequality aversion because a balance must be reached 
in terms of the best mutual outcome when the receiver will behave spitefully (Rand et al., 
2013), while  punishment provides an individual with the opportunity to harm another at little 
cost to themselves. Thus costly punishment may be a useful general tool to maximise the 
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difference between oneself and other group members; the effect is just greater if one starts 
with those who have behaved unfairly or free-rode and are therefore the greatest distance 
away from the actor. Accordingly, ‘envious’ costly punishment can be considered a strategic 
application of a spiteful motivation, or, as noted by Jensen, “Causing harm for harm’s sake is 
a spiteful motivation, and it can be underpinned by a comparison of oneself to others“ (2010, 
p. 2643). This explains why most individuals punish when it is effective, as reducing 
disadvantageous inequality is easier, but also why some also punish when redressing unequal 
resource distribution is impossible (Dawes et al., 2007; Egas & Riedl, 2008). 
Therefore, for a spiteful explanation for costly punishment, it does not matter whether the 
patterns of punishment show a specific sensitivity to disadvantageous inequality or just the 
desire to burn the resources of other (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Either motivation would 
explain why punishment still takes place when there is no direct chance of a reputation being 
formed (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) or where there is no possibility of altering the behaviour of 
social defectors (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010). The primary aim of spiteful punishment is to 
lower the resources of the target rather than to compel them to cooperate. Spite does not 
require the target to do anything but suffer. 
1.2.4 Strong Reciprocity 
The theories presented above as to how costly punishment could be evolutionarily stable have 
relied upon one core assumption, that the punisher survives both the initial defection and the 
confrontation with the defector. This need not be the case. The risk from retaliation will be 
discussed later (2.1); here we turn to the possibility that the defection could result in the 
destruction of the group itself.  
Intergroup conflict is as much as part of non-state human societies as it is of the modern 
world (Chagnon, 1988; Keeley, 1996; Stanish & Levine, 2011) and likely played a major role 
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in our evolution (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Lehmann & Feldman, 
2008). Indeed, Manson et al. (1991) have shown that Chimpanzees not only show territorial 
defence, but engage in behaviours such as raids into rival group’s territory that have been 
likened to human warfare (see also, Mitani et al., 2010; Wilson & Wrangham, 2003). Such 
behaviour therefore clearly has a long evolutionary history. Importantly, human intergroup 
conflicts can escalate into genocidal conflicts (Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Keeley, 1996). 
Thus, defecting from the public good, and especially from tasks such as territorial defence, 
can have lethal consequences for the group as a whole. Furthermore, even without a direct 
threat from a neighbouring group, extinction could result from famine or environmental 
disasters caused by failure to contribute to the public good (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 
2002) or overexploitation of common resources (Hardin, 1968).  
Therefore, instead of trying to explain the evolution of costly punishment from the point of 
view of the individual, we might concentrate on how punishment affects group-level survival. 
This group-selectionist explanation, Strong Reciprocity (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 
2003; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, 2000), states that individuals are willing to sacrifice their own 
resources to reward co-operators and those who behave fairly, and to punish those who defect 
from the public good or behave unfairly, without any regard for the costs to themselves. 
Theoretical models have shown that groups with altruistic punishers, the term used correctly 
in the sense that no individual benefit or cost is considered, outcompete other groups either in 
direct conflict or when extinction rate is high due to natural disasters or famine (Boyd et al., 
2003; Denga, Gintis, & Chua, 2011). While disadvantageous for the individual, punishment 
can drastically increase cooperation within groups, and the resulting increase in group-
efficiency allows groups with punishers to succeed in conflicts against, or otherwise 
outcompete, groups without them (Abbink et al., 2010; Sääksvuori, Mappes, & Puurtinen, 
2011).   
Literature review 
50 
 
Nevertheless, when punishment is possible a great deal of resources are destroyed by the 
actions of the punishers, and this has led some to conclude that punishment does not in fact 
help groups compete, or at least that the differences between punishing and non-punishing 
groups are negligible (Dreber et al., 2008; Ohtsuki, Iwasa, & Nowak, 2009; Sääksvuori et al., 
2011). However, as shown by Fehr et al. (2002), when interactions occur repeatedly over 
time with the same individual, which likely represents the social environment of our 
evolutionary past, then groups with punishers become far more efficient.  Masclet and 
Villeval (2008) and Gächter, Renner, and Sefton (2008) found this to be especially true when 
groups competed against one another, but it is also the case when the risks of inter-group 
conflict or natural disaster are low (Bowles & Gintis, 2004). Mappes and Puurtinen (2009) 
found that even without punishment being possible, groups are still more cooperative when 
faced with inter-group conflict. In fact, models with similar restrictions have suggested that 
such conflicts have resulted in ‘parochial altruism’, whereby individuals should behave 
altruistically towards in-group members and aggressively towards an out-group in order to 
with conflicts with the latter (Choi & Bowles, 2007; García & van den Bergh, 2010). This 
can be considered part of Strong Reciprocity insomuch as selection pressure favoured groups 
whose members where unconditionally altruistic towards one another, which, according to  
Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014), potentially includes behaviour such as punishing free-riders.  
Essentially, Strong Reciprocity posits that random mutations gave rise to strongly 
reciprocating individuals. Different groups have a random number of strong reciprocators, 
and if there were a sufficient number of such individuals in a group (Carpenter, Bowles, 
Gintis, & Hwang, 2009), then cooperation can be enforced because strong reciprocators 
reward cooperative individuals (Bowles & Gintis, 2004) or punish defectors (Boyd et al., 
2010) altruistically. Because such groups are successful at avoiding extinction, either due to 
natural events or through inter-group conflicts, the genes for strong reciprocity are 
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maintained in the population even though the behaviour they engender has a negative impact 
on the individual. Through this group-level selection, humans show a fundamental ‘other 
regarding preference’ (Camerer & Fehr, 2006) for the welfare of others and are willing to 
punish acts of social defection and unfairness while ignoring the proximate costs and benefits 
of costly punishment. 
However, as supporters of the theory say, “Strong Reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an 
adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation” (Fehr et al., 2002, 
p. 1). This is a bold claim to make, and not surprisingly a number of researchers have 
questioned this Strong Reciprocity theory. One objection from West et al. (2007) is that the 
punisher does gain directly from punishment as, at a population level, even if a punisher is 
losing out relative to their local group, relative to a global population of non-punishers their 
group’s success still gives punishers a greater fitness. Additionally, the costs of punishment 
could be recovered if it ensures the defector behaves cooperatively in a group containing a 
number of the punisher’s relatives (Lehmann & Keller, 2006). Furthermore, an alternative 
model of intergroup conflict by Lehmann and Feldman (2008) suggested that group-
enhancing behaviour can evolve individually if the actors gain something from the activity, 
for example by requisitioning additional mates through raiding. Finally, according to 
Baumard and Liénard (2011), the apparently altruistic punishment in non-state societies (see 
Mathew & Boyd, 2011) may in fact occur because free-riding in this instance hurts the 
punisher personally, so that punishment can be considered as revenge. These criticisms 
cannot be levelled at, for example, Spite, because there the theory provides its own 
mechanism for costs to be recovered, whereas the key theoretical point to Strong Reciprocity 
is that human cooperation and punishment evolved as group-level behaviour and individual 
actions should not be beneficial to their actor. 
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Nevertheless, given the prevalence of inter-group conflict in our evolutionary history (and 
present), it is plausible that behaviours and emotions that specifically enhance group-
cohesion evolved. Shame, for example, is a very useful (Barr, 2001) and potentially cost-free 
(Bazzan & Dahmen, 2010) method of punishment. However, Jaffe (2008) suggested that 
shame could evolve at an individual-level if it initially evolved to avoid or mitigate 
punishment and antagonism, perhaps as an extension of primate submission and 
reconciliation gestures (see Cheney, 2011; Silk & House, 2011). More importantly, Gavrilets 
et al. (2008) demonstrated that competition between individuals in forming alliances could 
give rise to group-beneficial behaviour. Because larger coalitions win conflicts, it is in their 
members’ best interest to behave fairly and police unfair behaviour, lest the coalition disband. 
A number of recent models have, for example, shown that the ability to withdraw from 
cooperation reduces unfairness (the 'loner' strategy, García & Traulsen, 2012; Sigmund, 
2007) and Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, and De Cremer (2004) experimentally found that 
participants would abandon groups containing anti-social individuals. The result of the 
process described by Gavrilets et al. (2008) is a coalition that encompasses a whole group. 
Thus, in principle, apparently group-efficiency enhancing behaviours are the result of 
individuals making selfish decisions, and there is no need for an idiosyncratic human-only 
selection mechanism. 
Finally, Strong Reciprocity makes a very specific statement about the cost of punishment; 
“[it] is a willingness to sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair 
behaviour even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future material rewards for 
the reciprocator” (Fehr et al., 2002, p. 3). It would be more convenient to say that the costs 
should not matter. However, as detailed in 1.1, individuals are very sensitive to both the cost 
of punishment and its potential benefits, either due to the potential for indirect reciprocity 
(Kurzban et al., 2007) or extra resources from group success (Abbink et al., 2010; Sääksvuori 
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et al., 2011). On a proximate behavioural level, the incredible flexibility humans show in 
punishment and cooperative behaviour as single individuals (Kurzban & Houser, 2005; 
Sigmund, 2007), in response to specific local factors (Lamba & Mace, 2011, 2013) and cross-
culturally in general (Gächter et al., 2005; Herrmann & Gächter, 2009; Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Iris, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2009), is problematic for Strong Reciprocity. This is also 
problematic for Spite as theory as, as will be discussed in 2.1, there are many situations 
whereby individuals a) do not obey fairness norms, but b) this unfairness is accepted. 
However, Strong Reciprocity does consider an important point about human behaviour 
ignored by other theories: that, like our primate forbears, our survival is tied up in the 
survival of our fellow group members. The web of associations and alliances an individual 
forms with others affects our lives and behaviour (for an introduction, see Christakis & 
Fowler, 2010),  whether that individual is a Western primary school child (Gest, Graham‐
Bermann, & Hartup, 2002; Sapouna et al., 2011) or an indigenous herder in the Andean 
mountains (Lyle & Smith, 2014). Indeed, one of the most widely accepted theories as to the 
origins of our species’ exceptional cognitive abilities is the need to navigate and manipulate 
the social environment (Byrne & Whiten, 1997; Dunbar, 1998). Given the importance of 
intra-group coalitions, as well as inter-group conflict, in our evolution (Cummins, 2005; 
Guala, 2012; Pietraszewski et al., 2014), it would not be surprising if a number of behaviours 
and emotions had co-evolved to benefit coalition members, including shame (Jaffe, 2008), 
generosity (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Silk & House, 2011) and morality (Brosnan, 2011; Flack 
& De Waal, 2000; Silk & House, 2011; Trivers, 1971), as well as the use of costly 
punishment driven, perhaps, by a concern for others being treated unfairly. In his appraisal of 
the economic approach to behaviour, Guala (2012) acknowledged that such preferences can 
be demonstrated experimentally, and experiments are most effective when teasing out such 
preferences and biases. Certainly costly punishment, with its associated costs, does often 
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seem like a group-beneficial behaviour, even if the mechanism that ultimately produced it 
was not group-level selection (West et al., 2007). 
1.3 Summary of current theories 
At the end of 1.1, it was stated that any theory claiming to explain the evolution of costly 
punishment must account for the proximate costs of punishment behaviour itself, how there 
may be heterogeneity in these costs, and provide an ultimate explanation as to why humans 
would have evolved the dislike of anti-social behaviour from which punishment results. The 
three core theories discussed above, Costly Signalling, Spite, and Strong Reciprocity all 
cover different aspects of punishment, but fail, in my opinion, to sufficiently explain the 
behaviour.  
Costly Signalling provides a good account of the proximate costs behind costly punishment, 
as the costs are needed in order to make punishment an honest signal. As a result, it can 
explain some of the variation seen in punishment behaviour, for example why (in lab 
experiments) many will punish if it is cheap and especially why punishment is sensitive to an 
audience and future association. Also Costly Signalling as a general theory can account for 
heterogeneity in punishment behaviour when/if it occurs outside of the laboratory: those who 
cannot afford the signal do not engage in the behaviour. However, current punishment 
research based on Costly Signalling does not explain what actual proximate biological or 
social state could allow an individual to signal effectively: only a physically fit individual 
could free-climb a sky-scraper, only a wealthy individual could own a yacht, but what allows 
an individual to costly punish, or rather, what prevents everyone from doing so? Finally, 
while the indirect benefits from signalling might allow punishment to be evolutionarily stable 
(Gintis et al., 2001), as stated by Barclay (2006) signalling theory does not offer an ultimate 
explanation as to why observers should find the punishers of anti-social conspecifics so 
appealing.         
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Spite provides an interesting, if bleak, theoretical account for the evolution of inequality 
aversion based in the long-term selfish benefits of inflicting immediately severe punishment 
and thereby lowering the fitness of others in response to being treated unfairly. On this 
account, costly punishment is a method to reduce the difference in resources between the 
actor and the target, it just so happens that ‘unfair’ individuals often have more than others. 
With such a motive, spiteful impulses could certainly explain, for example, the willingness to 
punish in anonymous and unstable conditions (see, Fehr & Gächter, 2000). The proximate 
costs of punishment are the price to pay for ‘levelling the playing field’ and are recovered in 
the long-term through this levelling. However, while Spite may be a good explanation for 
why we have the impulse to punish, it cannot necessarily account for when punishment does 
not occur. For example, unlike Costly Signalling, Spite does not provide a theoretical 
explanation as to why we might find variation in punishment behaviour between individuals, 
i.e. heterogeneity in cost (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011). For a specific example, if we all 
punished spitefully, there would be no second-order free-rider problem.  
Finally, Strong Reciprocity provides an alternative theoretical account of the evolution of 
punishment and its associated emotions, in the form of group-level selection pressure acting 
to encourage pro-social behaviours. While Strong Reciprocity has been the dominant theory 
since the early 2000s (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000), as mentioned in 1.2.4 it has 
recently faced some serious challenges to its validity. Moreover, the theory is based in the 
fundamental principle that individuals should be insensitive to the immediate costs and 
benefits of punishment, but a great deal of experimental evidence suggests punishment is 
very sensitive to these factors. Nevertheless, as discussed in 1.2.4, Strong Reciprocity is the 
only theory that recognises the effect punishment has on group-level behaviour, and that 
group-dynamics and competition might play a role in more direct benefits from engaging in 
punishment behaviour. 
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All the theories above offer possible explanations for the evolution of costly punishment. 
However, in my opinion, all fail to sufficiently address the three main areas that need to be 
covered in order for an explanation to be valid; how the costs of punishment can be 
recovered, how there can be heterogeneity in the cost of punishment, and why humans show 
a unique sensitivity to unfair or anti-social behaviour in our social environment. This thesis 
aims to put forward an alternative theory that could potentially explain the evolution of costly 
punishment. As will be described in the next chapter, and tested in the empirical chapters, I 
propose that dominance is the key factor in the proximate cost of punishment, and that the 
behaviour itself has an evolutionary origin in dominance and status contests and social 
reasoning
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2 Chapter 2: an alternative theory – Dominance 
 
In Chapter 1, I summarised the major current theories for the evolution of costly punishment. 
This thesis offers an alternative explanation. I suggest that dominance, or rather the fact that 
humans live in societies in which dominance relationships play a significant role, is a key and 
thus far overlooked factor that can explain the proximate occurrence and the ultimate 
evolution of costly punishment. A number of theories (Machiavellian Intelligence, Byrne & 
Whiten, 1997; Dominance Theory, Cummins, 1996a; Cummins, 2005; Social Brain 
Hypothesis, Dunbar, 1998) suggest that the need to outwit conspecifics or otherwise navigate 
the social environment was one of the key driving forces behind the evolution of the human 
mind. This section will detail how dominance, or more specifically the social cognition 
required to navigate human social dominance hierarchies, provides a compelling explanation 
as to how our concepts of fairness and inequality evolved, and why they produce the 
emotions that lead to punishment. Furthermore, on a more proximate level, the characteristics 
of a dominant social position encompass many, if not all, of the factors that have been 
experimentally shown to encourage punishment. As a result the characteristics of a dominant 
position might allow individuals to mitigate the costs that prevent the evolution of 
punishment behaviour. Finally, by grounding costly punishment in dominance we can 
potentially establish a phylogenetic link to the behaviour of non-human animals, as without 
such a link it is not possible to produce a valid evolutionary explanation for the presence of 
costly punishment in humans (Pedersen et al., 2013).  
The suggestion that costly punishment might be an overtly coercive act related to dominance 
and to dominance hierarchies is not wholly original; it is offered as a possibility by, for 
example  Dreber et al. (2008, p. 350) and Rand et al. (2010, p. 630). However, as the page 
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numbers imply, such comments have been asides at the end of articles and have not, in my 
knowledge, been followed up or extrapolated upon. To the best of my knowledge, the 
discussion below is the first attempt to formally explain the evolution of costly punishment 
through dominance and status contests. 
2.1 Defining dominance 
First, it is important to define what is exactly meant by dominance and a dominant individual, 
as the concept has proven difficult to define. Dominance can be used as a relative measure to 
express the consistent outcome of antagonistic encounters between two individuals (Hand, 
1986) or as a more general description of a individuals who is at the top of a dominance 
hierarchy (“dominance is a trait that conveys rank", Drews, 1993, p. 297). Still, in an attempt 
to produce a definition of dominance, Drews (1993) maintained the focus on relative 
interactions “Dominance is an attribute of the pattern of repeated, agonistic interactions 
between two individuals, characterized by a consistent outcome in favour of the same dyad 
member and a default yielding response of its opponent rather than escalation” (p. 308). 
However, it has been argued recently by Hawley (2014) that such a definition is too 
concerned with the form of behaviour that characterise a dominant individual, specifically in 
terms of aggressive interactions, as opposed to the purpose of such behaviour, to exert control 
over resources (Hawley, 1999; Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976) in order to increase 
reproductive fitness (Ellis, 1995). Therefore a much more functional description has also 
been proposed, with a dominant instead defined as an individual who has “priority of access 
to resources, especially reproductive resources” (Cummins, 1996a, p. 467), or an individual 
who has “preferential access to any requisite that adds to the genetic fitness of the dominant 
individual” (Wilson, 1980, p. 129). Importantly, this definition not only implies that the rank 
of an individual is evident by their access to resources, but also what the motivation for this 
high rank, for being dominant, is. 
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The advantage of this functional definition of dominance is that it allows a greater variety of 
ways that dominance can be achieved, which is important when considering humans as “the 
greater the size of the brain, and the more flexible the behaviour, the more numerous are the 
determinants of rank [dominance] and the more nearly equal they are in influence” (Wilson, 
1980, p. 143). Nevertheless, in human and non-human animals dominance has been seen in 
the light of overt acts of, or threat of, aggression (Cummins, 2005), both to gain position 
(Griskevicius et al., 2009) and to maintain it (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Sell, Lovaglia, 
Mannix, Samuelson, & Wilson, 2004; Silk, 2003). Group living non-human primates do 
recognise non-physical aspects of a individuals social position, for example family relations 
(for example, in  Baboons, Bergman, Beehner, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 2003; and vervets, 
Cheney, 2011) and known allies (Chimpanzees, De Waal, 1982/2007), but such examples can 
be seen as derived dominance (Chapais, 1992), whereby it is the threat of aggression from an 
individual’s associates that allows an individual to access resources. The same is also true in 
humans. Hobbes (1651/1996) posited that human societies and social interactions are 
governed by hidden threats of force, be it from the local police or a vengeful Deity (McKay, 
Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2010). A good specific example was given by Dunbar, Clark, 
and Hurst (1995) and their study of Viking Berserkers, warriors considered terrifyingly fierce 
even by Viking standards: should a family that contained a berserker aggrieve another family, 
the latter were far less likely to retaliate for fear of the berserker.  
Recently however, it has been suggested that humans have unique way to gain social status, 
namely prestige (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). These papers refer to prestige and dominance, but what they call dominance is 
referred to here as ‘formidability’, as they use dominance as a term for purely physical 
domination and coercion, whereas in this thesis dominance is used to represent sustained 
preferential access to resources, however this is achieved. While formidable individuals rely 
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on fear, intimidation and coercion to achieve their differential access to resources, prestigious 
individuals are seen as useful, with conspecifics offering or yielding resources to them in 
recognition of their knowledge and expertise. Individuals give prestigious conspecifics 
resources because they actively want to, as opposed to having to. As argued by  Henrich and 
Gil-White (2001), the relationship between the prestigious individual and the subordinate is a 
much more reflexive, with the prestigious individuals having to offer something in return, 
such as tutelage.  
This does raise some interesting questions for the definition of dominance, as a dominant 
position reached via prestige is achieved by a very different mechanism than formidability. 
Equally, prestige might be very domain specific, whereas a dominate-formidable individual 
may be recognised a wide variety of environments. For example, Sell, Cosmides, et al. (2009) 
found the recognition of physical strength to be fast, accurate and cost-cultural, whereas 
recognition of an individual’s prestige would depend on a certain level of cultural knowledge; 
although while one might not recognise why an individual should be differed to, it is likely 
even a naive visitor would recognise that an individual is being deferred to (Cummins, 
1996a).   
However, as stated by Henrich & Gil-White themselves, their analysis relates to the process 
by which the recognition of expertise may have evolved as a unique trait in humans, rather 
than its application to specific individuals as such. It is likely that for the majority of human 
history formidability and expertise were strongly related, for example a skilled hunter is also 
a formidable opponent. Direct comparisons of prestigious and formidable individuals by 
Cheng et al. (2013) showed that both systems are part of human dominance and rank 
recognition and seem to work in parallel to one another (see also, Hawley, 2014). 
Furthermore, the same ‘dominant and submissive’ gestures and behaviours occur when 
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interacting with someone who is formidable or of higher status (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 
2010; Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013; Gregory & Webster, 1996). 
In fact, keeping dominance as an umbrella term for prestige and formidability makes it very 
similar to more social psychological terms such as leverage and power (Lewis, 2002) as these 
concepts includes formidability, expertise, and current market value and bargaining power. 
Leverage, for example, recognises that at any given moment an individual might have a 
higher market value than others; a formidable individual might seem very worthy of ‘freely 
offered deference’ when an enemy is spotted on the horizon and a prestigious individual can 
use their position to make direct threats against those who are less prestigious, for example a 
threat of preventing career advancement. Furthermore, leverage results in power (Lewis, 
2002), whereby powerful individuals (and groups, Sell et al., 2004) have the freedom of 
action to act in their own interests (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Specifically, 
power gives an individual the “capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding 
resources or administering punishments. This capacity is the product of the actual resources 
and punishments the individual can deliver to others” (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003, p. 265). This definition acknowledges both the usefulness and threat that an individual 
might pose, and more so than leverage, recombines the distinctions made  by Henrich and 
Gil-White (2001) and others between the ‘ways to the top’ of the human social system.  
However, like other terms such as  ‘social dominance’ (Sidanius & Pratto, 2004), the term 
power  has certain sociological connotations (Lewis, 2002; Sell et al., 2004), the discussion of 
which is not relevant to the topic in hand. Equally, in terms of the nomenclature, while power 
can be used interchangeably with dominance in the social psychological literature, it is not 
commonly used this way in the biological or evolutionary literature (Cheng et al., 2013, 
Table 1). Also dominance is the term most often applied to non-human animal social 
behaviour, and as such its use stresses the core hypothesis of this thesis that costly 
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punishment is an evolved behaviour with an origin in dominance-based conflicts and social 
reasoning.  
While one should be hesitant to offer a new definition of a much-used concept, combining the 
two definitions above, so to cover the range of ways in which the concept is currently used, 
seems apt. The concept of ‘Dominance’ in this thesis is therefore defined as the recognition 
that “an individual has sustained priority of access to resources, especially reproductive 
resources, due to their capacity to modify others’ states by providing or withholding 
resources or administering punishments”. This recognises that the ultimate reason organisms 
strive for dominance is to acquire fitness enhancing resources (Cummins, 1996a, 2005), that 
dominant individuals have the capacity to influence the behaviour of others  (Keltner et al., 
2003), and that they can do so by through both coercive and cooperative means (Hawley, 
1999; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008). By accounting for 
these attributes, the definition also acts a description of position (rank). Perhaps most 
importantly for a thesis on costly punishment, this definition captures the idea that dominant 
individuals have many mechanisms at their disposal with which to inflict costs on others. 
2.2 Why dominance? 
In any social hierarchy, dominant individuals have a priority of access to resources, and it has 
been argued that dominance hierarchies therefore represent a set of basic implicit social 
norms surrounding this access (Cummins, 1996a, 2005). Dominance theory  suggests that the 
need to maintain these norms placed strong section pressure on social cognition to recognise 
ones place in a social hierarchy, to recognise when these rules are violated and, potentially, to 
punish others when violations occur. Indeed, one of the most accepted theories as to our 
species’ cognitive abilities attributes is the need to navigate and manipulate the social 
environment (Byrne & Whiten, 1997; Dunbar, 1998), and primates devote a great deal of 
time and energy to deceiving dominant individuals in regards to activities such as feeding and 
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mating (Le Roux, Snyder-Mackler, Roberts, Beehner, & Bergman, 2013; Whiten & Byrne, 
1988). Specifically, this view posits that when perceiving a social situation, decisions should 
be made taking into account social ranks of those involved and the potential ramifications of 
making a grab for resources and/or social position.  
At this point, the difference between dominance and dominance hierarchies should be noted, 
as dominance relationships between individuals, the ability of one to access resources or 
drive away an intruder without escalation, can occur without there being a strict dominance 
hierarchy, i.e. consistent and sustained, and possibly linear, rank differences between 
members within a group (Wilson, 1980, Chapter 13). Indeed primates are perhaps unique in 
the complexity of the rank-based interactions and affiliations the display (for a review, see 
Schino, 2001). However, the idea that it is in an individual’s best interest to recognise the 
dominance relationships between them and a competitor (Cummins, 1996a) is valid 
regardless of whether these relationships can be integrated into a hierarchy encompassing the 
entire social group. The same is true of the advantages of being dominant, i.e resource access. 
Thus, although dominance is often used as a shorthand for dominance ranks within a 
hierarchy  (for example, Sapolsky, 2005), a dominance analysis does not depend on the 
existence of such a hierarchy. In what follows however, I assume that dominance has a least 
some group-wide meaning, i.e. that all members of a social group would recognise certain 
individuals within it as dominant.  
There is a great deal of evidence that reasoning about dominance and status affects our daily 
lives, or to state it another way “dominance is so intrinsic to human social relationships that 
we don't even notice it” (Maestripieri, 2012, p. 8).  In everyday life we adjust our behaviour 
in response to dominance and status, for example, by adopting the mannerisms and speech 
patterns of higher status individuals (Gregory & Webster, 1996), and submissive gestures are 
made when facing a conspecific who is either more formidable or more prestigious (Ketelaar 
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et al., 2012).  In fact, Gambacorta and Ketelaar (2013) found that when faced with (a picture 
of) a formidable male competitor, participants would engage in far less creative display. The 
opinions of dominant individuals hold more weight (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), and those 
wearing badges of status (e.g. expensive clothes) have their requests complied with more 
readily than subordinate individuals and are also treated more generously (Nelissen & 
Meijers, 2011). Such accommodating behaviour towards dominant individuals includes 
treating them far more leniently when they violate cooperation norms or outright commit 
crimes (Eckel, Fatas, & Wilson, 2010; Petersen et al., 2012; Walker, 2013).  
Conversely, a dominant position also alters how individuals behave. The sense of holding a 
dominant position, due to the presence of allies (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013) or priming 
(Watkins & Jones, 2012), lowers the perception of threat in the local environment, which in 
itself  may explain why dominance is associated with norm violations (Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). Perhaps more importantly, as would be expected if our 
social reasoning is concerned with dominance and status, a dominant position alters the 
perception of fairness. Dominant individuals feel entitled to more resources (Sell, Tooby, et 
al., 2009) and, as shown by Pratto, Tatar, and Conway‐Lanz (1999), are likely to favour 
resource distribution based on ‘merit’ as opposed to equality. Practically, this results in, for 
example, greater rejection of lower offers in the ultimatum game by dominant individuals 
(Burnham, 2007) and more self-serving behaviour by such individuals (Maner & Mead, 
2010; Piff et al., 2012).  More generally, Nikiforakis et al. (2012) suggested that individuals 
select norms of fairness and cooperation in a self-serving manner, i.e. we can switch our 
behaviour depending on the local situation, including when we rise and fall in dominance. 
While not a definitive list, the above does demonstrate how even subtle cues of dominance 
and status affect our everyday behaviour and, more importantly, perceptions of how we 
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should behave towards others. This obviously includes when and why we should engage in 
costly punishment of anti-social individuals. 
2.2.1 Dominance and punishment in non-humans 
Punishment, if not always an aggressive act, is certainly a confrontational one. While the 
majority of experimental work on punishment has used economic methods where punishment 
is somewhat abstract, outside the laboratory at some point punishment must involve one 
individual imposing, or threatening to impose, material or social costs on a defector or social-
norm violator (see, for example, Levine et al., 2011). As stated by Pedersen et al. (2013) “A 
link must be established between human [punishment] and non-human animal behaviour” (p. 
7), and across taxa confrontational and/or antagonistic behaviour is strongly associated with 
dominance. This in itself strongly suggested that the impulse to punish originated in 
dominance and status contests. Thus the following section will detail how dominance is 
associated with aggressive behaviour and how the rule that govern the relationships between 
dominants and subordinates might have resulted in an aversion to inequality that has led to 
the evolution of costly punishment in humans. 
Firstly, aggression is used to maintain a dominant position and to ensure that the dominant 
individual has priority of access to resources. In an influential paper  Silk (2003) argued that 
dominant individuals should “Practice random acts of aggression and senseless acts of 
intimidation”, as doing so continually reinforces their position; by engaging in low level 
aggression, they reinforce a credible threat of more extreme punishment (Cant & Johnstone, 
2009). Indeed, while such behaviour could be seen as spiteful (West et al., 2007), it is 
advantageous for dominant individuals to remind subordinates of their relative social ranks to 
ensure later conflicts do not escalate. 
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However, this does not mean that a subordinate individual should simply accept their fate, as 
there are of course negative outcomes for being the first to back down in a conflict; one has to 
sacrifice resources to a more dominant individual or rank to a successful challenger. Thus 
dominance in humans and non-human animals is also strongly associated with functional 
punishment (also referred to as second-party punishment), the response to antagonism from 
others, as failing to respond to aggression results in the loss of status and an increased 
likelihood of future acts of antagonism. As models of animal contests by Maynard-Smith and 
Price (1973) demonstrated, one should always retaliate if possible. For example, after losing a 
conflict, many primate species have been shown to engage in redirected aggression (for 
example vervet monkeys, Cheney & Seyfarth, 1989; and for a general overview, see Kazem 
& Aureli, 2005), whereby the losing individual will attack either an individual subordinate to 
them, or relatives/allies of the victorious conspecific, with the aim of demonstrating they are, 
as it were, ‘down but not out’. There are clear parallels with human society; in hunter-gather 
societies, raids are often launched on neighbours with the expressed purposes of revenge and 
deterrence (Chagnon, 1988; Keeley, 1996; Mathew & Boyd, 2011), and the same motivation 
lies behind many instances of inner-city gang warfare (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). 
More individually, Kim et al. (1998) found that, when faced with an antagonistic conspecific, 
participants were more likely to take revenge when the former was subordinate, but less 
likely when the conspecific was dominant, and Felson (1982) found that insults and 
challenges, in both males and females, were responded to more aggressively when there was 
an audience.  
So far we have discussed dominance in terms of direct aggressive encounters. However, such 
encounters only occur to ensure one has preferential access to resources, so similar results 
should apply to the direct and ‘fair’ distribution of resources. This does seems to be the case: 
human participants react very negatively when receiving ‘unfair’ offers from humans, but not 
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from a computer (Van’t Wout et al., 2006) and low pay can be interpreted as ‘insulting’ 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000b). Interestingly, both Brosnan et al. (2010) and Riedl et al. 
(2012) found that while chimpanzees generally do not reject unequal offers as long as the 
receiving individuals get something, dominant individuals, particularly males, would accept 
equal offers but reject low ones, as do dominant humans in similar experiments (Burnham, 
2007). Dominance at its core concerns access to resources and therefore any unequal split can 
be considered a challenge to dominance. Thus, it is in a group-living individual’s interest to 
respond to both direct aggression and other acts of unfairness (because random attacks in the 
form suggested by Silk, 2003, are pretty 'unfair'), lest they appear subordinate. This includes 
accepting unfair offers, as accepting a ‘subordinate’ share will lead to future unfairness from 
others (Nowak et al., 2000; Rand et al., 2013).  
A dominance approach therefore produces a similar explanation for the evolution of an 
inequality aversion as spite (1.2.1.2), in that, all things being equal, one should always stand 
one’s ground; certainly in principle the evolutionary pressure to develop a comprehension of 
‘fairness’ is the same. However, things are not always equal; if they were, then dominance 
and status would not result in such consistent differences in resources and reproduction (Ellis, 
1994, 1995). Attempting to assert oneself against a stronger opponent or coalition would 
simply result in injury or death (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973). As is the case with many 
animals, challenging a stronger opponent is unlikely to occur when there have been previous 
encounters or when the dominance hierarchy of a group is well understood (Johnstone & 
Bshary, 2004; Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976), which is especially true for  human and non-
human primates (Cheney, 2011; Cummins, 1996a). As mentioned previously, human 
participants will back down when faced with a stronger challenger (Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 
2013), acquiesce to their demands (Nelissen & Meijers, 2011)  or otherwise not respond to 
unfair behaviour (Eckel et al., 2010; Kim et al., 1998). Such behaviour is consistent with the 
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reasoning of dominance; i.e. recognising what one can or cannot do and deciding whether it 
is worth the risk, or conversely, recognising what dominance ‘entitles’ one to (Cummins, 
1996a).  
Thus, in terms of dyadic interactions, a dominance perspective on disadvantageous inequality 
aversion suggests why ultimately it is important to recognise one is being treated unfairly or 
unequally, as such behaviours indicate rank (Brosnan, 2006). Dominance also suggests why, 
proximately, the circumstances under which ‘unfairness’ will be tolerated or responded to. 
Indeed, a dominant position is one in which others accept the dominant individual’s priority 
resource access without question (Drews, 1993). 
Because dominance relationships carry with them implicit norms about resource distribution 
and behaviours (Cummins, 1996a, 2005), it is in a dominant individual’s best interest to 
intervene to ensure these ‘norms’ of resource assess are observed across the group as a whole. 
For example, in many social species only a single dominant pair breed, and this is enforced 
through harassment and eviction by dominant individuals (banded mongooses, Cant et al., 
2010; and for a general overview, see Cant & Johnstone, 2009), and in cleaner fish, larger 
individuals will punish cheating conspecifics (Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010), lest 
continued cheating drive clients away (Bshary & Grutter, 2002). Indeed, in humans, 
dominant individuals are far more sensitive to cheating by subordinates that vice-versa 
(Cummins, 1999; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010). 
As with functional punishment, dominant individuals should act to protect their position 
through the use of costly punishment. Wong, Buston, Munday, and Jones (2007), 
demonstrated that dominant members of coral-reef fish queues (where group members wait 
their turn to inherit a dominant position) punish group members who grow too large with 
eviction before they can become a threat. In a similar vein, among fallow deer Jennings, 
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Carlin, Hayden, and Gammell (2011) found that intervention by dominant individuals in 
fights between two other males effectively prevented either benefitting from a winner effect, 
and reinforced the dominance of the intervener. In their review of 38 primate species, 
Bissonnette, Franz, Schülke, and Ostner (2014) found that one of the main methods of 
achieving a dominant position was to form a revolutionary coalitions and overthrow the 
dominant group member, and there is some evidence that dominant individuals will attempt 
to disrupt affiliative behaviour between conspecifics to prevent the formation of such 
coalitions (Chimpanzees, De Waal, 1982/2007; Barbary macaques, Widdig, Streich, & 
Tembrock, 2000). Interestingly, similar behaviour has been observed in humans; Maner and 
Mead (2010) found that when faced with a talented subordinate in an experimental game, 
dominant individuals attempted to exclude these subordinates from group tasks by 
withholding key information and preventing communication. The need to watch for future 
social competitors may also explain why the formidability of a defector raises the anger at 
their actions (Jenson & Peterson, 2011), and why we are more sensitive to subordinate 
cheaters  (Cummins, 1999; Lammers et al., 2010), as cheating may suggest subordinates are 
no longer accepting their position. The examples above show that dominants in both humans 
and non-humans will engage in forms of punishment entirely for self-motivated reasons 
linked to maintaining a dominant position. 
2.2.2 Dominance, inequality aversion and costly punishment 
The previous section argued that aggression and intervention by dominant individuals to 
protect their priority access to resources occurs across taxa, even in species that are not 
considered particularly cognitively sophisticated. Simply put, punishment is the prerogative 
of dominant individuals (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995). However, due to the social 
complexity of human (and some other primate) societies, the reasoning about dominance and 
behaviour take on a more nuanced role when multiple levels of interaction become important. 
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For example, A recognises that B’s behaviour towards C is unfair, and A cares because it 
suggests that B has risen in rank and that D, A’s ally, might face a similar challenge in the 
near future. This is especially important when the role of coalitions is taken into account, and 
non-human primates do show transitive reasoning in regards to kin and alliances (for a 
review, see Cummins, 1996a), and will respond when coalition members signal they are 
under attack (Cheney, 2011). Corvids also show transitive reasoning ability (Emery & 
Clayton, 2004) and have also been shown to aid ‘friends’ under attack (Fraser & Bugnyar, 
2011), and the evolution of such behaviours in primates and corvids has been linked directly 
to social complexity (Fraser & Bugnyar, 2011). Nevertheless, the level of social reasoning 
suggested by the example above might be developed only in humans (Brosnan, 2011; see 
also, Melis & Semmann, 2010).  
Given the role of coalitions in human evolution (Gavrilets et al., 2008; Pietraszewski et al., 
2014), it would be in the interest of dominant individuals to recognise when their allies were 
being treated unfairly by others (for chimpanzee examples, see  De Waal, 1982/2007). By 
punishing unfairness a dominant individual might firstly protect their social ally, or rather 
social investment, who may have been chosen in the first place for their rank (i.e. their 
market value, Barclay, 2013; Barrett & Henzi, 2006). The positive social regard towards 
punishers found by Barclay (2006), Farthing (2005) and Fessler and Haley (2003) may also  
make it easier to recruit social allies to their cause. Thus, an other-regarding preferences 
(Camerer & Fehr, 2006) might have evolved to selfishly maintain a coalition (Gavrilets et al., 
2008). 
Furthermore, the need to recruit and placate coalition members might result in pressure for 
dominants to behave in a positive and generous manner. For example, it should remembered 
that dominant individuals can behave altruistically and cooperatively (Barclay & Willer, 
2007; Hawley et al., 2008; Massen, van den Berg, Spruijt, & Sterck, 2010; Roberts, 1998), 
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and Fiddick and Cummins (2007) found that dominant individuals are expected to let 
subordinates free-ride to a certain degree. This also has connections to models of 
reproductive skew (Powers & Lehmann, 2014; Vehrencamp, 1983) whereby dominants are 
expected to concede some reproduction to subordinates to keep them in the group. This could 
easily be extended to include extending access to non-reproductive resources and allowing 
greater autonomy in behaviour, i.e. “my friends are allowed to behave unfairly”.  Finally, this 
also touches on biological markets and social bargaining (Barclay, 2013; Sell, Tooby, et al., 
2009), with dominants, perhaps, perceiving subordinates as a resource that needs to be 
attracted or otherwise attained, and competing for them: in their description of prestige for 
example, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) suggested dominant individuals must actively earn 
the deference of their subordinates.  
Fundamentally therefore, the need to maintain allies raises the interesting possibility that, at 
some point in human evolution, dominant individuals had to behave in a pro-social manner. 
Such pro-social behaviour may include punishing free-riders for the ‘good of the group’. The 
reasoning is grounded in dominance and the interests of the individual involved, but the 
pressure of coalitional violence caused implicit norms of acceptable behaviour to be extended 
to include non-kin associates, i.e. the desire to protect others from harm. 
Interestingly, it has been suggested that once coalitions became important to human sociality 
it was easy to supress those who tried to become too dominant, either through direct coalition 
aggression (Gavrilets, 2012) or through exclusion from resources in an environment where 
long-term storage is impossible and foraging unpredictable (Charlton, 1997), resulting in the 
apparent ‘egalitarian syndrome’ observed in pre-state societies (Boehm, 1997). This last point 
is perhaps the greatest advantage of a dominance approach to punishment and its associated 
emotions, because by grounding punishment in an evolutionary history of dominance and 
status contests rather than, for example, group-selection for ‘niceness’, we can potentially 
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explain more adequately why modern human societies aren’t egalitarian. Or rather why, 
during the Neolithic when the wide-spread adoption of agriculture broke the constraints of an 
immediate return economy that had made the suppression of dominant individuals ‘easy’ 
(Charlton, 1997), human social structure once again came to resemble those of some of our 
primate brethren (Betzig, 2014; Powers & Lehmann, 2014; and see Turchin, Currie, & 
Whiteshouse, 2013, Figure 1, for a graphical representation). 
In sum, for any animal that lives in a social hierarchy, by definition dominant individuals 
have priority of access to resources. Theoretically, for this to be the case individuals must be 
able to recognise their position in relation to others in the group and what this entitles them to 
(Cummins, 2005). As argued by Silk and House (2011), a sense of inequality would evolve as 
such a sense would be required to recognise when one received ‘less’ than others, whether 
this was appropriate for one’s rank, and how one could behave to covertly circumvent any 
restrictions (Byrne & Whiten, 1997). Importantly, while it might be beneficial to either take 
as much as possible or respond spitefully to unfairness, dominance relationships will dictate 
when this is possible (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995). It is in a dominant’s best interest not 
only to recognise when subordinates are violating the ‘rules’ of resource access and 
behaviour (for example by establishing forbidden affiliations), but also to intervene to 
prevent them.  
Since dominant individuals in species with relatively strict dominance hierarchies (Fallow 
deer, Jennings et al., 2011; Coral reef fish, Wong et al., 2007) demonstrate such ‘policing’, 
punishment to suppress subordinates might not require complex social reasoning beyond 
basic recognition of social position. However in humans and some other primates, coalitions 
are an important part of social manoeuvring (Harcourt & De Waal, 1992), and therefore the 
recognition of ‘fair’ treatment and behaviour should become extended to coalition members 
(Brosnan, 2011; Cummins, 1996a). Finally, and possibly uniquely to humans, costly 
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punishment of anti-social individuals might have evolved to have become a tool to actively 
recruit and maintain allies (Barclay, 2006) and suppress those who try to benefit at the 
expense of others (Fehr, 2004), i.e. others who try to  assert dominance, resulting in an 
apparently altruistic regard for the welfare of others.  
2.3 Dominance and the costs of punishment 
The previous section provided a theoretical rationale as to why dominance might have given 
rise to the evolution of costly punishment. More importantly, if costly punishment does have 
an origin in dominance, the advantages and motivations associated with a dominant position 
should exert an effect on proximate behaviour. As may be expected, there is little actual 
research directly examining the role that dominance and status might play in human costly 
punishment but, as detailed in the following section, many of the core costs of punishment 
can potentially be reduced or avoided completely by a dominant position.   
2.3.1 Effectiveness and retaliation 
Experimental economic games consistently find that the effectiveness of punishment, that is 
the ratio of resources spent on punishment by the actor to the amount removed from the 
target, is a strong predictor of both the occurrence of punishment and of a subsequent 
increase in cooperative behaviour (Balliet et al., 2011). Ever since the earliest work in the 
area of punishment (see, Ostrom et al., 1992; Yamagishi, 1988), experiments have employed 
mechanisms that make sure punishment is effective, and the majority of theoretical models of 
punishment also rely on the cost inflicted on the target of punishment being sufficiently 
severe (for example, Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Roberts, 2013). As long as some individuals 
(Nikiforakis et al., 2009), or a single individual (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011; O'Gorman et 
al., 2009)  can punish effectively, then punishment both occurs and promotes cooperation. 
Importantly, models have shown that such heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness can 
allow punishment to be stable over evolutionary time (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011), i.e. not 
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everyone needs to be able to punish effectively for punishment to evolve. However, there 
have been limited attempts to explain either how such effectiveness could biologically 
manifest itself, or how and why would certain individuals be able to punish more effectively 
than others?  Such variation in the effectiveness of punishment can be explained by an 
individual’s dominance. 
Dominants have uncontested access to resources because, as discussed previously (2.1, 2.2) 
dominant individuals have the capacity to alter the behaviour of others by inflicting 
punishment. In fact, the establishment of a dominance hierarchy results in less overall 
aggression because, after a few initial encounters, individuals accept that other group 
members can assert power over them (Wilson, 1980). Sell, Cosmides, et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that among humans physical formidability is easily recognised (in males), and 
that formidable individuals – as measured by physical strength – showed a greater history of 
fights, and of winning these fights (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). In women strength also 
predicted success in fights, but not a history of such conflicts. This demonstrates a perhaps 
obvious point that physically formidable individuals can inflict physical harm on others. 
Interestingly, men who are physically imposing (Watkins et al., 2010) or who have been 
primed to feel dominant (Watkins & Jones, 2012) are less sensitive to dominance cues in 
others, i.e. are less sensitive to the threat others might pose. Thus, not only are physically 
formidable individuals more able to inflict costs on another, they are also less sensitive to the 
risks of confrontations. This may explain why, when punishment by third parties occurs in 
everyday life, the punishers are generally formidable (Huston, Ruggiero, Conner, & Geis, 
1981). 
In addition, dominant individuals have more social allies to potentially provide aid in 
conflicts. As with group-living non-human primates (Cheney, 2011; Widdig et al., 2000), 
dominance in human is not simply the result of personal formidability, but of the ability to 
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navigate the social world (Hawley, 2014; Hawley et al., 2008). Dominant individuals are 
sought out as social partners (Barclay, 2013; Fessler, Tiokhin, Holbrook, Gervais, & Snyder, 
2013; Hawley, 1999) and being at the centre of a group is a strong negative predictor of 
victimisation (de Bruyn, Cillessen, & Weisfeld, 2012; Gest et al., 2002; Smith, Talamelli, 
Cowie, Naylor, & Chauhan, 2004). Fessler and Holbrook (2013) demonstrated that being 
surrounded by friends reduces the fear of a potential adversary, and when punishment occurs 
in non-state societies (if it occurred at all, see Baumard & Liénard, 2011), it is only after a 
great number of allies have been recruited (Mathew & Boyd, 2011). 
Importantly, while we may expect that social allies will assist a dominant individual in any 
conflict, as our analysis of dominance also suggests, dominants can also punish by denying 
access to resources. Being dominant, for example, means to be central in a social network 
(for theory and discussion, see Freeman, 1979; Scott, 2007) and as a result an individual can 
act as a bottleneck between group members, a position that, as shown by Maner and Mead 
(2010),  can be used to deny subordinates access to information. Furthermore, especially if an 
individual is prestigious (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), the refusal to provide assistance, 
training or knowledge could be a very effective punishment. In fact, this logic suggests that 
when dominant individuals withhold cooperation or severe dyadic social connections with 
another, these might be more effective punishments than when subordinates attempt them. 
Ostracism occurs less when it is expensive  (Masclet, 2003), and a ‘real-life’ manifestation of 
this cost would be the loss of a reciprocal partner. However because dominants have a greater 
number of outside options for cooperation than other (Cant, 2011), they should potentially be 
more able and willing to withdraw support (for an example of this bargaining power, see 
Camerer & Fehr, 2006). Finally, costly punishment, when it occurs in non-state societies, is 
highly coordinated (Guala, 2012) and while in such societies no one is ‘in charge’, dominant 
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individuals have a louder voice in group decision making (Boehm, 2000; Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). 
Little has been said so far about retaliation. However dominant individuals should face less 
risk of retaliation than others because the will of dominants is respected more than that of 
others. Dominants are deferred to in social encounters (Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013; 
Gregory & Webster, 1996; Nelissen & Meijers, 2011), those overtly labelled as high status 
are not punished for non-contributions to the public good (Eckel et al., 2010), and 
subordinates will simply acquiesce to being treated unfairly by them in dyadic interactions 
(Kim et al., 1998). Indeed, individuals who are both high status and useful are treated more 
leniently for any crimes (Petersen et al., 2012) and Henrich and Gil-White (2001) mention 
that among the Aché, men overlooked  liaisons between skilled hunters and their wives. The 
role of dominance in punishment and retaliation can be nicely illustrated by the case of 
Simon Singh, who was sued by British Chiropractic Association for questioning the evidence 
behind their claims (Singh, 2008). While Dr Singh ultimately triumphed, without the 
financial and high-profile support from The Guardian newspaper (Boseley, 2009), i.e. a 
strong ally, an individual  who ‘punished’ in the public good would have been crushed by the 
retaliation of a more powerful coalition.   
To return to our analysis of dominance, dominant individuals have the “capacity to modify 
others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments”, and this 
not only allows them to punish more effectively, but also means they have a much greater 
freedom of action (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), whether their actions are pro- 
or anti-social. Subordinates will simply acquiesce to their demands for their own safety. Such 
acquiescence likely also extends to retaliation, because if subordinates are unwilling to 
respond antagonistically to social norm violations or unfairness by dominants, they are 
unlikely to risk further social, monetary or physical injury by attempting to counter-punish 
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the same dominant individual. Indeed, when punished, the more common response of 
subordinates is to attack someone lower down in the social hierarchy (Barash & Lipton, 2011, 
Chapters 1 & 4). 
I would argue therefore that when economic experiments employ an effective punishment 
mechanism, they are simulating a dominant position. Animal conflicts take place as a series 
of escalating steps (Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976; Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973), and one 
of the key advantages of dominance relationships is that such escalation does not take place; 
subordinates simply retreat. An effective punishment mechanism allows such an 
asymmetrical conflict and outcome; one individual punishes the other who must accept and 
yield (because the game mechanism means they cannot respond in any other way). One of the 
methodological advantages of economic games is that innate preferences can be teased out by 
the way they interact with the game mechanism (Camerer, 2003; Guala, 2012), and placing 
participants in a position where they can punish effectively with impunity taps into evolved 
dominance-based instincts surrounding norm violations. As a result many individuals will 
punish when punishment is both effective and free from retaliation, but when the ‘dominant’ 
position is lessened, for example by the inclusion of unrestricted retaliation (Nikiforakis, 
2008), individuals are less willing to punish. 
Individuals may universally become angry at unfairness or acts of defection, or indeed may 
not and simply accept inequality, but as detailed throughout this chapter, the relative status 
between actors dictates the behaviour of both the ‘unfair’ individual and the response from 
the aggrieved party. In fact, one of the advantages of a dominance-based approached tocostly 
punishment is that it provides a theoretical account of why we are so sensitive to the costs of 
punishment, because these costs are indicative of  dominance and status. 
An alternative theory 
78 
 
2.3.2 Resources and the net cost of punishment  
A number of models have suggested that as long as some individuals experience a lower net 
cost of punishment (Frank, 1996), specifically in the production cost of the behaviour, i.e. the 
amount of resource that must be expended per unit of punishment (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 
2011), then costly punishment can evolutionarily stable. A reduced net production cost of 
punishment certainly applies to dominant individuals. By definition, dominant individuals 
have priority access to resources: dominant individuals believe they are more deserving of 
resources (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) and can behave coercively in order to attain them 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Hawley, 1999). Indeed, even without any direct antagonistic 
behaviour, Nelissen and Meijers (2011) found participants were more likely to give resources 
to dominants, and generally subordinates are willing to tolerate asymmetries in reciprocity to 
maintain a close relationship with them (for humans, see Barclay, 2013; and for other 
primates, see Schino & Aureli, 2009). One reason why such asymmetries are tolerated is 
because dominant individuals also have a higher value in the biological marketplace as a 
potential romantic or social partner. For example males are more desired as romantic partners 
if they are of high status (Buss, 1989; Li, Valentine, & Patel, 2011), and both males and 
females who are of ‘high market value’ tend to make more demands of any potential partner 
(Pawłwski & Dunbar, 1999). Individuals who are seen as formidable are also valued as a 
social ally (Bassett & Moss, 2004; Farthing, 2005; Fessler et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, being dominant in a group implies that one is at the centre of the social network 
(Freeman, 1979; Krause, Croft, & James, 2007; Scott, 2007) and individuals benefit from 
such a position in informal hierarchies. This central position is beneficial for several reasons. 
a) It means more group members are socially close and Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) found 
participants in a dictator game are more likely to send generous offers to individuals whom 
are close to them in a network, with the generosity of offers decreasing with distance (Jones 
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& Rachlin, 2006). b) Participants will endure more discomfort for close reciprocal friends 
than they will for family members (Harrison, Sciberras, & James, 2011). c) The position 
provides more opportunities for cooperation with others and, more negatively, allows an 
individual to manipulate group interactions to ensure a favourable outcome for themselves 
(Dasgupta, 2011; Maner & Mead, 2010). 
Finally, a further way that dominance could lower the net cost of punishment is through 
coordination. Ostrom et al. (1992) demonstrated that allowing communication can greatly 
enhance cooperation (for a review of communication, see Ostrom, 2006), and group 
efficiency can be improved by having a single coordinator or leader (Gillet, Cartwright, & 
Vugt, 2010). Given that groups tend to coalesce around dominant individuals  (Hawley, 
1999) and that in non-state societies dominant individuals have a greater say in group 
decisions (Boehm, 2000; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) it is possible that dominants could 
fulfil such a coordination role. One issue with the Boyd et al. (2010) model of coordinated 
punishment is that individuals still have to pay a cost to signal honestly; however as dominant 
individuals can potentially punish independently, their initial behaviour could result in 
coordination and therefore cheaper punishment, and Przepiorka and Diekmann (2013) 
demonstrated that initial differences in the cost of punishment can in fact result in such 
coordination.  
2.3.3 Direct benefits and second-order free-riding 
It could be said that the main puzzle behind the evolution of punishment is second-order free 
riding (Dreber et al., 2008), as no matter how cheaply an individual can punish, they will 
always be outcompeted by others who cooperate but don’t punish. However, this conclusion 
is based on the premise that individuals are homogeneous in the benefits derived from 
punishment, and this need not be the case. Dominant individuals are in a position to benefit 
disproportionally from the benefits of punishment. For instance, in non-human animals, the 
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punishment by dominants of non-dominant breeders (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995), of 
‘cheating’ conspecifics (Raihani et al., 2010), to prevent associations between conspecifics 
(Widdig et al., 2000), and to police growth (Wong et al., 2007) all benefit the dominant 
individual greatly. Even when there is no clear direct benefit, dominant individuals can still 
monopolise group resources through coercion and intimidation (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995; Hawley, 1999) or through their closer connections with others in the group. 
Thus, dominant individuals can potentially benefit disproportionately from any group 
cooperation and the increase in the social product that it brings. While, for example, all 
individuals might benefit from a collective project such as building a dam or irrigation 
system, the increase in productivity and benefits such a project may cause will vary amongst 
the population (Reuben & Riedl, 2013). Because dominants benefit from group success, they 
have a direct strategic motivation to act to police free-riders. Additionally, dominant 
individuals enjoy higher reproductive success than others (Barthes, Godelle, & Raymond, 
2013; Ellis, 1994; Pawłwski & Dunbar, 1999) and because of this any increase in group 
productivity will be multiplied via indirect fitness benefits. It also potentially gives more 
dominant individuals ‘more to lose’ when faced with, for example, inter-group conflict. 
Consistent with this, individuals will generally punish altruistically when faced with inter-
group competition (Abbink et al., 2010) and dominant individuals will behave in a more pro-
social fashion when faced with such a conflict (Maner & Mead, 2010).  
A recent model by Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014) suggested that when individuals can 
sequester a disproportionate share of resources, they should actively contribute more to the 
public good. Interestingly, this model also suggested that one reason subordinates may 
remain in a group despite the skew in resource distribution is so they can free-ride on this 
public good activity (see also, Roberts, 2013). Furthermore, it seems that such behaviour is 
expected, with leaders being expected to punish free-riding on collective action (King, 
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Johnson, & Van Vugt, 2009) and it is the case that those in a better position to punish do so 
(Nikiforakis et al., 2009; Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013). In fact, when only a single 
individuals in a group could punish effectively (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011; Nikiforakis 
et al., 2009; O'Gorman et al., 2009), they did so almost exclusively altruistically, i.e. when in 
a tacit position of leadership, individuals behaved in a pro-social way. Potentially therefore, 
costly punishment might could be seen as a behaviour a dominant individual has to engage in 
to ‘justify’ their social position and continued priority of access to resources. This once again 
hints that costly punishment, superficially for the ‘good of the group’, is actually another 
mechanism by which to navigate complex social relationships and maintain one’s dominant 
position.     
However, few of the studies that have directly manipulated the benefit from group success 
have shown punishment to correlate with a higher level of benefit (Tan, 2008), partly because 
low earners are very willing to target higher earners (Burns & Visser, 2006; Zizzo & Oswald, 
2001). However,  when the punishment of high earners was forbidden, which simulates the 
privilege resulting from a dominant position, higher earners did punish free-riding more than 
low earners (Noussair & Tan, 2011). This suggests that dominants will punish for the good of 
the group, but perhaps only when in a secure position. For example instability in a dominance 
hierarchy produces more negative behaviour directed at subordinates (Fast & Chen, 2009; 
Georgesen & Harris, 2006), and more direct self-serving tendencies by dominants 
(Georgesen & Harris, 2006; Maner & Mead, 2010).   
It needs to be stressed again that part of the rationale for economic experiments is that 
individuals bring their implicit biases and social norms into the laboratory with them and 
these biases are highlighted by participant responses to the game mechanisms (Guala, 2012; 
Levitt & List, 2007). Therefore, although it is hard to disentangle disproportional benefit 
from punishment effectiveness (see 1.1.2), there is some evidence that when individuals gain 
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a disproportionate benefit from any group activity they are more willing to punish free-riding 
than when this is not the case. Thus, when individuals are given the attributes of a ‘dominant’ 
position, they show the behaviour that would be expected if dominance exerts an influence on 
costly punishment behaviour. 
2.3.4 Indirect Benefits 
Dominant individuals, as shown above, may be motivated to punish because they derive a 
direct benefit from maintaining the public good.  In addition, substantial indirect benefits are 
available to anyone who engages in costly punishment. As shown in  1.2.1 and 1.2.2, 
punishers are both well liked (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008) and seen as formidable (Brandt 
et al., 2003). Importantly, it has been have suggested these indirect benefits are generated 
because punishment can act as a costly signal of ones pro-sociality (Farthing, 2005; Fessler & 
Haley, 2003). Given these benefits, as raised in 1.3, the question remains as to why everyone 
would not punish if such positive reputations were available, i.e. what factor prevents 
someone from ‘affording’ the signal? This factor, I suggest, is dominance.  
While there are potentially ways the production cost of punishment could be ‘free’, for 
example through condemnation (Masclet et al., 2003) or gossip (Bazzan & Dahmen, 2010), 
punishers will likely face retaliation for any such attempt. Yet one of the logical 
consequences of a dominant position is that dominant individuals do not suffer aggression for 
their actions, altruistic or otherwise. Thus punishment could be considered a conventional 
signal, i.e. a signal where the costs are generated from the reaction they provoke in 
conspecifics (Maynard-Smith et al., 1988). The fact that only dominant individuals can 
punish suggests that costly punishment could be a signal of dominance.  
Punishment as a costly signal of dominance has important ramifications for any punishment 
behaviour. While any individual could attempt to punish and may even be successful in doing 
An alternative theory 
83 
 
so, unless they are actually in a dominant position the repercussions could be dire, especially 
if, as suggested by Tennie (2012), individuals are image-scored as ‘punishers’ in the way they 
are as co-operators or defectors. For example, establishing oneself as a ‘protector’ could 
make an individual the first target during any anti-social action. Furthermore, animal 
experiments (Molles & Vehrencamp, 2001; Tibbetts & Izzo, 2010) have shown that false 
signalling of dominance, as costly punishment by a subordinate would be, results in far more 
aggression directed at a subordinate individual that would otherwise be the case. Indeed, 
Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, and Chatman (2006) demonstrated that humans are very 
aware of our own position in a social hierarchy  and Anderson, Ames, and Gosling (2008) 
showed that individuals are socially punished for seeming to ‘over step themselves’ in social 
interactions. Furthermore, differences in physical strength and social power will likely mean 
a subordinate would fail to punish successfully and, beyond the direct retaliation a 
subordinate individual might receive, such failed attacks in primate societies often elicit 
further aggressive behaviour from a dominant individual for a period of time after (Clutton-
Brock & Parker, 1995). 
Costly punishment therefore may signal dominance in general but also, uniquely for an 
antagonistic behaviour, that one is dominant but (potentially) willing to forgo some of the 
more coercive behaviours associated with such a position, and as such is trustworthy (see, for 
example, Barclay, 2006). Furthermore, as discussed in 1.2.2 and 2.2.2, a reputation for costly 
‘moralistic’ punishment might help recruit and maintain social alliances, as punishment 
shows that an individual is willing to police group behaviour and protect weaker members. 
Interestingly, a recent model by Schoenmakers, Hilbe, Blasius, and Traulsen (2014) 
demonstrated that if punishment is considered a costly signal of a willingness to police, 
punishment behaviour encourages others to commit to punishment (see also, Kim et al., 1998; 
Mulder et al., 2009). So by punishing, a dominant might encourage others to do so as well.  
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However, conventional signals are only honest when an individual cannot walk away from 
the environment (Számadó, 2011b). In the small scale societies of our evolutionary past, a 
punisher would be stuck with those they punished and were signalling to, and this is still 
likely the case today in terms of our workplace, friends and other formal and informal 
networks (Christakis & Fowler, 2010; Dunbar, 2010). Thus the signalling and subsequent 
reputational benefits of punishment will only be available if the individual in question can 
consistently absorb or mitigate the immediate costs of punishment. An individual should only 
attempt punishment if they think they can not only win, but win repeatedly. 
Finally, taking a dominance perspective on costly punishment highlights an issue with 
previous experimental and theoretical research to punishment, that punishment is always 
successful, i.e. if a participant makes a decision to assign deduction points this will 
automatically punish the target. While, for example, Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden 
(2007) and Kamei and Putterman (2012) tested the effects of imperfect information on 
punishment, to my knowledge no one has tested imperfect success. If we see punishment 
behaviour as fundamentally a dominant behaviour, behaviour that is confrontational with the 
intention to inflict a cost and/or enforce resource distribution norms on the target, then 
success is not guaranteed. To use spite as an example, while it may be ideal to respond 
aggressively to inequality (e.g. Nowak et al., 2000), dominance relationships may make this 
unwise. Indeed, while redirected aggression (for example, Aureli, Cozzolino, Cordischi, & 
Scucchi, 1992) could be seen as spite, it is spiteful behaviour grounded in dominance and 
dominance relationships. 
2.4 A note on sex differences  
 The section that follows on from this will detail how the relationship between dominance 
and costly punishment was investigated. However, one factor that is not present in the 
An alternative theory 
85 
 
empirical chapters is an analysis of the role sex differences might play in costly punishment. 
This is due to both theoretical and practical reasons.  
Firstly, in terms of dominance, while overtly dominant and status-seeking behaviours are 
stereotypically seen as male, a number of recent reviews (Cummins, 2005; Hawley, 2014; 
Hawley et al., 2008), have suggested that sex differences in status seeking and contests have 
been overestimated. As stated in 2.1, it has been suggested that definitions of dominance have 
been too concerned with aggressive interactions as opposed to the purpose of such behaviour, 
to exert control over resources (Hawley, 1999; Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976), in order to 
increase reproductive fitness (Ellis, 1995). As access to resources, as opposed to competing 
for status as value in unto itself, is suggested to motivate females (Buss, 1989; Kwang, 
Crockett, Sanchez, & Swann, 2013), females should also wish to be dominant in a hierarchy. 
Indeed, female conflict over resources has been shown to mirror male conflict over 
reputation/loss of status (Griskevicius et al., 2009), females are just as willing to act 
antagonistically as males in same-sex confrontations (Felson, 1982) and dominant females 
show the same pattern of self-serving biases as dominant males (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). As 
argued by Cummins (2005), the main sex difference may be that, compared to males, females 
are more likely to act covertly to achieve dominance (see also, Griskevicius et al., 2009). 
Fundamentally, the differences lie in means by which males and females achieve dominance, 
not the desire for it.  
Secondly, in terms of punishment,  reviews of the literature (for example, Balliet et al., 2011; 
Guala, 2012), do not consider sex to be an important factor, and to the authors knowledge 
only one study that has investigated sex found an effect (Barclay, 2006); here males and 
females punished with equal frequency, but the former punished more severely. While 
physical difference between males and females, i.e. the ability to inflict physical costs and 
withstand physical retaliation, might in practice result in males being more likely to punish 
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outside of the laboratory (see, Huston et al., 1981; Levine et al., 2011), males and females are 
equally as likely to report anti-social behaviour (Borofsky, Stollak, & Messe, 1971): there is 
no sex difference in the ‘moralistic’ desire to punish. This may explain the lack of sex 
differences in economic games, as the game environment provides an implicit and 
unassailable dominant position from which to pour retribution on to those who violate 
fairness norms. Therefore, we would not expect sex differences in economic games (Chapters 
6 & 7). 
This is not to say sex would definitely not have an effect on costly punishment. Indeed, the 
role of culture, sex and expectations of behaviour regarding costly punishment could be a 
thesis in itself. As noted above, physical differences between males and females might bias 
the behaviour towards males in everyday life, even if this is entirely due to rational 
calculations of risk rather than differences in the desire to punish. Furthermore there are also 
potential cultural differences. Lowe, Levine, Best, and Heim (2012), for example, suggested 
that uncertainty about norms of inter-sex conflicts change the patterns of bystander 
intervention when two females are in conflict and a third party is male. Equally, Eisenegger, 
Naef, Snozzi, Heinrichs, and Fehr (2010), found that cultural beliefs about the role of 
testosterone in behaviour meant females who believed they received the hormone (it was a 
placebo) behaved more negatively than females who actually, but unknowingly, received 
testosterone.  
Thus, while the vignette based studies were presented as gender neutral, it is likely that some 
cultural biases were present; specifically the characters may have been implicitly assumed to 
be male. Nevertheless, it is in the best interests of both males and females to acquire 
resources (Ellis, 1994), to recognise when they are being treated unfairly (Brosnan, 2011), to 
monitor the social environment and respond to changes in the social hierarchy (Cummins, 
1996a, 1999), and to recognise the advantages to both associating with individuals who costly 
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punish and to signalling one’s own pros-sociality through the behaviour (Barclay, 2006; 
Farthing, 2005). Therefore, while any possible cultural and biological effects of sex cannot be 
dismissed, the study of any effects is beyond the purview of this thesis. 
Finally, there were also practical considerations. For one, to tease out the relationship 
between dominance and costly punishment, the studies below use multi-factorial designs to 
which sex would be an additional variable. Given that there is little evidence sex would affect 
punishment behaviour in experiments, it would not be a useful factor to include in these 
models. Perhaps more pressingly, as is the case in many UK universities, the psychology 
undergraduate cohort is predominantly female and therefore directly testing for sex effects, or 
performing post-hoc exploratory analyses based on sex, was not possible due to the skew in 
recruitment. Thus, while a sex difference cannot be ruled out, for the theoretical and practical 
reasons mentioned above, such sex differences were not addressed in this thesis. 
2.5 Testing the relationship between dominance and costly punishment 
Dominance potentially provides a theoretical explanation as to why humans have evolved an 
other-regarding preference (Camerer & Fehr, 2006), because of which we become angered 
by, and are willing to punish, those who behave unfairly, those who free-ride on group 
activities or otherwise act in an anti-social manner. In essence, reasoning about our place in a 
dominance hierarchy and how this affects entitlements and behavioural proscriptions 
(Cummins, 1996a) has resulted in  an evolved sense of what is ‘fair’ (Brosnan, 2006, 2011) 
that goes beyond simple equality for ourselves. This is comparable with a spiteful account, 
which suggests that it is beneficial to avoid exploitation and harm those who attempt it 
(Gardner & West, 2004b; Nowak et al., 2000; Rand et al., 2013). Indeed, given that many 
animals that do not live in complex hierarchies show spiteful behaviour (Jensen, 2010; 
Johnstone & Bshary, 2004), spite could be a precursor to the formation of  reasoning about 
‘norms’ of behaviour (see, Cummins, 1996b). Because in more socially complex species a 
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dominant position depends on alliances and coalitions, more complex transitive reasoning is 
needed to recognise and punish those who ‘cheat’ both the dominant individual and their 
allies. Finally, in humans, this results in behaviour that suppresses more/too dominant 
individuals to prevent such individuals exploiting ourselves and our allies (Gavrilets, 2012).  
More importantly, as argued in previous sections, a dominance-based approached costly 
punishment can potentially provide a theoretical account of why we are so sensitive to the 
proximate costs of punishment, something which is lacking in other theoretical explanations 
(see 1.3). Because the sense of entitlements and behavioural proscriptions are bound to 
dominance, so that a subordinate who felt they could openly monopolise mating would soon 
discover the error in their thinking, our concept of  ‘fairness’ changes with our proximate 
social position, i.e. our ability to acquire, defend or hold resources (Fessler & Holbrook, 
2013; Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976; Peterson, 2012; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). Therefore, 
many of the manipulations of proximate costs, benefit and situations in experiments on 
costly/third party punishment can be seen as simulating the effects of dominance and status, 
for example the ability to punish with impunity, to establish a (dominant) reputation or ensure 
the success of one’s own group in conflicts.  
However, few studies have directly examined whether punishment is affected by dominance 
and status. The literature and theories discussed above suggest a number of potentially 
fruitful avenues for research into the role that dominance and dominance-reasoning might 
play in human cooperative and punishment behaviour. As a first step in such research, to 
investigate the basic premise and to see if dominance could be established as a credible 
theory, a series of 10 studies were devised to evaluate whether dominance has played a role 
in the evolution of costly punishment. The literature and theories presented in Chapter 1 and 
2 provide the background for this research series as it was finally developed. The theory 
described in the present chapter was developed in reference to the results of earlier studies. 
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The later studies themselves were, in turn, developed in reference to earlier results and to the 
literature and theory that these earlier results pointed towards, i.e. there was a reflective 
relationship between the theoretical development and the experimental studies.  Accordingly, 
the earliest of the studies (Chapters 3&4) were framed mainly in terms of the theories set out 
in Chapter 1; the later studies are more clearly tied to the ideas in the present chapter. All, 
however, contribute to the development of a dominance theory of costly punishment, and 
provide evidence in its support.  The studies themselves are presented in broadly 
chronological order, and their progression represents the development that took place over 
the course of the research. A brief summary of the studies therefore follows. 
2.5.1 Chapter 3: Measuring punishment behaviour 
Chapter 3 investigated whether individuals took the presence of an audience into account 
when making punishment decisions, and whether punishers were well liked. It also 
investigated, specifically in response to the model by Boyd et al. (2010),   whether a cheap 
signal of a willingness to punish would encourage participants to punish more readily. 
Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the usefulness of the questionnaire/survey method 
for investigating costly punishment. 
2.5.2 Chapter 4: Perceptions of punishers 
Chapter 4 investigated whether costly punishment can actually be considered a signal of 
dominance and pro-sociality, and whether the latter was unique to costly punishment, or 
caused by the ‘warm glow’ felt when anti-social individuals get their comeuppance. Chapter 
4 also further investigated under what circumstances the signalling benefits of punishment are 
generated, specifically whether they are dependent on the success of any intervention. 
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2.5.3 Chapter 5: Dominance rank and observer perceptions of punishers    
Chapter 5 investigated whether the reputational benefits investigated in Chapter 4 were 
dependent on the dominance of an intervening third party, i.e. whether only dominant 
individuals could actually access the indirect benefits of punishment. Chapter 5 also 
investigated participants expectations of dominant individuals, i.e. are they expected to 
punish, and how status affected the perceived risk of retaliation. Chapter 5 also investigated 
how the rank of both the defector and punisher affected observer perceptions of costly 
punishment. 
2.5.4 Chapter 6: Dominance and the behaviour of punishers 
Chapter 6 attempted to simulate one aspect of a dominant position by allowing certain 
individuals to benefit disproportionally from any group success. It invested whether 
individuals would be more willing to punish when the net cost to punishers was low. Chapter 
6 also investigated whether the way in which these additional resources were generated 
affected behaviour; would better-resourced individuals be more willing to punish free-riding 
when they were explicitly benefitting at the expense of others? Finally, Chapter 6 also 
investigated whether punishment was used strategically to ensure continued benefit for the 
‘dominant’ punishers. 
2.5.5 Chapter 7: Dominance and behaviour - naturally occurring dominance 
Chapter 7 tested whether being in a dominant position affected an individual’s sensitivity to 
unfairness in the local environment. Specifically Chapter 7 investigated whether an 
individual’s position in an informal social hierarchy affected their cooperative and 
punishment decision making.  Chapter 7 also investigated whether, based on position in an 
informal social hierarchy, punishment behaviour would be affected by the possibility of 
gaining a reputation as a punisher.  
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2.5.6 Chapter 8: General discussion 
Finally, Chapter 8 discusses whether the studies presented in this thesis provide evidence that 
dominance is associated with costly punishment and why this is the case. It will be shown on 
a proximate level that dominance is an intrinsic part of costly punishment, both in terms of 
those engaging in punishment itself and in our perceptions of punishers. As such, regardless 
of the ultimate cause of the human other-regarding preference, dominance is a factor that 
should be considered in any future model, experiment or theoretical explanation of costly 
punishment.  However, the general discussion will also show that dominance can itself 
provide a coherent explanation for the ultimate cause behind the human desire to punish 
unfairness, and that dominance is a fundamental aspect of the socio-cognitive reasoning 
surrounding fairness. With dominance established as a viable hypothesis for the evolution of 
costly punishment, Chapter 8 will offer future research suggestions to further probe this 
relationship.   
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3 Chapter 3: measuring punishment behaviour 
3.1 General introduction 
Human cooperation may be  unique in the natural world: while traditional theories of kin 
selection, direct reciprocity and signalling/reputation building have been used to explain 
cooperation in humans and, to an extent, in other animals (Bird & Smith, 2005b; Hamilton, 
1964; Trivers, 1971), no other creature displays our willingness to cooperate with non-kin 
individuals (Melis & Semmann, 2010).  
One, perhaps the main, reason for our consistently high level of cooperation appears to be 
punishment: specifically punishment to uphold norms of fairness and egalitarian sentiment at 
their own apparent expense (Gintis, 2000). This altruistic punishment not only drastically 
increases cooperation between both strangers and partners (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ostrom et 
al., 1992) but is something individuals both desire to have (Gürerk et al., 2006) and find 
rewarding when it occurs (de Quervain et al., 2004). Because of this, the costly punishment 
of anti-social behaviour is now seen by many as not only a human universal behaviour but 
one that is unique to the species (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Marlowe et al., 2010). 
However the evolution of this behaviour presents something of a puzzle. While punishment 
can be evolutionarily stable once established in a population as it becomes essentially cost-
free (Boyd et al., 2010; see also Masclet et al., 2003 for this in practice), before this point is 
reached the individual cost of the behaviour means that punishers can be outcompeted by 
defectors and non-cooperators, and by second-order free riders; those who cooperate but 
don’t punish (Dreber et al., 2008; Yamagishi, 1988). However, punishment could potentially 
be evolutionarily stable if the net cost of punishment could be reduced, either by punishers 
individually recuperating the cost of their behaviour (i.e. through means that would not 
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benefit the group as a whole, unlike improvements to overall group efficiency, which would 
also benefit free-riders) or if the cost of the behaviour itself could be reduced.   
The current chapter investigates two such possible mechanisms that costly punishers could 
employ to alter the cost of punishment. Study 1 investigated whether punishers would vary 
their punishment behaviour depending on the potential for reputational gains, and addresses 
the questions concerning indirect reciprocity and signalling that were raised in 1.2.1, 1.2.1 
and 2.3.4. Study 2 investigated whether punishers would alter their behaviour in response to a 
signal that others would also be willing to punish and thus share the cost. Study 2, as well as 
addressing indirect benefits, examines how the cost of punishment could be spread between 
multiple punishers (1.1.2/ 2.3.2). 
This chapter also examined whether a questionnaire/vignette method can be effectively 
employed to study costly punishment. The majority of work in this area has been conducted 
using economic games (but see Mathew & Boyd, 2013; O'Gorman et al., 2005). However the 
vignette method, as well as being used consistently in social psychology, has also been used 
to study other phenomena related to human evolution (for example altruism, Barclay, 2010; 
formidability, Fessler et al., 2013; mate choice, Iredale et al., 2008; and for norm violation 
and a general discussion of the use of vignettes, see Wilson & O’Gorman, 2003) and thus can 
potentially be applied to the study of costly punishment. The advantage of the vignette 
method is that conditions can be systematically varied to provide clear data without violating 
the proscription against deception in the economic literature (Bonetti, 1998), and that these 
scenarios can be varied in ways that would be difficult to simulate within an economic game. 
Nevertheless an attempt was made to construct each scenario around the logic of a public 
goods game; that is to say involving a small group of people in which one member fails to 
contribute to a common good.   
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There are however some issues with this method. First, a number of reviews have suggested  
that a performance-related payment method (based on cooperation/punishment decisions) 
produces the most robust decisions from participants (Etzioni, 2010; Perc & Szolnoki, 2010; 
but see Guala, 2012;  and, Levitt & List, 2007) and a vignette method would make this 
impossible. Equally, individuals will often indicate more willingness to punish unfairness 
when the situation is hypothetical rather than immediate; this is true both for experimental 
economics (Pedersen et al., 2013) and for wider research into social norm violations and 
moral dilemmas (for example Kawakami et al., 2009; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & 
Silani, 2014). However it should be noted that the ‘strategy method’ (see Fischbacher & 
Gächter, 2010), despite being criticised for inflating punishment behaviour, is commonly 
used in economic games and is often required to make an experiment feasible. Furthermore 
the issue of inflated rates of punishment has been directed at economic experiments in 
general (Guala, 2012). Thus a vignette method should at least been seen as no worse than the 
alternatives. 
3.2 Study 1: is punishment behaviour sensitive to reputational gains? 
3.2.1 Reputation 
Humans are very adept at image scoring, i.e. keeping track of an individual’s reputation 
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998); indeed, there are great advantages to associating with like-
minded others (Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006) and the ability to predict (and 
manipulate) future behaviour is one of the strongest explanations for the evolution of human 
cognitive ability (Byrne & Whiten, 1997; Dunbar, 1998). In terms of cooperative and/or 
altruistic behaviour, individuals behave far more pro-socially when they believe the situation 
places their reputation under threat (Bateson et al., 2006) and conversely will reduce such 
behaviours when the likelihood of future interaction with a specific individual is low  and 
when groups are unstable (O'Gorman et al., 2005). If the purpose of altruism is to secure a 
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positive reputation, there is little point in behaving altruistically when anyone who observed 
the behaviour is no longer around.  
Therefore, one possible way in which individuals can make up the costs of punishment is 
through some sort of reputational gain. It has been suggested that we image-score punishment 
in a similar fashion to altruism (Tennie, 2012) and there is some evidence that individuals 
like those who punish, and that this positive affect  translates into actual material rewards 
(Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008). Indeed, a number of models have shown that such indirect 
benefits from an act of punishment can make the behaviour evolutionarily stable  
(Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Sigmund et al., 2001). If such reputational gains were 
important in enabling the evolution of costly punishment, we may expect punishment 
behaviour to be sensitive to conditions that would maximise the potential for such 
reputational gain, and this does indeed seem to be the case. When punishment decisions are 
non-anonymous, individuals are far more willing to engage in punishment (Bering, 2008; 
Kurzban et al., 2007) as more individuals are present to witness the behaviour. Also when 
groups are stable, that is to say the same individuals will interact repeatedly, individuals are 
far more willing to punish non-co-operators (Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992). 
3.2.2 Type of reputation  
One fundamental question it is important to address is what sort of reputation an individual 
would get from an act of punishment. It has been suggested that punishment might act as a 
costly signal of an individual’s commitment to fairness norms; bearing the cost of costly 
punishment demonstrates, for example, you are an honest person (Nelissen, 2008), and 
indeed, generally those who punish are also highly cooperative (Falk et al., 2005). Such a 
reputation may help recruit cooperative partners or coalition members (something potentially 
vital in our evolutionary history; Gavrilets et al., 2008)  as, for example, we prefer to be in an 
environment where someone will punish unfairness or defections (Gürerk et al., 2006; 
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Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). Indeed, one of the more direct proximate motivations of 
punishment is to change the behaviour of the defecting individual (Fudenberg & Pathak, 
2010) or to remove them from the group altogether (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Masclet, 2003). 
The fear of defectors inhibits cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001), so by signalling a 
willingness to prevent this, punishers provide an environment safe from such threats and are 
thus seen as people worth associating with: it is unlikely to be coincidence that the traits 
attributed to punishers, such as trustworthiness and being group-focused, are those demanded 
of leaders (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012).  
Alternatively, engaging in punishment might be less about signalling hidden pro-social 
personal characteristics and more about signalling personal formidability. While non-human 
animals show only limited evidence of costly punishment, the few examples of a non-human 
animal appearing to punish norm violations occur only where there is a large asymmetry in 
dominance (Flack, de Waal, & Krakauer, 2005; Flack, Girvan, De Waal, & Krakauer, 2006; 
Wong et al., 2007). Thus punishment might enable an individual to signal that they are not to 
be treated unfairly in future dyadic interacting (Barclay, 2006). In fact, Marlowe et al (2008) 
suggested that one reason for the lack of third party punishment in small scale societies is 
that, due to eavesdropping on dyadic interactions, a “don’t mess with me” reputation can be 
easily established without an individual involving themselves in the conflicts of others (See 
also, Rand, Ohtsuki, et al., 2009). 
3.2.3 Personality and punishment 
Individuals experience a great deal of ‘moral outrage’ (Trivers, 1971) when observing an 
unfair interaction and this emotional response is a strong predictor of punishment (de 
Quervain et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2005). Because of this we may expect personality traits that 
lower social affect to also lower punishment behaviour, traits such as those defined as the  
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‘Dark Triad’ of personality: Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism (Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002).  
These personality traits are especially characterised by low affect, low empathy for others and 
short-term strategizing (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), and when individuals high in trait-
Psychopathy received low offers in an Ultimatum Game they accepted these offers more 
often than others (Osumi & Ohira, 2010). In fact high-trait individuals showed behaviour far 
closer to the Nash equilibrium than other participants by accepting far more of these lower 
offers, so we may expect that high Dark Triad individuals will also not punish in a third party 
situation. Nevertheless there is limited and inconsistent data as to how levels of Psychopathy 
and how other ‘Dark Triad Traits’ would affect behaviour in a punishment situation. For 
instance those high in the Dark Triad traits should forgo punishment as they are not 
emotionally aroused by unfairness, i.e. they don’t care about other people. However both 
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe & Smith (2002) and Fehr & Schneider (2009) demonstrated that, 
albeit in a different context, individuals with high Machiavellianism in particular were 
sensitive to potential future gain and the loss of reputation. Furthermore, two of the traits of 
Psychopathy are aggressiveness and impulsivity so we may expect high Dark Triad 
individuals to punish indiscriminately. The current study therefore included a measure of the 
Dark Triad to see how these personality traits affected punishment behaviour. However while 
the Dark Triad may affect punishment behaviour, it is not possible to make a definitive 
prediction about the direction of any effect. 
3.2.4 The current study 
Using fictional vignettes, the current study investigated whether punishment behaviour would 
be sensitive to the potential for reputational gain. The vignette scenarios were manipulated to 
vary the stability of the groups participants were described as being a member of, and the 
extent to which their actions would be observable by others. It was predicted that participants 
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would be most likely to engage in punishment when the groups were described as stable and 
when there would be an audience to that behaviour.  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the psychology department of the University of Exeter via 
the university’s internal email system. A total of 86 participants, 29 Males (M age = 27) and 
58 females (M age = 24) with an overall age range of 18 – 46 completed the questionnaire 
and answered the manipulation check questions successfully (3.3.5). A further 22 participants 
did not complete the questionnaire or failed to correctly answer the manipulation checks. 
Recruitment was conducted between December 2010 and January 2011. 
3.3.2 Materials and procedure 
The survey consisted of two sections. The first section presented participants with an 
experimental vignette and the second section collected personality and demographic 
information. The survey was conducted using the web-based application SurveyMonkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com) and was presented to participants in the order shown below. 
3.3.3 Group stability and Audience to punishment 
Participants were presented with a short vignette asking them to imagine that they were part 
of a 5-person university study group tasked with producing a presentation for a course 
module, a project worth 50% of the marks for that module. The vignette then described how 
one member of the group failed to complete their assigned task. It was stressed the lack of 
contribution from this group member was not due to any extrinsic factors such as ill health 
(for the full vignette, see Appendix A). Participants were then asked the following questions. 
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a) How angry are you with the group member who did not work on the presentation? 
On a scale of 1 – 7 (1 being not angry at all and 7 being extremely angry) 
b) How much would you like to see this person sanctioned in some way for their 
actions? On a scale of 1 – 7 (1 being not at all and 7 at lot)  
The second part of the vignette described the participants preparing to approach the course 
tutor in order to request that the mark received by the defecting group member be reduced. 
Participants were then asked the following questions. 
a) How likely is it you would do the above? On a scale of 1 – 7 (1 = never, 7 = being 
definitely) 
b) How likely do you feel it is that your actions would be supported by the group? On a 
scale of 1 – 7 (1 never and 7 being definitely) 
c) How much would you wish the non-contributor’s mark to be reduced by? On a scale 
of 0 (no change) to 100 (no marks at all) 
The study used a 2x3 design with the stability of the group and audience for the punishment 
(who else knew the participant was about to approach the tutor) being manipulated. In the 
case of Group Stability, participants were either informed in part 1 of the vignette that the 
group would be permanent for that year or that it was a one-off group for that assignment 
only. For Audience, in part 2 participants were informed they had either approached the tutor 
privately, had told the other group members what they were planning, or had let it be known 
to the whole course that they were requesting a grade reduction for the defecting member. 
The final part of the vignette described how another member of the group, Avery (chosen 
from an online list of the top 20 androgynous names; accessed November 2010) told the 
participant and other group members that they had informed the tutor already. Participants 
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were then asked to answer the following questions on a scale of 1-7 (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree).  
a) Avery is a trustworthy individual 
b) Avery is group focused 
c) Avery is a ‘nice’ person 
d) I would happily work with Avery in the future 
e) I would invite Avery to a social occasion 
These 5 items were adapted from Barclay (2006) and had a high reliability index (α=0.88). 
They were therefore collapsed into the single variable “Attitude to Avery” 
3.3.4 Personality Measure: The Dirty Dozen  
The Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) is a 12-point scale developed to measure the 
“Dark Triad” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) of personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism 
and Psychopathy.  The scale provides a compressed alternative to individual measures of 
these traits as together amount to 120 items.  
The measure consists of statements such as “I tend to lack remorse” to which participants 
indicate their level of agreement using a 7-point scale, (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly 
agree). There is a minimum score of 12 and a maximum of 84. The alpha reliability for this 
measure was 0.86. 
3.3.5 Manipulation check and demographic questions  
Following completion of the personality measure, participants were asked the manipulation 
check question. This question asked them to identify, from a list of four possible choices, 
what occurred in the scenario. Data from any participant who did not answer this question 
correctly were excluded from the study. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their sex 
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and age. Following completion of this information, participants were shown a debriefing 
screen explaining the study and thanked for their participation. 
3.4 Results 1: behaviour of participants 
3.4.1 Punishment  
There was a strong correlation between the amount individuals were willing to punish and the 
other variables (Anger at defection, desire to see that person punished, willingness to engage 
in punishment, and feeling of support; see Table 3.1). These variables correlated highly with 
one another and had a high reliability index (α=0.74) and therefore were collapsed into a 
single variable “Outrage”. This new variable was also strongly correlated with the amount 
participants wished to punish the defector (rs=0.53, N=87, p<0.001) 
3.4.2 Group Stability  
Group Stability did not affect Outrage at the defection (stable, M=4.3, SD=1.3, unstable, 
M=4.4, SD=1.1; F1,85=0.38, p=0.54), however there was a trend towards Group Stability 
affecting the amount of punishment participants wished the defector to receive (stable, 
M=32.4, SD=29.3; unstable, M=44.0, SD=33.1; F1,85=30.9, p=0.08) with participants 
wishing to reduce the defector’s mark by a greater amount when the group was unstable As 
shown in Figure 3.1, there was an uneven distribution in punishment (although statistically 
the data are normally distributed; ks=1.320, n=90, p=0.061), with the majority of individual 
choosing to reduce the defector’s mark by 0%, 50% or 100%. To analyse the data further 
therefore, a median split was carried out on the data and, as shown in Figure 3.2, participants 
in the stable group condition were more likely to punish below the median amount of 
punishment (X
2
1=3.98, p=0.046). 
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Table 3.1: the relationship between punishment and the emotional response to a defection 
3.4.3 Audience  
As the Audience manipulation was presented after participants had responded to ‘anger’ and 
‘desire to see defector punished’ items, it was not appropriate to use the ‘Outrage’ variable. 
Therefore, the audience effect on the amount of punishment, willingness to punish, and 
feeling of support were analysed separately. Audience did not have any effect on participant 
responses (MANOVA, F2,84=0.62, p=0.94) and nor were there effects on any individual 
items. Participants were also equally likely to punish above or below the median amount 
  Anger 
Desire for 
punishment 
Willingness 
to punish 
Feeling of 
support 
Amount punished 0.321** 0.47** 0.40** 0.46** 
Anger 
 
0.68** 0.42** 0.31** 
Desire for 
punishment   
0.51** 0.32** 
Willingness to 
punish    
0.28** 
 (N=87, **<0.001, two tailed)       
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Figure 3.1: distribution of the percentage 
participants wished the defector’s marks to be 
reduced. 
Figure 3.2: percentage of participants who 
punished above (grey) or below (blank) the 
median amount of punishment. 
 Measuring punishment behaviour 
104 
 
regardless of the potential Audience (X
2
2=3.81, p=0.144) 
3.4.4 Group Stability and Audience  
As above, the amount of punishment, willingness to punish, and feeling of support were 
analysed as individual variables. There was a significant overall interaction between Group 
Stability and Audience (M ANOVA, F6,160=2.67, p=0.016), however there was no significant 
effect of this interaction on individual variables. An interaction between Group Stability and 
Audience also did not influence whether participants punished above or below the median 
amount (Wald X
2
5=8.91, p=0.11). 
3.4.5 The Dark Triad 
There was no correlation between Dark Triad scores and the amount participants were willing 
to punish the defector (rs=-0.14, N=87, p=0.21) or the amount of ‘Outrage’ participants felt at 
that defection (rs=-0.06, N=89, p=0.59). Individuals who punished above the median amount 
were no more or less likely to exhibit Dark Triad traits than those who punished below 
(Mann-Whitney, U=743.5, N=47/39, p=0.14). 
3.5 Results 2: perception of a punishing other 
3.5.1 Punishment and Outrage 
As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, participants liked Avery (the group member who punished 
the defector) more when they themselves were outraged at the defection (rs=0.33, N=87, 
p=0.002) and when they wanted the defector to be punished by a large amount (rs=0.27, 
N=87, p=0.013). When entered into a Stepwise regression model only Outrage predicted 
attitude to Avery (Adjusted R
2
= 0.16, F1,87=17.88, p<0.001). 
A mediation analysis was conducted with Outrage as the predictor of participant’s attitude to 
Avery, with the amount of punishment participants felt the defector should receive as the 
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mediator. There was no mediation by Punishment on the relationship between Outrage and 
Attitude to Avery (CI95%= -0.05, 0.16). 
3.5.2 Audience, Group Stability and the Dark Triad 
Participants’ attitude to Avery was not affected by how stable the group was (F1,81=0.06, 
p=0.80) or the audience the participants themselves would have faced had they punished 
(F1,81=0.52, p=0.60). There was also no interaction effect of Stability or Audience on 
participant’s Attitude to Avery (F2,81=0.82, p=0.45). There was also no relationship between 
Dark Triad personality traits and attitude to Avery (rs=-0.003, N=87, p=0.98). 
3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Group Stability 
One of the more direct proximate motivations of punishment is to change the behaviour of 
the defecting individual (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010; Masclet, 2003). Thus by initially 
investing in punishment, punishers ensure cooperation in the future. It was predicted 
therefore that in a situation where the participants expected to work with the same individuals 
again, that they would be more willing to punish someone who defected from a group task. 
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Figure 3.4: relationship between participant's 
outrage at a defection and their attitude to a 
punisher. 
Figure 3.3: relationship between the severity 
of the punishment demanded by participants 
and their attitude to a punisher. 
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However, the current study found the opposite; participants were more willing to punish 
when groups were unstable. While this affect was marginal, it does contradict previous 
findings. One explanation may be the fear of retaliation from the defector. Both theoretical 
and experimental studies that have demonstrated that the prospect of retaliation reduces 
costly punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008; Rand et al., 2010) and even without the explicit ability 
to counter-punish, defectors who have been punished will use subsequent punishment rounds 
to retaliate if the person who punished them is identifiable (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006). 
Indeed outside the laboratory, one of the primary reasons members of the public do not 
inform the police of criminal behaviour is the fear of being identified by the criminal 
fraternity (Tarling & Morris, 2010). This may be why other studies have found that 
individuals are just as willing to punish when the behaviour is anonymous (Fudenberg & 
Pathak, 2010) and will actually pay to hide their punishment (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). 
Thus, while participants in both conditions felt equally outraged at the act of defection, and 
outrage is strongly connected to punishment (Marlowe et al., 2010; Reuben & Van Winden, 
2008; Sigmund, 2007; Van’t Wout et al., 2006), only in a situation where it was unlikely that 
participants would have to face the target of their punishment were they willing to punish in 
line with their emotional reaction. When retaliation was possible, i.e. they would meet the 
person again, participants had to reconsider whether to punish. 
Another explanation may be that participants did not want a reputation as a punisher. It has 
been suggested that we reputation-score punishers in a similar fashion to co-operators 
(Tennie, 2012) and there may be negative, as well as positive, repercussions to being seen as 
a ‘punisher’. In the most minimal sense, costly punishment is a dyadic interaction between a 
defector and a third-party who has voluntarily entered into a conflict with the defector 
(although in the case of the current scenarios, via the course tutor) The outcomes of such 
interactions can imply dominance and status (Jones, DeBruine, Little, Watkins, & Feinberg, 
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2011; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Being perceived as dominant can have negative 
consequences on the opinion others form (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Vaillancourt & Hymel, 
2006) and there are mechanisms that ensure individuals cannot ‘false-signal’ dominance or 
status (Anderson et al., 2008; Számadó, 2011a; Tibbetts & Izzo, 2010). Indeed Számadó 
(2011b) demonstrated that signalling displays are kept honest by long term commitments, 
thus when groups were stable participants would have to bear the social ‘badge’ of any 
actions they.  
Thus, while individuals may want to be well-liked by others they may not wish to be seen as 
formidable or to assume the role of ‘policeman’, and with these labels the retaliation and 
conflict they could invite. This is not an aspect of punishment that has received much 
attention, but examining the social consequences of punishment (e.g. on the perceptions of 
observers) may help explain why people do or do not punish, especially in everyday life. 
The results of the current study did not contradict all previous research as, employing a 
similar methodology O'Gorman et al. (2005) failed to find any effect of group stability on 
punishment behaviour. While O'Gorman et al (2005) attribute this to a group selection 
explanation for human sociality, the way in which both that result and the current study differ 
from the literature could be due to the vignette method. On the one hand, punishment in both 
studies was ‘cost free’ in the sense that the hypothetical scenario did not describe an explicit 
imagined cost on the participant for their choices, and the cost of punishment is another 
strong predictor of its occurrence (Falk et al., 2005; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). Indeed 
many models suggest the cost to the punisher, as opposed to the effect punishment has on the 
target, may be the most important factor in the evolution of costly punishment (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996). Thus, the results of the study could be attributed to the fact 
participants did not face any actual costs to their behaviour and may suggest, that in terms of 
investigating punishment behaviour a survey/questionnaire approach may not be appropriate. 
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However, a caveat to this is that both theoretical models and experiments have demonstrated 
that punishment does not have to be costly to be effective at deterring free-riding and 
promoting cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Masclet et al., 2003)  
One reason for the above criticism is that individuals over estimate their willingness to punish 
(Pedersen et al., 2013), so the question remains why, rather than group stability having no 
effect, individuals punished more when groups were unstable; one explanation may also be 
retaliation. One limitation of economic experiments is they artificially limit the information 
and behavioural options open to participants. A case in point is that, despite being a 
consistent motivation of human individual and group behaviour (Barash & Lipton, 2011; 
Mathew & Boyd, 2011), retaliation was not considered as a part of cooperative/punishment 
behaviour until recently  and when it was included the results were dramatic for punishment 
(Nikiforakis, 2008). By asking participants to take the perceptive of the vignette character 
(see Alexander & Becker, 1978), the current study asked them to invoke their individual 
experiences and perceptions of this social behaviour, informal peer-sanctioning, which would 
include any physical or social repercussions for ‘moralistic’ intervention. In fact, this is a 
principle that often underpins studies that employ economic games as a method (Levitt & 
List, 2007). While this is not to say the criticisms of the questionnaire approach are not valid, 
or that in the future other methods would be more appropriate to measure actual punishment 
behaviour, it does suggest that the use of vignettes can be considered a legitimate way to 
study evolved human behaviours. 
3.6.2 Audience 
One cannot establish a reputation without there being an audience to one’s behaviour and a 
number of studies have suggested that when an audience is present individuals are more 
willing to engage in punishment (Bering, 2008; Kurzban et al., 2007). Such an effect makes 
sense if costly punishment can be used to signal hidden qualities about the individual such as 
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their commitment to fairness (Nelissen, 2008) or unwillingness to tolerate any unfairness 
directed against themselves in future social interactions (Barclay, 2006; Baumard & Liénard, 
2011).  However the opposite has also been found. Individuals are sometimes more willing to 
punish when the target of punishment would only be informed at the end of the experiment 
(Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010) and, interestingly, individuals will pay additional sums to have 
their punishment decisions kept hidden from the target and the group as a whole (Rockenbach 
& Milinski, 2011). With this in mind it was predicted that the audience for any punishment 
would have an effect on punishment behaviour, but without a predicted direction. However 
the study found not such effect in either direction. 
While this finding contradicts the suggestion that individuals will aim to maximise (or 
minimise) any reputation gained from an act of punishment it does conform to an alternative 
theory for the evolution of costly punishment, Strong Reciprocity. This theory suggests that 
group-level processes selected for individuals who would act in the best interest of the group 
without concern for their individual well-being or in-line with their individual fitness (Gintis, 
2000). The results therefore may indicate participants were demonstrating a general concern 
for the welfare of the group and egalitarian ‘fairness’ rather than acting to ‘show off’ their 
individual prowess. Thus it was more important that a social defector was punished for their 
actions than that the punisher received attention and acclaim for doing so.  
A more mundane and methodological explanation may be that the manipulation was 
unsuccessful in making the participants feel suitably ‘anonymous’. Certainly, in the economic 
literature at least, there is debate as to how truly anonymous conditions are (Levitt & List, 
2007), with some researchers making a distinction between anonymous behaviour (where no 
one knows who carried out an action) and secret behaviour (where no one knows an action 
took place). The two can produce very different results (Winking & Mizer, 2013). However, 
there were significant effects of group stability on punishment behaviour and this may be 
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because “you will always work in the same group” is fairly unambiguous and the 
consequences of any action are easier to imagine – i.e. “I will have to continue to work with 
the person I just punished”. However, the idea that once it was apparent someone had told the 
course tutor that this behaviour would remain secret may have been harder to imagine: this 
especially applies to whether participants could really imagine a difference in anonymity 
between the “working group only” and “full course” conditions. 
3.6.3 Attitude to punishers 
Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly the clearest, results of the study are those 
regarding the participants’ attitude to another punisher, “Avery”. There was a strong 
relationship between how outraged participants were, their willingness to punish and their 
attitude to Avery. These results agree strongly with the findings from the economic literature, 
firstly in that emotional response to defection influences punishment decision-making 
(Dawes et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2005), and more importantly here, that individuals who 
punish also like those who punish (Barclay, 2006). This does suggest that the results gathered 
by the vignette method can be seen as comparable to the economic literature in regards to 
how participants perceive other punishers. 
The results of the study regarding the relationship between Outrage/Punishment and attitude 
to Avery suggest a number of mechanisms by which a punisher could gain from an act of 
punishment. Firstly, they could suggest that costly punishment operates in a like-attracts-like 
fashion that has been observed in cooperation (Albert et al., 2007; Fehl, van der Post, & 
Semmann, 2011), with individuals preferring to be in groups where everyone else will also 
punish. As one of the main theoretical problems with the evolution of punishment behaviour 
is the cost to the punisher, both in terms of the production of the behaviour (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011) and the potential for retaliation (Dreber & Rand, 2012), pooling 
punishment effort with other like-minded individuals would be advantageous. Boyd et al 
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(2010) suggested that punishment can evolve if there is a way to signal a willingness to 
punish and, Mathew & Boyd (2011), in their study of non-state tribes, found that before 
punishment occurs, a great deal of discussion takes place to ensure a large number of people 
agree with this decision. Experiments have also shown that, despite the costs of such 
mechanisms, participants prefer environments where the costs of punishment are pooled 
(Traulsen et al., 2012). This suggests that individuals may in fact be conditional punishers as 
well as conditional co-operators (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2005; Peter, Ottone, & Ponzano, 
2010) and that engaging in punishment is as much a coordination signal as it is a costly signal 
of one’s character. 
However, while there was a relationship between participants’ punishment behaviour and 
their attitude to Avery, this relationship disappeared when participants’ outrage was 
considered as a variable: even individuals who didn’t punish the defector, despite being 
outraged, still liked Avery. Thus a second explanation is that the reputational benefits of 
punishment are not so much “like-attracts-like” as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. In 
a very Hobbesian fashion, despite the threat of perverse or anti-social punishment 
(Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008), the reduction in group efficiency 
punishment causes (Traulsen et al., 2012), or simply the lack of freedom to free ride, 
individuals prefer environments were punishment is possible (Gürerk et al., 2006; 
Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). Engaging in punishment therefore may not be a signal to 
attract other punishers per se, but a signal to others of your willingness to uphold fairness 
norms yourself, which will help attract cooperative partners. As individuals tend to fear 
defection, and reduce their cooperation as a result (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010), joining the 
group of someone with a reputation for enforcing cooperation and fairness will likely be 
advantageous for all. Studies (for example, O'Gorman et al., 2009) have shown that a single 
punisher can be as effective as many. Why outraged participants liked Avery is the reflection 
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of why they didn’t punish as expected; participants were unwilling to don the ‘punisher’ 
badge themselves, but want to be around an individual who was willing to. 
The advantage of the latter explanation is that, while in both explanations punishment acts as 
a costly signal, in the case of the latter explanation the returns would not be diminished by 
second-order free-riding. In the former case however the cost of punishment cannot be 
recovered if others do not join in with the behaviour. Indeed, Boyd et al (2010) comment that 
one issue of punishment as a coordination signal is that someone could incite punishment but 
not actual take part, i.e. use ‘moralisation’ strategically (Peterson, 2012). However, if 
punishment is a costly signal of other qualities, then any cost is recuperated through gains in 
reputation, be it egalitarian intent or formidability. This indicates that while potentially costs 
could be reduced if other individuals also punish (and this may certainly happen), that is not 
the primary mechanism by which the costs of punishment are reduced or offset. 
3.6.4 Dark Triad  
The study did not find any evidence that Dark Triad personality traits had any effect on 
punishment behaviour, nor were they associated with the level of anger participants felt at an 
act of defection. As stated in 3.2.3, on the one hand Dark Triad traits are associated with low 
social affect (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) and more rational economic behaviour (Osumi & 
Ohira, 2010), but on the other they, and especially Machiavellianism, are associated with 
social manipulation and reputation management (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002; Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002). Therefore no predictions were made about the direction the effect of Dark 
Triad traits on punishment might take. Nevertheless it was predicted that they would have an 
effect on punishment, and this was not the case. While emotion might play a role in 
punishment behaviour (Falk et al., 2005), as discussed in the sections above (2.6.2, 2.6.3) and 
as will be elaborated upon in Study 2, individuals might demonstrate more strategic concerns 
when choosing to engage in punishment.  
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3.6.5 Limitations  
One direct limitation of the study, which may be responsible for the contradiction in results 
between group stability and audience, is the ordering of the questions. The group stability 
manipulation appeared first in the text and after this participants answered a series of 
questions. It was only following this that participants were informed about the audience for 
punishment, and they may not have attended to this new information. While a general 
manipulation check was carried out (“What happened in the scenario”) the questionnaire did 
not include a specific manipulation check to ensure participants noticed the manipulation. 
Additionally, the study did not include the option to give a qualitative explanation for their 
answer, which might have provided further evidence of success/failure of the experimental 
manipulations and whether factors such as group opinion or the potential for retaliation were 
part of participants’ decision making.  
Another limitation, and one inherent to the survey method, is the lack of actual cost to the 
punishment decision making. Fundamentally participants are being asked to imagine what 
they would do ‘if’ something occurred, and they may not be correct or honest in predicting 
their own behaviour. This is one reason why in behavioural economics there is a consensus 
that any pay off must be dependent on a participant’s actual behaviour (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2001). This is not a problem that is easily solved, but others (e.g. O'Gorman et al., 2005) have 
argued convincingly that the fictional vignette approach does have merit. Indeed, the most 
concrete results from the current study were generated from the attitude to a punisher part of 
the questionnaire and these results match those from economic experiments, experiments that 
asked for responses to economic behaviour in terms of social opinions (Barclay, 2006) and 
actual monetary reward (Nelissen, 2008). This suggests that survey method would be more 
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suitable to investigate participant opinions about others who engage in costly punishment, 
rather than predictions about their own punishment behaviour.  
Finally, the study did not measure whether the actions of Avery also led to him/her being 
seen as more formidable. It is important to test whether this occurs as one of the reasons we 
have suggested for the unstable group results of punishment behaviour is that participants did 
not want to be seen as formidable, even if they would also be treated well by others 
(Nelissen, 2008). This is also important as such a result may help explain the evolutionary 
origins of the behaviour as, for example Pederson et al (2013) suggested that no theory about 
the evolution of costly punishment could be considered accurate unless there was a clear 
connection to the behaviour of non-human animals. Given much aggressive behaviour in 
non-human animals, and certainly primates, is linked to dominance and status contests 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Silk, 2003), that punishers are perceived to be more 
formidable may suggest punishment has its origins here rather than in the maintenance of 
cooperation. 
3.6.6 Conclusion 
The study investigated whether participants would alter how much they believed they would 
punish a social defector depending on the stability of the group and the audience to the 
punishment. The audience for punishment had no effect on predicted punishment behaviour, 
and while group stability did affect this, the direction of the effect was contrary to 
predictions. Participants were more willing to punish in the unstable condition, and we 
suggest this was because participants were unwilling to endure the possible negative 
responses that punishment would bring in a stable group. Nevertheless, the latter result was 
marginal and we suggest that an alternative explanation for both results might be that (with 
numerous caveats) the use of vignettes is not appropriate to investigate punishment 
behaviour.  
 Measuring punishment behaviour 
115 
 
The study also found that participant anger and punishment behaviour strongly affected their 
opinion of a punishing other, Avery. We suggest that punishment can act as a costly signal, 
either to fellow punishers as a way to coordinate and reduce the cost of subsequent 
punishment, or to attract cooperative partners by signalling that the punisher will police 
fairness in their vicinity. These results also conform to the findings of experiments employing 
different methodologies and this suggests that vignettes could be a useful and practical tool in 
investigating the reputational rewards of punishment, as they are in other areas of social and 
evolutionary psychology. 
3.7 Study 2: actions speak louder than words: the response to deceptive and non-
deceptive signalling of punishment behaviour 
Punishment, or the threat thereof, can be a powerful motivator for encouraging cooperation; 
groups not only cooperate more when punishment is possible (Fehr & Gächter, 2000), but 
such groups (eventually) also out-compete those where punishment is not possible (Gächter 
et al., 2008). However, while advantageous at a group level, the cost to the individual who 
engages in punishment is such that explaining how the behaviour could evolve has been 
problematic (Dreber & Rand, 2012; Dreber et al., 2008). 
One potential solution to this problem is to distribute punishment between many individuals. 
Early research into the effect of punishment on cooperation found that when individuals were 
given a brief period prior to testing to discuss their responses to free-riding, more individuals 
were willing to punish free riding in the experiment itself (Ostrom et al., 1992). Indeed, when 
the punishment of social defectors occurs in non-state societies, it does so after a long 
consultation process amongst many individuals  (Mathew & Boyd, 2011). More recently, 
Traulsen, et al (2012) showed that participants preferred a pool-punishment mechanism, 
where participants paid a small amount to a ‘punishment pool’ that was automatically used to 
punish low contributors if there were sufficient contributions to the pool, over a peer-
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punishment system that is the standard in public goods games. This finding corresponds 
closely to a theoretical model by Boyd et al (2010) which demonstrated that costly 
punishment could be evolutionarily stable if punishers could somehow signal their 
willingness to punish a social transgression, but only actually (collectively) punished when a 
certain threshold of willing punishers was reached. 
3.7.1 Honest signalling 
One issue, however, is what form this signal could take for it to be an honest signal of intent. 
One potential solution is that engaging in punishment may itself act as an honest signal, due 
to the production costs (Frank, 1996) and potential repercussions (Rand et al., 2010; Tibbetts 
& Izzo, 2010). These costs would exclude anyone unwilling, or unable, to actually take part 
in punishment. For instance, while anti-social punishment does occur, the majority of 
individuals who punish are also highly cooperative (Barclay, 2006; Lehmann, Rousset, Roze, 
& Keller, 2007), with anti-social punishment disappearing entirely when punishment is no 
longer cheap (Falk et al., 2005). Study 1 in this chapter found a strong positive association 
between punishment behaviour and the attitude to punishing individuals, suggesting 
punishers may be seeking one another out based on their actual behaviour. This curtails the 
need for an independent signal of intent, as a reputation for punishment may itself act as the 
signal (Barclay, 2006), and mirrors findings from cooperation research suggesting that like-
minded individuals cluster together (Albert et al., 2007; Skyrms & Pemantle, 2000). 
However, this creates a paradox whereby in order for punishers to signal and coordinate their 
punishment, and thus enable punishment to be evolutionarily stable, they have to punish 
independently first. 
Therefore, as noted by Boyd et al (2010), if punishers are to signal their desire to punish, and 
if the signal is to be effective at both promoting mass action and not harming the producer, it 
must be low cost or cost free. A candidate for this type of signal may be language.  Recent 
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work has demonstrated that the ability to publicly identify free-riders enhances cooperation 
(Bazzan & Dahmen, 2010) and it has been suggested that language evolved to aid the transfer 
of socially salient information (Dunbar, 2004). Indeed, while those who engage in social 
gossip are generally disliked, the gossiper can gain a positive reputation if the content relates 
to social defections (Peters & Kashima, In Press). So, vocalising anger or outrage over 
another’s behaviour could act as a signal to others. There is, however, the issue of deceptive 
signalling. Language itself is very cheap to produce; an individual could pay a small cost to 
trigger others into punishment without paying the full cost of being involved. This is not an 
unlikely scenario as it has been suggested that moral outage at social defections may be an act 
of last resort by individuals who cannot defend themselves directly from exploitative or 
unfair behaviour (Peterson, 2012). 
3.7.2 Conventional signalling and retaliation 
A solution to this problem is that, while being cheap to produce, a vocal signal of outrage 
may be honest due to the response it provokes in conspecifics. For example, studies on 
territorial calls in birds have demonstrated that while vocalisations cost little enough 
energetically as to be considered cost free, they act as honest signals due to the antagonistic 
response they elicit from neighbours (Molles & Vehrencamp, 2001). In terms of punishment 
specifically, retaliation to an act of punishment has been shown to severely curtail 
punishment behaviour (Janssen & Bushman, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Rand et al., 2010), and 
this effect may also apply to any sort of precursory behaviour. Firstly, verbal challenges are 
seen as effective punishment (Masclet et al., 2003; Ostrom et al., 1992), clearly suggesting 
that verbal challenges are perceived as punishment, and  it has been found that verbal insults 
or challenges are taken very seriously, and are as likely to lead to physical fights as physical 
challenges (Felson, 1982). Thus, denouncing someone for their behaviour will likely result in 
a similar reaction to that triggered by actual punishment. Vocalising a willingness to punish 
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might, therefore, be a conventional signal, cheap to produce but with the potential reaction of 
the target ensuring its honesty. 
Even if the retaliation costs are not as certain for signals of intent to punish as they are for 
punishment behaviour, there are other costs to signalling a willingness to punish. One such 
cost is that is forces the signaller to inhibit their own behaviour. We dislike hypocrites far 
more than plain defectors (Kurzban, 2012), so the act of signalling outrage at another’s 
behaviour is costly in the sense that it prevents the signaller from taking part in the punished 
action themselves (Peterson, 2011). Equally costly might be the response of the other 
individuals who engaged in punishment after any signal was sent. In this regard, the situation 
can be seen as a prisoner’s dilemma interaction where, following a mutual signal to punish, 
individuals can either cooperate (follow through with their intention) or defect (stand back 
and let others punish); and individuals react very negatively and seek retribution when they 
are defected against  (Fehr, 2004; Nowak et al., 2000). In fact, such breaking of social 
contracts is viewed far more negatively by observers than, for example, the inequitable 
division of resources (Fehr, 2004). The advantage of this explanation is that it allows for the 
case where punishers can coordinate punishment without the target knowing: while someone 
willing to give a dishonest signal may never face retaliation from the target, they would still 
face a response from their duped comrades. 
3.7.3 Personality and punishment  
Study 1 did not support the idea that punishment behaviour would be related to Dark Triad 
personality traits. Measures of these variables were included again in the present study in 
case the results of Study 1 were idiosyncratic. However, their failure prompted the 
consideration of other individual difference variables that might be relevant, and one that 
commanded attention was dominance. Firstly, dominant individuals are in a position that 
inherently reduces the cost of punishment. Dominant individuals have access to greater 
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resources (for example, because others wish to associate with them, Barclay, 2013; and 
because they can monopolise group resources Cheney, 2011) and therefore the net cost of 
punishment is lower for dominants. Secondly, dominant individuals are less likely to face the 
threat of retaliation from the target of punishment; as in other forms of social interaction, 
subordinate individuals might simply submit to the demands of a more powerful individual  
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Eckel et al., 2010). Finally, physical or social dominance is a 
strong predictor of anger (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) which in turn can lead to punishment 
behaviour. Indeed, research into welfare trade-offs has suggested that being in a dominant 
position calibrates an individual’s expectations of how they should be treated and what they 
deserve, which manifests as anger when these expectations are not met (Sell, Tooby, et al., 
2009).  
Therefore, when faced with a social defection or free-riding, we may expect a more dominant 
individual to be more willing to punish because the production and/or retaliation costs are 
less for them, and because they will react more negatively to any behaviour that affects them 
personally (Brosnan, 2011; Cummins, 1999). Equally, and for the same reasons, we might 
expect more dominant individuals to react negatively to being ‘tricked’ by someone false-
signalling a willingness to engage in punishment. 
3.7.4 The Current Study 
The current study therefore tested how punishers respond to signals from another individual. 
Firstly, it examined whether individuals were more willing to punish when others have 
signalled that they too wished to punish a defector. Secondly, the study investigated how 
participants would respond when this other individual acted contrary to or in accordance with 
their previous signal. Informed by the results of Study 1, as well as asking participants to 
indicate their desire to punish and their opinion of the other individual on 7-point scales, the 
current study also included a short qualitative section where they were asked to explain their 
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actions. This was to ensure that, compared to Study 1, there would be less conjecture as to the 
motivations of the participants. 
3.8 Method 
3.8.1 Participants 
A total of 76 participants, recruited from the psychology departments of three UK universities 
via each of their internal email systems, the University of Exeter (n=33), Manchester 
Metropolitan University (n=34) and the University of York (n=9), successfully completed the 
survey. Nine of the participants were Males (M age = 26) and 67 were females (M age = 23); 
the overall age range was 18 – 51. 42 additional participants were excluded as they failed the 
manipulation check (see 3.8.6). All data were collected between April and May 2011. 
No significant differences were found between the three departments on any of the measured 
variables, so the university participants attended was not included in further analyses. 
3.8.2 Materials and procedure 
The survey consisted of three sections: the main experimental treatment containing the 
signalling manipulation, a section that collected personality information, and a section 
collecting demographic information that also contained the manipulation checks. The survey 
was conducted using the web-based application SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com). 
The survey was presented to participants in the order shown below. 
3.8.3 Signalling and punishment scenario 
Participants were presented with a short vignette asking them to imagine themselves 
travelling to a ski resort with other students of unspecified gender after winning a prize draw. 
It was stressed that while everyone was from their university, no one on the trip knew one 
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another. Participants were informed that a member of their 5-person chalet (“Charlie”1) was 
consistently refusing to clean up after making a mess in the kitchen (for the full vignette, see 
Appendix A). 
Participants then encountered the ‘signalling’ manipulation; they were informed of a 
conversation they had with another housemate (“Alex”1) who either said he found Charlie’s 
behaviour be to unacceptable and said they should confront Charlie together; said he was 
annoyed but didn’t want to get involved; or conversed about an unrelated matter (neutral 
control). Following this, participants were shown the following statements and asked to 
indicate their agreement, on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very): 
a) How angry are you at the behaviour of Charlie?  
b) How likely is it you would confront Charlie about his behaviour? 
c) If you confronted Charlie, how likely is it that other people in the chalet would 
support you? 
Following this, participants encountered the honest/dishonest manipulation. Participants were 
informed they had indeed confronted Charlie about his behaviour and had looked for support 
to Alex, who either did support them or did not, giving the study a 2x3 design. Participants 
were asked to indicate their opinion of Alex using the same ‘likability’ items as detailed in 
Study 1 (2.3.3). As in Study 1, these items had a high reliability index in this study (α=0.91) 
and were collapsed into the single “attitude to Alex” variable.  
Participant were also asked to rate their feelings towards Alex using the Ekman emotions. 
They were asked for their agreement with the following statements, on a scale of 1 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree): 
                                                          
1
 A pilot study was conducted which determined these to be the most androgynous names. For the sake of 
clarity, male personal pronouns will be used when referring to these characters 
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a) I am angry at Alex 
b) I am disgusted by Alex 
c) I am afraid of Alex 
d) I am happy with Alex 
e) I am saddened by Alex 
f) I am surprised by Alex 
Participants were then presented with the final part of the vignette containing the critical 
question. The passage informed participants that it was the last day of the trip and they were 
the last to leave the chalet. Having locked the door, and carrying their luggage, participants 
were told they noticed a souvenir Alex had bought but had clearly left behind. They were 
asked to rate, on a scale of 1-7 (1=not likely at all, 7=very likely) how likely it would be that 
they would go back for his property. Participants were also asked to give a qualitative 
explanation for their decision. 
3.8.4 The Trait Dominance-Submissiveness Scale (TDS) 
The Trait Dominance-Submissiveness Scale (Mehrabian, 1994) is a 26-item scale designed to 
measure trait dominance independent of arousal or extraversion and contains questions such 
as “When I am with someone else, I usually make the decisions”. The version used here 
asked participants to indicate their agreement with such statements on a 9-point scale (1= 
Very strong disagreement, 9= Very strong agreement) with a ‘1’ response subsequently being 
scored as -4 and a ‘9’ response scored +4. The alpha reliability for this measure was 0.91. 
3.8.5 The Dirty Dozen  
As with Study 1, the current study also examined any potential effects of anti-social 
personality traits on punishment behaviour. The Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) is a 
12-point scale developed to measure the “Dark Triad” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) of 
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personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy.  The scale provides a 
compressed alternative to individual measures of these traits which together amount to 120-
items.  
There were no significant results associated with the Dirty Dozen personality measure. 
Because the non-significant results replicated the findings of Study 1, the non-significant 
results of the current study will not be discussed further. 
3.8.6 Comprehension and manipulation check questions  
Following completion of the personality measure, participants were asked two questions 
about the scenario. One was a comprehension check which asked them to identify what 
Charlie was doing, and the second was a manipulation check to ensure they had noticed 
Alex’s honest or deceptive signal to support them. 
3.9 Results 
3.9.1 Reaction to Charlie  
As shown in figure 3.5, participants felt more supported when Alex also indicated his 
willingness to punish (F2,73=4.15, p=0.02). Bonferroni-corrected pair comparisons found a 
significant difference in feeling of support between the help and refuse conditions only 
(p=0.016). Anger was strongly correlated with a willingness to confront Charlie (rs=0.34, 
N=76, p=0.002), but was did not correlate with Support (rs=0.02, N=76, p=0.84). 
A step-wise linear regression carried out with Alex’s signal, Support and Anger included as 
the predictor variables found that Anger accounted for 11% of variation in 
confronting/punishment behaviour (Unadjusted R
2
=0.112, Adjusted R
2
= 0.10, F1,74=9.337, 
p<0.001). Alex’s signal and Support were excluded from the model. This suggests that while 
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participants did respond to the manipulation, as suggested by the variation of support, this 
was not factored into the decision to confront Charlie about his behaviour. 
3.9.2 Attitude to Alex 
Whether Alex signalled that he would help (M=4, SD=1.6), refuse to help (M=4.1, SD=1.2) 
punish Charlie or did not mention the subject (M=3.9, SD=1.2) had no effect on how 
positively participants viewed him (F2,70=0.37, p=0.69). As shown in Figure 3.6 participants 
did view Alex positively if he assisted them in the punishment (F1,70=21.34, p<0.001). As 
also shown in figure 3.6, participant attitude to Alex was affected by an interaction between 
his signal and his behaviour (F2,70=3.70, p=0.03), with participants viewing Alex more 
positively when he signalled his refusal or signalled nothing and then also refused to engage 
in the actual punishment of Charlie. That is to say, participants liked Alex more when his 
signal was honest, even if this meant he did not assist in their punishment of Charlie. 
A step-wise linear regression was carried out with Alex’s signal, Alex’s behaviour, Support, 
Anger and willingness to punish entered into the model. Alex’s behaviour accounted for 20% 
of the variance in positive attitude to Alex (Adjusted R
2
= 0.20, F1,74=19.71, p<0.001; β=0.46, 
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Figure 3.5: how supported participants felt in 
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Figure 3.6: attitude to Alex when he did (blank) or 
did not (grey) assist in punishing Charlie in relation 
to the former’s initial signal. 
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p<0.001), with Anger accounting for a further 4% (Adjusted R
2
= 0.24, F1,74=12.89, p<0.001; 
β=0.23, p=0.028). 
3.9.3 Emotional response to Alex (The Ekman emotions) 
There was no overall effect of Alex’s initial signal on the emotional response to him 
(MANOVA, F12,132=0.637, p=0.808), nor did the initial signal affect any emotional 
individually. However, as shown in Figure 3.7 Alex’s actions did affect the overall emotional 
response to him (MANOVA, F6,65=0.637, p<0.001), with participants being less happy 
(F1,70=15.21, p<0.001), more disgusted (F1,70=17.37, p<0.001) more angry (F1,70=41.42, 
p<0.001) and more saddened (F1,70=57.66, p<0.001) by Alex when he failed to aid in the 
punishment of Charlie. Participants’ emotional response to Alex was also affected by an 
interaction between his signal and his action (MANOVA, F12,132=2.59, p=0.004), however 
this effect was driven by surprise at Alex’s behaviour (F2,70=13.58, p<0.001, see Figure 3.8). 
With “surprise” removed from the analysis, there was no longer a significant overall 
interaction between signal and action on emotional response (MANOVA, F10,134=1.004, 
p=0.443). This suggests that while participants clearly noticed any conflicts between Alex’s 
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Figure 3.7: emotional reaction to Alex whether he punished (blank) or did not 
punish (grey). Bars = 1 standard error. 
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signals and behaviour, their emotional response was driven by his actions alone. 
3.9.4 Punishment of Alex 
Participants were willing to help Alex by retrieving his lost property regardless of his initial 
signal (help, M=5.9, SD=1.5; refuse, M=6.1, SD=1.2, no signal, M=6.3, SD=1.2; F2,70=0.54, 
p=0.59), his actual behaviour (help, M=6.2, SD=1.2; refuse, M=6.0, SD=1.2; F1,70=0.66, 
p=0.42), or how these interacted (F2,70=0.47, p=0.76). In addition, there was no relationship 
between the anger participants may have felt at Alex and their willingness to help him (rs=-
0.11, N=76, p=0.36) or any other variables. It should be noted that the mean response to this 
question was high, 6.1 of a maximum of 7; participants were simply overwhelmingly helpful.  
Participants were also asked to give a qualitative explanation for their behaviour towards 
Alex. There were six common themes identified in participant responses (see Table 3.2) with 
“Moral” and “Quid Pro Quo” being the most common overall and occurring across both of 
Alex’s potential behaviours. Many participants suggested they would want someone to do the 
same for them in the future; i.e. expected some form of direct or indirect reciprocity (Quid 
Pro Quo). Indeed while the prevailing response to Alex’s refusal to help was “Two wrongs do 
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Figure 3.8: participant's surprise that Alex did (blank) or did not 
(grey) punish in relation to his initial signal. 
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not make a right” some participants did indicate that a desire to be seen as the “better person” 
was behind their altruism.  
Interestingly participants did take context into account when Alex did not signal any 
behaviour (the neutral condition). Participants made reference to Alex potentially being 
nervous or shy so that it would be wrong to punish him for his behaviour. Overall participants 
did favour helping Alex, but did so for very different reasons between the conditions. They 
were basing their behaviour more on Alex’s “actions” when he had supported them, but when 
he did not, on general social norms surrounding appropriate behaviour. 
 
Table 3.2: summary of most common participant responses to Alex's behaviour 
 
 Signal Help Refuse No Signal 
Action Help Refuse Help Refuse Help Refuse 
"Quid pro quo"  3 2 3 4 6 1 
"Moral"  4 5 3 4 6 7 
"Action" 2 2 1 
 
3 
 
"Better Person" 
     
3 
"Effort" 
    
4 1 
"Understanding" 
     
5 
"Quid pro quo"  Participants indicated helped Alex as "they would like 
someone to do that for them" 
"Moral"  Participants indicated it was the "right thing to do" or 
something they should do 
"Action" Participants indicated their behaviour was in direct 
response to Alex's actions 
"Better Person" Participants indicated that helping Alex would show what a 
better person they were 
"Effort" Participant indicated helping Alex would be little effort 
"Understanding" Participants specifically indicated they understood why 
Alex may have acted as he did 
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3.9.5 Dominance 
3.9.5.1 Attitude to the defector (Charlie) 
There was a significant positive correlation between dominance and a willingness to confront 
Charlie (rs=0.47, N=76, p<0.001), however there was no positive correlation between 
participant anger at Charlie’s defection and dominance (rs=0.015, N=76, p=0.90) 
Dominance was added to a step-wise regression model with support, anger and Alex’s signal 
and this revealed dominance to be individually to be responsible for 20% of variance in 
willingness to confront (Adjusted R
2
= 0.209, F1,74=20.821, p<0.001), with anger and 
dominance predicting 31% of variance (Adjusted R
2
= 0.299, F2,73=16.983, p<0.001). This 
suggests that trait-dominance had a more powerful influence on a willingness to confront 
than emotion or the potential for support from others. 
3.9.5.2 Attitude to Alex 
Trait-dominance only correlated significantly with how likable participants believed Alex to 
be (rs=-0.227, N=76, p=0.015), with more dominant individuals liking Alex less. It did not 
correlate with any of the emotional responses to him. A step-wise regression model was 
created with Anger at Charlie, Dominance and Alex’s actions and, as shown in Table 3.3, 
while dominance was added into the model, it only explained 4% of the variance in attitude 
to Alex. While dominance could affect how participants respond to defection (see Sell, 
Tooby, et al., 2009) trait-dominance did not mediate the relationship between Alex’s 
behaviour and their opinion of him (CI95% =-0.012/0.03). 
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Table 3.3: model summary 
 
3.9.5.3 Punishment of Alex 
Trait-dominance did not correlate with the decision to retrieve Alex’s property (rs=0.126, 
N=76, p=0.27) and nor did dominance moderate any relationship with this decision and 
Alex’s behaviour (CI95%=-0.02/0.02). 
3.10 Discussion 
Boyd et al (2010) suggested that if individuals could cheaply coordinate punishment prior to 
the action itself, then punishment behaviour could evolve even when initially rare. The 
primary aims of the study were to investigate the behavioural realities of this model, i.e. 
whether individuals would alter their punishment behaviour in response to a signal from 
another, and whether there would be any negative consequences to signalling a willingness to 
engage in punishment and then withdrawing from any subsequent action. The current study 
failed to find any evidence that a cheap verbal signal from one individual altered the 
punishment behaviour of participants, and while there was some evidence suggesting 
participants disliked false-signallers, their response to Alex was primarily driven by his 
behaviour alone. Furthermore, the study did not find any evidence that a deceptive signaller 
would actually be punished for their actions. 
Model variables 
Adjusted 
r2 F df P β 
1 Behaviour of Alex 0.2 19.71 1,74 <0.001 0.46 
2 Behaviour of Alex  
0.26 12.9 2,73 <0.001 
0.46 
  Anger at Charlie 0.23 
3 Behaviour of Alex  
0.31 11.02 3,72 <0.001 
0.44 
 
Anger at Charlie 0.24 
  Dominance -0.23 
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3.10.1  Signal of punishment and participant behaviour 
 In response to some of the limitation of Study 1, the first question to address is whether 
participants responded to the experimental manipulation. All participants included in the 
analysis of Study 2 successfully passed the manipulation check, and importantly, seemed to 
respond to the initial set of questions as one would predict: as shown in Figure 3.5 they felt 
far more supported by others when Alex signalled he would assist in the punishment of 
Charlie. However this did not affect their punishment behaviour, for which the only 
significant predictor was the anger felt at the defection. This support the finding that 
emotional response is the strongest predictor of punishment behaviour (Falk et al., 2005), 
which itself may help explain why there tends to be ‘over punishment’ when multiple 
individuals can punish (Peter et al., 2010); individuals are more concerned with ensuring a 
defector is punished than with effective coordination. And while coordination can help lower 
the costs of punishment, others have shown that costly punishment can be both effective and 
evolutionarily stable even if there is no coordination between punishers (Bowles & Gintis, 
2004). After all punishment is seen as a ‘human universal’ (Fehr & Gächter, 2002) driven by 
the ‘moral outrage’ that acts of defection induces; perhaps participants ‘would have 
confronted Charlie anyway’ and thus paid little attention to this signal alone. 
For the results of the Boyd (2010) model to be fulfilled, individuals would have to respond to 
relatively-cost free signal by another. However, participants in this study simply did not 
respond to the verbal (potentially cost-free) signal from Alex when making their punishment 
decisions. 
3.10.2 Response to honest or deceptive signalling 
The study found some evidence that participants responded negatively to false signalling: 
when Alex signalled a willingness to punish and then refused, he was disliked more than 
when he honestly signalled his intention not to help. Indeed, participants were surprised when 
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Alex went against his word which, if nothing else, demonstrate that participants had attended 
to the second piece of information about Alex’s behaviour in the vignette. 
However, despite false signalling having a negative effect on social attitude to the signaller, 
participants were primarily concerned with the signaller’s actual behaviour: whether Alex 
engaged in punishment with them or not. Participants demonstrated significant differences in 
attitude and emotional response to Alex depending on whether or not he joined them in the 
actual confrontation. This potentially indicates a like-attracts-like property amongst punishing 
individuals (Albert et al., 2007; Skyrms & Pemantle, 2000) with those who punish being 
liked far more by individuals who also punish. While potentially in a future situation the 
presence of a known punisher would encourage others to also join in, this can be considered a 
secondary effect of a separate motivation to punish. 
This may be why participants did not respond to the verbal signal from Alex: given the costs 
involved in actual punishment behaviour, from either the production of that behaviour (Frank, 
1996) or the risk of retaliation (Dreber et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008), only actually engaging 
in punishment may be (potentially) costly enough to signal something about the individual. 
Individuals do, for example, pay close attention to the actual cost of any punishment 
(Nelissen, 2008) and there is a is a strong connection between costly punishment and 
cooperative behaviour (Barclay, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2007). Furthermore, when punishment 
is very costly, only moralistic punishment of free-riders occurs (as opposed to a mix of anti-
social, spiteful and random punishment, Falk et al., 2005). Therefore, only by actually 
punishing can an individual send an honest signal of a commitment to fairness and pro-social 
social norms. In fact, Duffy and Feltovich (2002) demonstrated that when there is any 
ambiguity in the motives of a signaller, for example here perhaps an attempt to deceive the 
receiver (the participant) into punishing,  receivers will rely on past actions alone. Thus, only 
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a reputation for actually engaging in punishment acts as a predictor of future social 
behaviour: actions speak louder than words. 
3.10.3 Punishment of a deceptive signaller 
While participants responded far more to the actions of Alex, they did demonstrate some 
reactions to the interaction of signal and behaviour, with Alex being significantly more 
disliked when he signalled a willingness to assist in punishment, but subsequently withdrew 
that support. This negative response in social attitude demonstrates a potential cost of the 
false signal as, for example, there is a strong association between (a lack of) positive attitude 
to someone, trust in them and cooperation (Albert et al., 2007; Gächter et al., 2004; Rotter, 
1980). While not tested explicitly in this study, the negative attitude may have led to future 
social ostracism of Alex by participants. Indeed, individuals tend to self-assort in a ‘like-
attracts-like’ fashion when given the opportunity to adjust their social ties (Fehl, van der Post, 
& Semmann; Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011; Santos et al., 2006), and so the cost to 
Alex’s deceptive signalling may be in the form of the loss of long term social opportunities 
rather than in a direct response to his action.  
Regardless of any long-term social costs, what the study did not find was any direct 
retaliation against Alex for any combination of signal and behaviour: participants 
overwhelmingly did not take advantage of the opportunity to punish Alex by withdrawing 
cooperation. An explanation for this is offered by the qualitative information collected at the 
end of the study, as participants did not want to violate wider norms of cooperative behaviour 
(Moshagen, Hilbig, & Musch, 2011). While no specific method of analysis was applied to 
this data, in the majority of cases no deeper investigation was needed as participants made 
quite definite statements, such as wishing to be seen “as the better person” and the desire not 
to be caught “stooping to their level”. This suggests that participants were more concerned 
with their reputation as a ‘nice’, rather than antagonistic, person.  
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An alternative explanation for the lack of a response to Alex’s false signalling may be the 
threat of retaliation from Alex. Opportunity for retaliation significantly curtails punishment 
behaviour (Janssen & Bushman, 2008; Rand et al., 2010), and long-term vendettas are a 
feature of human societies regardless of how such vendettas started (Topalli et al., 2002; 
Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Thus participants may have either feared a response from Alex or at 
least wished to avoid a string of tit for tat punitive actions. Conversely, the lack of overt 
punishment from participants may be due to a lack of retaliation in the vignette: the scenario 
did not describe what became of the initial confrontation, and participants who received the 
deceptive signal might have responded far more negatively to being ‘tricked’ had the 
punishment resulted some form of retaliation from Charlie, i.e. they had they paid an explicit 
cost for being abandoned by Alex. 
3.10.4 Trait-Dominance 
When the response to the initial (i.e. Charlie’s) defection was considered, dominance 
appeared to have an important impact on social decision-making. This is interesting in itself 
as it suggests that while anger at a defection may be important in driving punishment 
behaviour (Falk et al., 2005), there are other factors that curtail actual punishment behaviour. 
We suggested in Study 1 that one reason participants’ preferred to punish anonymously, 
despite being angry, was an unwillingness to bear the reputational marker that engaging in 
punishment might provide. Here, dominant individuals were more willing to confront Charlie 
about his behaviour, with dominance being a greater predictor of this confrontation even than 
anger.  
This result is interesting as it might suggest that costly punishment behaviour may be 
primarily carried out by dominant individuals. This is important as the main results of the 
current study suggest that the costs of punishment cannot be reduced by simply signalling a 
desire to punish, and a dominant position provides an individual with numerous ways to 
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punish at a lower cost without the need for the involvement of others. For example, dominant 
individuals possess greater resources, are surrounded by individuals willing to provide 
assistance in exchange for contact (Schino & Aureli, 2009) and, as we are unwilling to 
challenge more dominant individual regardless of their behaviour (Egas & Riedl, 2008; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Kim et al., 1998), being dominant might lower the cost of 
retaliation. If nothing else, dominant individuals enjoy a freedom of action not open to others 
and consequently the defection of others from an agreed action is not so great a risk. While 
this is, for the moment, purely speculative, it does hint at an alternative explanation for the 
emergence of costly punishment in humans, one decoupled from enforcing cooperation (Rand 
et al., 2010). 
3.10.5 Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that participants were only asked whether they would confront 
a social defector (Charlie), and not how much punishment they would inflict on him. This 
procedure was chosen as, as also seen in the results of Study 1, asking for actual punishment 
‘amounts’ might not be appropriate for a questionnaire/vignette method. In an attempt to 
overcome this limitation, the decision was taken to remove the idea of quantifying 
punishment by making the situation more ‘social’, i.e. describing the sort of low-level norm 
violation likely to occur in everyday life with the potential for the informal peer-sanctioning 
that economic experiments, for example public goods games, try to simulate. The vignette in 
the current study was developed to represent a common action problem (Hardin, 1968) 
familiar to many students and non-students alike: the use and maintenance of communal 
space.  
Indeed, a related limitation is that there was no actual ‘punishment’ inflicted on Charlie and 
as such any findings cannot be compared to the results of studies using explicit costs and 
effects of punishment. However, again, we would argue that many of the costs to such 
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behaviour, either to the punisher or the target, are likely to be expressed socially (Van Vugt, 
2006), for example through  humiliation (Barr, 2001), rather than in the form of physical 
violence. In fact, ‘non-monetary’ or ‘verbal’ punishment is seen as punishment even in the 
economic literature (for example, Masclet et al., 2003; Ostrom et al., 1992). 
Nevertheless, while we believe this means the results of the study can be considered 
alongside other methods, as opposed to being artefacts of the experimental design, we accept 
that when participants are not forced to pay a physical cost for their intervention, they believe 
they would be more willing to engage in punishment and pay the costs of such punishment 
then they actually would (Pedersen et al., 2013). 
3.10.6 Conclusion 
The study attempted to investigate whether a signal of a willingness to punish from another 
individual would affect the punishment behaviour of participants, and whether this signal 
could be considered honest due to the penalties inflicted upon deceptive signallers. The study 
found little or no effect of the signal or its honesty on either participant behaviour or their 
opinion of the signaller: how this signaller acted was seen as far more important than the 
promises they made. The finding suggests that participants make judgements of others based 
only on their willingness to engage in actual costly behaviour, and suggests that only a 
history and reputation for actual punishment behaviour might affect any future decision 
making. This suggests that any theory trying to explain the evolution of costly punishment 
will have to explain how any one individual can bear, or otherwise recover, the costs of the 
behaviour. The results for trait-dominance may suggest that dominance and status could be 
one such factor that may explain this. 
 Measuring punishment behaviour 
136 
 
3.11 General discussion 
The initial aim of the chapter was to assess two possible mechanisms by which the net cost of 
costly punishment could be reduced; by adjusting punishment behaviour in response to the 
potential for reputational gain, or by coordinating punishment with another individual. No 
evidence for either mechanism was found.  In Study 1 participants did not adjust their 
punishment behaviour in response to an audience, and participants actually preferred to 
punish when groups were unstable. In Study 2 participants did not adjust their punishment 
behaviour in response to the punishment-signal of another individual, nor did they punish an 
individual for deceptively signalling their intent to engage in punishment.  
The results of Study 1 do contradict some research in this area (Bering, 2008; Kurzban et al., 
2007) but can be seen as partially supporting other research that suggests individuals are 
actually happy to punish anonymously (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010) and will pay additional 
costs in order to hide punishment (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011): individuals, it seems, want 
to punish the social defection, but only when the chances of meeting the target were low. 
These results suggest that participants were not taking into account the possibility of gaining 
a positive reputation for the act of punishment and we theorised that instead they may have 
been reacting instead to the possibility of gaining a negative reputation which, specifically, 
might invite future antagonism or retaliation from the target (See Dreber & Rand, 2012; 
Nikiforakis, 2008). 
The results of Study 2 did not support the model of Boyd et al (2010) who suggested that 
punishment could evolve if punishers could coordinate. If this had been the case we would 
have expected participants to be sensitive to signals from others, or indeed to their own 
feelings of being supported by others, when making their punishment decisions. This mistrust 
of any signal by another might be explained by participant’s unwillingness to punish 
deceptive signalling. While there may be downstream costs (for example ostracism, Masclet, 
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2003) for this deception, a signal of a willingness to punishment alone was not seen as 
honest. 
3.11.1 People like punishers 
While the studies did not demonstrate that participants varied their punishment behaviour in 
order to most effectively generate a positive reputation, both did support the idea that 
punishers do gain indirectly from an act of punishment (Nelissen, 2008; Sigmund et al., 
2001); participants really liked individuals who punished. In Study 1, there was a strong 
relationship between how angry participants were at a social defection and how much they 
liked a punishing other, and in Study 2 participants based their opinion of another punisher 
solely on this action and not how they had previously signalled their behaviour. 
Importantly, the results from Study 1 suggest this is not just a result of ‘like attracting like’, 
as the positive opinion was related to anger rather than actual punishment behaviour. Instead 
this result supports the theory that engaging in punishment acts as a costly signal of other pro-
social or other regarding tendencies (Nelissen, 2008); indeed participants in Study 2 only 
responded to Alex based on his behaviour, i.e. when he had displayed the costly punishment 
signal. There are good reasons why individuals would wish to associate with a punisher: 
environments where punishment occurs possible are more cooperative and efficient (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006) and so associating with 
someone who is willing to uphold cooperation norms would be beneficial. Equally, signalling 
a concern for the welfare of others provides any target of aggression with a tacit ally; the 
presence of social allies reduces the perceived threat of an opponent (Fessler & Holbrook, 
2013) and Kim (1998) demonstrated that in the presence of (in their terminology) a ‘justice-
minded’ third party, low status victims were more willing to resist antagonism from higher 
status individuals. Given that anger at social norm violations might be a result of fear (Jenson 
& Peterson, 2011; Peterson, 2012), and that unfairness or antagonism is likely to be instigated 
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by high status or formidable individuals (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Griskevicius et al., 
2009; Piff et al., 2012; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009; Silk, 2003), for many a punisher would be 
especially welcome as an associate. 
3.11.2 Dominance equals more likely to punish 
This does however raise a certain paradox in the data. As shown by previous research, the 
actions of a punisher generated a positive reputation, but in Study 1 participants responded in 
a manner that would indicate they wished to avoid any such reputation. The results of Study 2 
may suggest a possible reason for this, as here punishment was associated with dominance. 
This is important for two reasons. Firstly, engaging in any sort of antagonism, even 
‘moralistic’ aggression, can be seen as a dominant act (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Jones 
et al., 2011); and one possible indirect benefit of engaging in punishment might be a 
reputation for formidability (Barclay, 2006). Participants may not have wished to gain this 
sort of reputation due to the potential for future antagonism (Tibbetts & Izzo, 2010).  A more 
important reason however is threat of retaliation. Retaliation might be the primary cost to 
costly punishment (Dreber & Rand, 2012) and experimentally it dramatically curtails 
punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008). While revenge may be a dish best served cold, in terms of 
ancestral human informal peer-sanctioning, the response to punishment is likely to be 
immediate (for a modern example, see Levine et al., 2011). Success in conflicts is often 
determined by dominance and formidability (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Maynard-Smith 
& Parker, 1976; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) and so, while reputation may offset the cost of 
punishment indirectly and in the long-term, this will only occur if the punisher survives the 
attempt at punishment itself. 
In fact this may be why individuals might not wish to gain a reputation as a punisher, as such 
a reputation for formidability and dominance will simply invite aggression from others 
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wishing to challenge them. Equally, as mentioned in 3.11.1, there may be negative social 
repercussions from falsely recruiting allies by engaging in costly punishment when one has 
no intention and/or ability to actually punish in the future. 
3.11.3 Abandoning the Dark Triad 
As discussed in 3.2.3 there has been little research conducted into the effect that the ‘anti-
social’ personality traits of the ‘Dark Triad’ have on punishment behaviour. Costly 
punishment seems to be drive by anger (Falk et al., 2005) and can be considered an impulsive 
act (Crockett et al., 2010). Therefore, due to deficits in empathy and impulse control that 
individuals with high Dark Triad trait exhibit (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), it was reasonable 
to investigate whether these individuals differences might have affected punishment 
behaviour. However the studies in the current chapter did not find any evidence that the Dark 
Triad personality traits affected punishment. While a lack of an effect of the Dark Triad on 
punishment could be due to the use of vignettes (see 3.6.5 and 3.10.5), the results of the other 
variables tested did conform to results gathered by economic games, for example the attitude 
to a punisher. Due to the lack of any effect therefore, the Dark Triad line of enquiry was 
abandoned. 
3.11.4 General conclusion 
The two studies in the current chapter did not find evidence that punishers respond to the 
opportunity to gain a positive reputation or responded to an attempt to coordinate 
punishment. However, the pattern of results seen in Study 1 & 2, has given rise to a 
potentially more interesting, and un-researched, question; the role that dominance and status 
might have played in the evolution of costly punishment. 
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4 Chapter 4: perceptions of costly punishers 
 
Chapter 3 revealed that punishers are well liked, and that dominance might be an important 
factor in punishment behaviour. Building on these results, Chapter 4 investigates the potential 
indirect benefits of punishment through Costly Signalling (see 1.2.2 and 2.3.4), and 
specifically whether punishment can signal dominance. Study 3 investigates whether 
participants judge a punishers differently compared to those who engage in other forms of 
confrontational behaviour in terms of their likability and dominance. Study 4 investigates 
whether acts of punishment are used to make dominance-rank judgements about those 
involved, and whether the success of punishment and the risks posed to the punisher by an 
aggressor affect the social judgments of the punisher.   
4.1 General Introduction 
Punishment has been consistently shown to be one of the main factors that ensures 
cooperation between groups of individuals (Balliet et al., 2011). Costly punishment is 
effective at promoting cooperation even if it is delayed (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010) or given 
in a verbal form only (Masclet et al., 2003), and the mere presence of a third party 
significantly increases both fair behaviour and, conversely, the unwillingness to accept unfair 
behaviour (Kim et al., 1998). The punishment of anti-social or ‘unfair’ others has also been 
claimed to be a universal human behaviour (Fehr & Gächter, 2002) and the desire to punish 
seems to be an automatic response (Crockett et al., 2010). Nevertheless, there is continuing 
debate as to how punishment and the associated moral sentiment could initially evolve 
because it imposes costs on the punishing individual while the benefits are shared amongst 
the group as a whole (Dreber et al., 2008).    
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4.1.1 Reputation and costly punishment 
This puzzle could be solved if there was some way for punishers to recuperate the costs of 
punishment through indirect benefits from their actions (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; 
Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 2010). One such indirect benefit might be a reputation as an 
honest and trustworthy person. It has been suggested that punishment might act as a costly 
signal; where one engages in a risky or otherwise energetically or materially costly behaviour 
to demonstrate an otherwise unobservable trait (Bird et al., 2001). Here, bearing the cost of 
punishment demonstrates, for example, you are an honest person who values fairness 
(Nelissen, 2008). Punishment as a signal for this trait does seem to be accurate as generally 
those who punish are indeed also highly cooperative, especially when punishment is very 
costly (Falk et al., 2005). Costly punishment therefore signals an individual is trustworthy 
and making such a signal so could allow other such individuals to self-assort with one 
another and enjoy the cooperative benefits this allows (Santos et al., 2006; Wang, Suri, & 
Watts, 2012).  
More speculatively, in that it has not been explicitly tested, a reputation as a punisher may 
also help recruit cooperative partners or coalition members (something potentially vital in our 
evolutionary history,  Gavrilets et al., 2008) as, for example, individuals do prefer to be in an 
environment where punishment might occur (Gürerk et al., 2006; Rockenbach & Milinski, 
2006). In fact, individuals are willing to pay far above what would be an efficient amount to 
maintain an environment where punishment occurs (Traulsen et al., 2012). This might be 
because while individuals wish to cooperate, they fear the cost of defections (Fischbacher et 
al., 2001) and one of the more direct proximate motivations of punishment is to change the 
behaviour of the defecting individual (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010) or to remove them from 
the group altogether (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Masclet, 2003). By taking action to prevent 
free-riding, punishers provide an environment safe from such threats and are therefore seen as 
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people worth associating with and/or following: it is unlikely to be coincidence that the traits 
attributed to punishers, such as trustworthiness and being group-focused, are also those 
demanded of leaders (Hogg et al., 2012). With this in mind the results of Rockenbach & 
Milinski (2006), that individuals prefer an environment where punishment is possible, could 
be reinterpreted to suggest individuals prefer to be in an environment where someone will 
punish social defection. Thus a reputation as a punisher allows the punisher to recruit social 
allies more effectively because, as well as signalling their own altruistic and cooperative 
tendencies, it may also suggest they will intervene to ensure any individual in their vicinity is 
treated fairly and that any defectors are removed.  
Alternatively, engaging in punishment might be less about signalling pro-social personal 
characteristics and more about signalling personal formidability. Firstly, costly  punishment 
can be considered a confrontational act that at some point must, by definition, involve an 
individual inflicting a cost upon a defector or aggressor, and most antagonistic actions are 
instigated by dominant individuals (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Silk, 2003). Indeed, those 
who feel high status or formidable are far more willing to both use and approve of the use of 
force (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). Equally, such aggressive actions are used by dominant 
individuals to maintain their position (Silk, 2003) and, while non-human animals show only 
limited evidence of  ‘altruistic’ punishment, the few examples of punishment in the non-
human literature are conducted by dominant individuals only (Flack et al., 2005; Flack et al., 
2006; Wong et al., 2007), with the apparent purpose of maintaining their social rank. Thus 
punishment  could be another form of aggression used as a signal of position and to 
demonstrate personal formidability (Barclay, 2006). In fact, Marlowe et al (2008) suggested 
that one reason for the lack of costly punishment in small scale societies is that, due to 
eavesdropping on dyadic interactions, a “don’t mess with me” reputation can be easily 
established without an individual involving themselves in the conflicts of others.  
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It should be noted that the reputation gained from an act of costly punishment need not only 
be either as a fair and trustworthy person or as a formidable person; it could be both. For 
example, research on welfare trade-off ratios, the process by which we make resource 
allocation decisions are made (see Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009), splits the factors in this process 
into two broad categories: the potential benefit the recipient provides to us, and their ability to 
inflict costs upon us. Thus an act of punishment would provide social gains to a punisher 
because, on the one hand, they are seen as beneficial to be around as their actions indicate 
they are trustworthy and are willing to defend group norms and eliminate free-riders, and on 
the other hand they have signalled their individual formidability or willingness to use force 
and thus should be treated fairly or even with deference.  
In summary, an analysis of the current literature suggests that engaging in costly punishment 
could act as a signal of both pro-social personal characteristics and personal 
formidability/dominance. These indirect benefits could provide a means by which punishers 
recuperate the cost of punishment. However, this will only be the case if a) punishers are 
indeed judged to be both formidable and likable, b) if such judgements in response to costly 
punishment specifically, as opposed to any individual who is victorious in a conflict 
generally, and c) if observers do make rank dominance judgments while observing 
punishment. To investigate these questions, the current studies used a vignette-based method 
to measure the social judgments made by uninvolved observers about individuals who engage 
in costly punishment. 
4.2 Study 3: both loved and feared: costly punishment is perceived differently from 
other agonistic behaviour 
This exploratory study investigated whether observers do in fact make judgements about the 
likeability and dominance of an individual after observing them engage in punishment. More 
specifically, the study investigated how judgements about punishers are different from 
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judgements about individuals who engage in other types of aggressive behaviour, i.e. whether 
any judgements of dominance or reputational benefits are related to the punishment itself or, 
more generally, to an effect of aggression and/or winning a physical contest. 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
414 (132 male) undergraduate students from the University of Exeter, UK, successfully 
completed the survey. Participants were recruited via email using an existing ‘paid 
participant’ list. As an incentive to take part, any participant who completed the survey was 
entered into a prize draw for a number of store vouchers worth £10 (about US$13). The mean 
age of participants was 22 years. 25 participants failed manipulation check questions and 
their data was excluded from all analyses. Recruitment took place between October 2011 and 
February 2012. 
4.3.2 Materials and procedure 
The survey was administered online. Participants followed an email link and were presented 
with a survey consisting of two sections. The first section contained the experimental 
vignette, presented as a news website-style article. To keep with the ‘news site’ aesthetic and 
the wider aims of the study, the article included a picture of its subject, a male identified only 
as ‘John Taylor’. The name was fake but the picture was chosen from a set of photos 
collected for a previous study (Gordon & Platek, 2009) as the face received neutral ratings in 
regards to attractiveness and trustworthiness. Once participants had finished reading the 
article they were presented the second section of the survey which contained a series of 
questions concerning John (for the full vignette, see Appendix B). 
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4.3.3 Experimental Scenario 
Participants were presented with one of four possible articles concerning the actions of John. 
In the Third Party Punishment condition, John was described as having successfully 
intervened to stop the mugging of an old man late at night - ‘third party’ is used here as John 
can be considered to be ‘disinterested; in the Second Party Punishment condition, John was 
described as having successfully fought off a mugger late at night; in the Bar Fight condition, 
John was described as having been involved in a bar fight of indeterminate cause, although it 
was made clear that alcohol was not involved and that John ‘won’ the fight; and in the 
Control condition John was described as having witnessed a flash-mob. In all three 
experimental conditions the assailant who fought John was described as “a 6ft muscular 
male”.  
The scenarios also manipulated the formidability of John. John was described as a “keen 
amateur boxer” (strong), as someone who “had never been in a fight in his life” (weak) or 
was given no additional description (neutral). Thus, study had a 4x3 between-subjects design. 
As the ‘weak’ description would have made no sense in the ‘control/flash mob’ condition, it 
was changed to “on his way back from a beauty salon”. While the author acknowledges the 
stereotyping this description represents, the stereotype did produce a response consistent with 
the other ‘weak’ conditions. 
4.3.4 Likability and dominance questions 
Participants were asked the same set of questions as in Studies 1 and 2 regarding how likable 
John was perceived to be. They were asked to rate John on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree) as to how trustworthy, group focused, ‘nice’ he was and whether they 
would work and socialise with him. In the current study the five items had a high reliability 
index (α=0.91). Therefore they were collapsed into a single ‘likability’ variable for all future 
analyses. While there was no reason to believe sex would affect likeability per se, a separate 
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analysis found that the sex of the participant did not affect likability or interact with the types 
of scenario presented to participants. Therefore sex was not included in the analyses below to 
conserve power. 
Male participants then answered a further set of questions concerning how dominant they 
perceived John to be, on a scale of 1-7 (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), on how 
threatening, intimidating, dominant, antagonistic or aggressive he was. In the current study 
the five items had a high reliability index (α=0.86) and were therefore collapsed into a single 
‘perceived dominance’ variable for all future analyses. 
As part of the wider aims of the study, female participants (n=282) were asked questions 
concerning their willingness to be romantically involved with John (these data are not 
reported here). In order to keep the questionnaires to a similar length for both sexes, females 
were not asked to judge John for perceived dominance. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Likeability  
As shown in Figure 4.1, John was seen as more likable in the Third Party Punishment 
condition than in the other conditions (F3,399=36.72, p<0.001). John in the Bar Fight condition 
was the least liked. Bonferroni-corrected pair comparisons found significant differences (all 
p<0.001) between all comparisons of Article-types except between the Control and Second 
Party conditions (p=1.0). As shown in Figure 4.2, John was seen as more likable when he 
was depicted as ‘weak’ (F2,399=4.40, p=0.013). Bonferroni-corrected pair comparisons found 
that the weak John was seen as more likeable than neutral John (p=0.031), however there 
were no significant differences between weak and strong John (p=0.45) or strong and neutral 
John (p=0.99). Likeability was not affected by an interaction between the article type and 
John’s formidability (F6,399=0.65, p=0.65). 
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4.4.2 Perceived dominance (male participants only) 
As shown in Figure 4.3, John was judged as more dominant in all the experimental articles 
compared to the Control condition (F3,120=6.15, p=0.001). Bonferroni-corrected pair 
comparisons found significant differences between the Control Article and the experimental 
conditions (Bar Fight, p=0.003; Second Party Punishment, p=0.009; Third Party Punishment, 
p=0.011), but no differences in judgments of dominance between the three experimental 
conditions (all p=1.0). John’s described formidability did not affect how dominant he was 
seen to be (F2,120=0.45, p=0.64), nor was there an interaction effect of article type and 
formidability on perceived dominance (F6,120=0.83, p=0.54). 
4.5 Discussion 
These results show that the increase in likability of punishers cannot be explained alone by 
them winning an altercation or by the ‘warm glow’ that may accompany seeing an offender 
receive retribution (de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). This is because when John 
fought off his own attacker, he was seen as no more likable than in the control article where 
John did nothing. This is probably because second party punishment is driven more by a 
desire to protect oneself, or for personal retribution and to save face (for example, Topalli et 
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al., 2002) and as a result is far more common than costly punishment (Fehr, 2004). Thus 
defending yourself says little about your qualities save your ability to fight back. This 
suggests that, in opinion of observers/receivers, engaging in costly punishment is seen as 
signalling additional information about the punisher, such as their commitment to fairness or 
as being someone with whom it may be worthwhile to associate. Indeed, while there can be 
sex differences in how violence is perceived (Griskevicius et al., 2009), in the present study 
both males and females made similar judgements about the likability of John. 
Judgements about dominance were however dependent solely on the aggression in the 
encounter rather than on the context, i.e. John was seen as equally dominant whether he acted 
as a third-party or was involved in a fight with an indeterminate cause.  This is unsurprising 
as engaging in aggressive behaviour can signal dominance (Silk, 2003) and perceiving 
dominance from an interaction can be seen as a reasonably objective process; it is in our 
interests to make accurate observations of the social hierarchy (Cummins, 1996a) and the 
outcome of a confrontation can be easily recognised (Jones et al., 2011). It is telling that 
when judging dominance, the participants did not take John’s reported formidability into 
account; their judgement was based entirely on the outcome of the conflict.  The dominance 
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data came from male participants only, however for the social-cognition reasons mentioned 
above, and because it has been shown that males and females agree on male formidability 
(Sell, Cosmides, et al., 2009), it is unlikely there would have been sex differences in 
dominance judgments in this study.  
By comparing the judgements of a punisher to other aggressive acts, this study demonstrated 
that engaging in costly punishment specifically provided the punisher with positive 
reputational benefits. This study also demonstrated, in males at least, that engaging in 
punishment can make one seem more dominant without the negative social consequences 
associated with other forms of aggressive behaviour, i.e. that third party punishers are not 
only seen as formidable, they are also well liked. 
4.6 Study 4:  perceptions of a third-party are affected by their attempt at punishment 
and not its success 
Study 3 found that third party punishers are judged to be more likable than individuals who 
engage in other aggressive behaviours, yet are seen as equally dominant as individuals who 
engage in other aggressive acts. Study 4 investigated whether observing punishment affects 
the perceived dominance rank of the individuals present in the interaction, i.e. if punishment 
can signal a dominant position relative to others. Study 4 also investigated what information 
observers are using to judge punishers, specifically whether judgements are affected by the 
success of the intervention and whether the level of threat an aggressor posed would further 
affect a participant’s perceptions of the punisher. For this study, ‘third party’ is again used to 
describe actions of the punisher as they are ‘disinterested’. 
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4.7 Method 
4.7.1 Participants and materials 
103 psychology undergraduate psychology students from the University of Exeter (85 
females) successfully completed the study, with 12 participants either failing the 
manipulation checks or dropping out of the study before completion. Participants were 
recruited via email from the 1
st
 year psychology cohort. As an incentive to take part, any 
participant who completed the survey was entered into a prize draw for a number of online-
store vouchers worth £10 (about $13 US). The mean age of participants was 21. The study 
employed a between-subjects design with 3 experimental conditions and one control 
condition; participants followed an email link which randomly presented with one of four 
experimental vignettes, followed by a series of questions concerning the punisher in these 
vignettes. The study was conducted between October and December 2011. 
4.7.2 Experimental Scenario 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves seated alone in a local bar and told that they 
observed a group of men enter and occupy a table nearby. Participants were then told they 
observed an altercation between group members in which one member (the ‘aggressor’)2 
forced another (the ‘victim’) to relinquish his seat so the Aggressor could sit down. In 
Condition 1, the Successful condition, a third group member (The ‘third party’) successfully 
intervened and forced the aggressor to give back the seat. In Condition 2, the Unsuccessful 
condition, the third party intervened but failed to force the Aggressor to give back the seat. In 
Condition 3, the Increased Threat condition, participants were told they observed a successful 
act of punishment, but in this scenario the male characters were unknown to one another and 
not part of a self-contained group. Thus the Aggressor was a greater potential threat to the 
                                                          
2
 These labels are for clarity only; in the scenario itself the characters were identified by the colour of the shirts 
they were described as wearing. 
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Third Party and the participant/observer. This Increased Threat condition matched the 
Successful condition in all other respects. In Condition 4, the Control/No Action condition, 
participants were told they observed a Third Party become agitated but not intervene (for the 
full vignette, see Appendix B). 
4.7.3 Likability and dominance 
Participants were then asked to make a series of social judgements about the Third Party in 
the scenario. Firstly, participants were asked to rank the three characters in the story in terms 
of dominance (1 being most dominant and 3 being least dominant). All participants were then 
asked the five likability questions (α=0.88) and the five social dominance questions (α=0.85) 
as described in Study 3. As in Study 3 these items were collapsed into a single ‘likability’ and 
‘dominance’ variable respectively for all future analyses. 
4.7.4 Manipulation checks and demographic questions 
Participants were then asked a comprehension/manipulation check question. They were asked 
to indicate, from a choice of “made the man-in-grey [the aggressor] move”, “attempted but 
failed to make the man-in-grey move” or “did nothing” how the third party behaved in the 
scenario. Finally, participants indicated their age, sex and nationality. 
4.8 Results 
The study tested two distinct hypotheses: that there would be a relationship between how 
participants responded to a third party depending on their level of intervention (Successful vs. 
Unsuccessful vs. Control), and that there would be a difference in participant responses 
between the level of threat posed by the aggressor (Successful vs. Increased Threat). Data 
relating to these hypotheses were analysed separately. 
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4.8.1 Relative dominance rank of the third party 
Participants ranked the third party to be most dominant when he successfully intervened, with 
fewer ranking him as most dominant when the intervention failed, and the fewest when he did 
not intervene. The victim was nearly always ranked as least dominant (See Figure 4.4). To 
investigate the relative difference between the characters, we considered which character was 
ranked as the most dominant by participants. Figure 4.5 shows that the third party was ranked 
as the most dominant when punishment was successful but not when intervention failed or 
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when he took no action (χ22=28.75, p<0.001). 
4.8.2 Perceived dominance of the third party  
As shown in Figure 4.5, the third party was judged to be more dominant when he attempted 
to intervene (F2,77=7.88, p<0.001). It was assumed a priori that success would affect 
perception of dominance, however planned contrast analyses (Successful vs. Unsuccessful, 
F1,78=1.65, p=0.20; Successful vs. No Action, F1,78=14.30, p<0.001; Unsuccessful vs. No 
Action, F1,78=4.06, p=0.047) demonstrated that the third party was seen as more dominant  
when he intervened, regardless of his success. 
4.8.3 Likability of the third party 
Figure 4.6 also shows that the Third Party was judged to be more likeable when he attempted 
to intervene, regardless of whether or not he was successful, than when he did not intervene 
(F2,78=4.70, p=0.01). It was also assumed a priori that success would affect likability, 
however planned contrast analyses demonstrated that the third party was seen as more likable  
when he intervened, regardless of the success (Successful vs. Unsuccessful, F1,78=0.15, 
p=0.70; Successful vs. No Action, F1,78=7.27, p=0.009; Unsuccessful vs. No Action, 
F1,78=6.40, p=0.01). 
4.8.4 Judgements of the third party and the threat posed by the aggressor 
As shown in Figure 4.7, the third party was judged to be more socially dominant when the 
threat posed by the Aggressor was increased (F1,57=4.56, p=0.037). However, the level of 
threat did not affect how likable the Third Party was judged to be (F1, 57=0.11, p=0.75). 
4.9 Discussion 
Here, the results concerning the judgements of dominance are unequivocal; successful 
intervention by the third party led participants to perceive him as most dominant, and 
unsuccessful intervention led to the aggressor being perceived as most dominant. This result 
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is no surprise as such, for example Jones et al (2011) found that humans eavesdrop on dyadic 
interactions to make dominance judgements and transitive reasoning is a core part of primate 
social cognition (for a review, see, Cummins, 1996a). However to the author’s knowledge it 
is the first study to experimentally demonstrate that engaging in punishment directly affects 
the perceptions of an uninvolved observer with respect to the punisher in this manner.  
What is surprising is that when asked to make social judgements about the punisher, 
participants judged him to be more likeable and dominant when he intervened, regardless of 
the success of the intervention. While previous studies, including Study 3 in this chapter, 
have demonstrated that punishment leads to reputational gains (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 
2008), in these studies (as was the case in the Study 3 scenario), punishment has always been 
successful by design; that is to say the action of punishment always results in the actual 
imposition of costs on the target, something which is not guaranteed outside of the laboratory 
(Levine et al., 2011). The fact that perceived likeability and dominance remained even when 
the intervention was unsuccessful suggests that such ratings are not due to a halo effect of 
seeing an antisocial individual punished (de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006) or due 
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Social perceptions of third party 
Figure 4.7: judgement of likeability (White) and 
dominance (grey) of the Third Party depending on the 
Third Party’s response to an act of aggression. Bars = 1 
Standard Error. 
Figure 4.6: participants’ judgements of the Third 
party between the Successful Punishment (white) 
and Increased Threat (grey) conditions. Bars= 1 
Standard Error. 
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to the punisher being the recipient of indirect or strong reciprocity for carrying out a public 
function.  
The results do however add further evidence to the suggestion that  punishment can be seen 
as a costly signal of an altruistic nature. Due to the threat of retaliation (Nikiforakis, 2008; 
Rand et al., 2010), the mere act of engaging in costly punishment should provide  an honest 
signal, as retaliatory costs will likely be present whether the intervention was successful or 
not (see Chapter 5). In Chapter 3, participants only responded to actual punishment 
behaviour, and the results of Study 4 imply that even if one fails to punish successfully, the 
attempt suggests to eavesdroppers that it could still be useful to form a punishing coalition 
with the failed punisher. That punishment is a costly signal was further highlighted by the 
higher dominance rating given to the punisher in the Increased Threat condition; the lack of 
any social information or social support from fellow group members made the risks even 
higher and thus the signal more reliable.  
However, there was no corresponding increase in likability in the higher threat condition. 
Nelissen (2008) suggested that increased signal reliability should increase the positive 
attitude to the punisher and the lack of an effect here may suggest there is an upper limit to 
the positive attitude engaging in punishment generates. The motivations of punishers, might 
be questionable (Barclay, 2006; Ottone, 2008) and indeed, if punishment is a dominant 
behaviour then the motivations of punishers might not be as altruistic and trustworthy as they 
seem (for example, see Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008; Nakamaru & Iwasa, 2006). If 
nothing else, in this study punishment was aggressive/violent and aggressive individuals are 
generally disliked (Hawley et al., 2008). 
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4.10 General Discussion 
Study 3 demonstrated that while participant judgements of dominance can be accounted for 
by the use of aggression or winning a conflict, only individuals who engaged in punishment 
also gained a positive reputation. Study 4 demonstrated that success was less important than 
the attempt when observers made judgments about punishers. Participants perceived third 
parties who were unsuccessful in their intervention as being just as likeable and dominant as 
third parties who were successful. This overall finding could have a profound impact on the 
benefits that are available to someone who engaged in punishment. 
4.10.1 Signalling dominance 
Both studies 3 & 4 suggest that costly punishment is perceived as an indication of a dominant 
social position. The majority of antagonistic or confrontational behaviour is carried out by 
dominant individuals, or at least by those relatively dominant to the target (Silk, 2003), and 
we are adept at recognising the status of others (Anderson, Srivastava, et al., 2006; Sell, 
Cosmides, et al., 2009) and interpreting the outcomes of such confrontations (Jones et al., 
2011). Indeed, as shown in the results of Study 4, while attempting punishment may have led 
a third party to be perceived as dominant, in terms of dominance rank the failed third party 
punisher was seen as being lower rank than the aggressor, i.e., while engaging in the act 
might raise the perceived dominance of an individual, the outcome is still relevant when 
making actual judgement about relative social rank. Equally, the fact that participants in 
Study 3 perceived a punisher to be just as dominant as an individual defending themselves or 
as someone involved in a random brawl suggests that the perception of the third party, in this 
domain at least, was of someone involved in an antagonistic conflict. The context (moralistic 
aggression) was not considered. This was further highlighted by the fact the strength of the 
third party was not taken into account for the judgements in Study 3; whether John was 
described as weak or strong did not affect the perceived dominance, likely because in all 
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instances he ‘won’ his aggressive encounter. Indeed, it was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that 
participants only paid attention to actual punishment behaviour regardless of any other social 
information.  
Nevertheless, the fact that failed punishers were also judged to be dominant suggests that 
punishment could be one amongst a number of behaviours that act as a costly signal of 
personal prowess. Costly Signalling Theory suggests that individuals should engage in risky 
activity to signal something about themselves’ and the aforementioned result suggests that 
punishment therefore be a mechanism to advertise one’s formidability or dominance due to 
the costs it involves, specifically retaliation.  Retaliation against punishment restricts its 
occurrence both inside and outside the laboratory (Nikiforakis, 2008; Tarling & Morris, 
2010) and prevents the evolution of the behaviour in evolutionary models (Dreber & Rand, 
2012). It is equally likely, if not more so, to occur when the punishment was unsuccessful, as, 
if punishment can be seen as a challenge, then the challenged must respond in order to save 
face and status (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Topalli et al., 2002). Therefore, any 
individual willing to punish must also be willing to bear these potential retaliation costs (see 
Levine et al., 2011). At the very least therefore costly punishment could be regarded as risky 
social behaviour that, by placing oneself in harm’s way, signals to others that the punisher is 
not someone to be treated unfairly or challenged in the future (Barclay, 2006; Farthing, 
2005).  
Thus engaging in punishment might allow an individual to signal their dominance and status 
within a group. There are a great many benefits open from being seen as dominant and high 
status, for example in terms of access to resources (King, Douglas, Huchard, Isaac, & 
Cowlishaw, 2008), the willingness of others to acquiesce to your demands and threats 
(Dasgupta, 2011; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) and the ability to control and manipulate the social 
environment (Maner & Mead, 2010). In fact, individuals who are seen as dominant are seen 
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as more as attractive social and sexual partners (Bassett & Moss, 2004; Ellis, 1994, 1995). 
Thus, even if there were no further benefits to costly punishment, the ability to signal 
dominance and status could potentially net the punisher sufficient indirect benefits to make 
the behaviour viable. 
4.10.2 Likeability 
The studies in this chapter also demonstrated that punishers are indeed well liked. One 
interpretation of this result is that the positive regard (which others have shown does translate 
into actual reward, Nelissen, 2008) is a form of reciprocity directed to the punisher because 
they carried out a public function by removing a free-rider or social defector. From a Strong 
Reciprocity perspective, it can be seen as spontaneously rewarding an individual for acting 
for the good of the group. Alternatively, the desire to associate with a punisher might have 
more a selfish rationale behind it. One of the proximate motivations and effects of 
punishment is to reduce non-cooperation (for a study where participants were explicitly asked 
abou their reasoning, see Masclet, 2003) and therefore any group with a self-styled punisher 
will be more cooperative and efficient, and thus a more attractive prospect, even if only a 
single individual is punishing (O'Gorman et al., 2009).  
This might seem to be disadvantageous to the punisher; after all the fact that everyone will 
benefit from the effects of their effort is one of the key stumbling blocks in the economics of 
punishment (Dreber et al., 2008). However this desire might also allow a punisher to recruit 
coalition partners and allies. Firstly, despite being less able to behave selfishly or unfairly, 
individuals prefer environments where punishment is possible (Rockenbach & Milinski, 
2006) and are happy to cooperate within these environments with very little actual 
punishment being necessary. Secondly, and in an interesting interaction with dominance, 
when a punishing third party is present, low status individuals are far more likely to punish 
unfairness from higher ranking individuals (Kim et al., 1998). Thus, when someone has 
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engaged in an act of punishment, it would be beneficial to associate with them for protection 
from unfair individuals. It should be remembered that coalitions may have been vital to 
survival in our ancestral past (Gavrilets et al., 2008) and having a large number of allies as an 
effective way to deter aggression from others even today (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013; 
Sapouna et al., 2011). Therefore at the very least one benefit a punisher receives from this 
positive regard is the ability to recruit and retain social allies, with potential for this increase 
in social value to translate into greater rewards in the form of increased bargaining power 
(Barclay, 2013) and deferential displays from others (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
However, the above argument is based on the assumption that the would-be punisher is 
actually able to deter free-riding and the results of the previous studies demonstrated that the 
positive attitude to a punisher cannot be explained by their mere ability to punish. In Study 3, 
participants did not ‘like’ the individuals who foiled an attempted robbery on themselves, 
which would demonstrate the ability to punish, and in Study 4 participants liked the punisher 
who tried and failed to punish as much as successful punishers. Indeed, in both Study 3 and 
Study 4, the likability of the of an individual did  not match their perceived dominance in key 
areas: in Study 3, only the third party punisher was judged to be both dominant and likable; 
and in Study 4 participants did not like the ‘high threat’ punisher any more than the lower 
threat punisher. This suggests that how likeable the punisher was perceived to be was not 
driven by the desire for a protector specifically or, more generally, for someone who would 
police the group. 
Instead the present results suggest that third party punishment could act as a costly signal of 
the punishers trustworthiness and honesty. Punishment is costly, both in terms of the 
retaliation costs (see above) and in terms of the resources needed to produce it, and it has 
been shown that not only do individuals reward punishers based on this cost (Nelissen, 2008) 
but that in general those who punish are cooperative (Falk et al., 2005) and when punishment 
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is costly, only the altruistic punishment of non-cooperation occurs. Thus, punishment can be 
seen as a valid signal of an individual’s altruistic nature which, as a result, can attract other 
‘altruists’ even if these new partners are not punishers themselves. Indeed, this was apparent 
in Study 4 whereby an unsuccessful punisher was as well liked as a successful one, which 
would not be the case if it was the outcome – the act of public good in the removal of a 
defector – that was valued over the potential risk the attempted punishment represented.  
Nevertheless, the result from Study 4 is problematic in the sense that an increase in signalling 
costs (the threat posed by the aggressor) should have led to an increase in signal strength, i.e. 
greater likability. This may be because while individuals do like risk-takers (heroic or 
otherwise, Bassett & Moss, 2004; Farthing, 2005), there is a limit to this: at some point the 
behaviours may seem reckless as opposed to brave (Farthing, 2007). In specific reference to 
the scenario in Study 4, while there may be advantages to associating with a punisher, these 
may be diminished if said punisher repeatedly start fights with strangers. Alternatively, if 
costly punishment is primarily a dominant behaviour, one that functions to signal and 
maintain this position, then there may be a point at which the benefits of being associated 
with a punisher are outweighed by the risk of this association (for example, of exploitation or 
coersion, Dasgupta, 2011; Hawley, 1999; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). 
4.10.3 Indirect benefits of costly punishment 
Panchanathan & Boyd (2004), Santos, et al (2010), and others have demonstrated that costly 
punishment can be evolutionarily stable if the punisher receives some sort of indirect benefit 
from their actions, and one indirect benefit is through reputation. Indeed, we know that 
punishment behaviour itself is strongly affected by the possibility of reputational gain 
(Kurzban et al., 2007; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011) and the studies in this chapter 
demonstrated that punishment does alter the social perceptions of observers. Importantly, 
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punishers are seen as dominant but, unlike other confrontational behaviours, punishers were 
also well liked by these observers. 
This has important ramifications for both proximate costly punishment and the ultimate 
stability of this behaviour, as, while there are advantages to being dominant or being seen as 
formidable, violent or aggressive individuals are disliked by others (Benard, 2013; Hawley et 
al., 2008). Indeed, in non-human primates short-term revolutionary coalitions will often form 
to depose a dominant individual, and while in this case the coalitions form for the entirely 
selfish reasons of supplanting the dominant individual, in our evolutionary history this 
coalitional psychology (Pietraszewski et al., 2014) was refined to curtail and contain overly 
dominant individuals (Boehm, 1997; Charlton, 1997; Gavrilets et al., 2008). In fact even if 
this was not possible, it was entirely possible for a number of individuals to simply leave the 
group of a despotic leader (Van Vugt et al., 2004).  
Costly punishment, therefore, potentially provides a mechanism by which an individual could 
signal their own formidability without the negative consequences described above. In fact, 
this may be why the second-party punisher was not well liked; costly punishment 
demonstrates that one can punish free-riders and defectors, but it also demonstrates that force 
will be used only in a manner that conforms to social norms and attitudes of fairness, i.e., that 
by establishing one is a moralistic punisher an individual is also signalling they will not 
engage in spiteful or anti-social punishment or will  engage in the more overtly coercive 
behaviours associated with dominance or high status. Thus, costly punishment can be seen as 
a sort of ‘heroic helping’ (Barclay, 2013), that allows an individual to demonstrate their 
formidability while at the same time signalling their pro-social and cooperative character.  
However, a note of caution should be issued as these benefits rely on punishment being a 
costly signal; a punisher must be willing to spend resources on the act itself, willing to risk 
 Perceptions of costly punishers 
163 
 
the retaliatory actions of the target, and also (potentially) be able to continually demonstrate 
their reputation as a punisher. As faking or otherwise sending false signals can have severe 
repercussions (Anderson et al., 2008), the question remains as to whether these benefits are 
actually open to all individuals, and specifically whether the dominance and status of the 
punisher might set a barrier to entry for access to these benefits. This will be addressed in 
Chapter 5. 
4.10.4 General conclusion 
The studies in this chapter demonstrate that punishment can affect the reputation of a 
punisher in the eyes of observers, making punishers seem both likeable and formidable. 
Independently, these are both traits that would provide the punisher with long terms benefits 
for their actions, and together  may increase an individual’s overall ‘worth’ to other 
individuals by demonstrating the punisher is both useful to them and also capable of inflicting 
costs on them should anyone attempt to cheat or subvert the punisher. Thus, to paraphrase 
Machiavelli (1532/2003), while it may be better to be feared than loved, ideally a Prince 
should aspire to be both, and the results from Study 3 & 4 suggest one way to achieve this is 
to engage in costly punishment. 
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5 Chapter 5: dominance rank and observer perceptions of costly punishers 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the role that a dominant position plays in the acquisition of the indirect 
benefits from punishment that were identified in Chapter 4, i.e., as suggested in 2.3.1 and 
2.3.4, are these indirect benefits only accessible by dominant individuals? Study 5 
investigates whether the dominance rank of a punisher affects how participants perceive both 
the likelihood of successful punishment occurring and the subsequent risk of retaliation from 
punishment. Study 6 investigates whether only dominant individuals are expected to punish, 
and how judgments of the occurrence of punishment, and the indirect benefits from 
punishment, are affected by the dominance ranks of the punisher and the target of 
punishment.         
5.1 General introduction 
Costly punishment can be evolutionarily stable if punishers can recoup the cost of 
punishment by indirect means (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Santos et al., 2010). The studies 
in Chapter 4 demonstrated that punishment did signal something about the punisher to 
observers, that they were ‘likable’ and that they were also dominant individuals. Perhaps 
more importantly there was no similar effect seen in other confrontational behaviour. Chapter 
4 also demonstrated that observers of punishment take the context of the altercation into 
account, with the risk to the punishment being factored into their judgements, which further 
suggests that punishment can function as a costly signal (Nelissen, 2008).  
However, while these results suggest that the costs of punishment can be recuperated through 
indirect reciprocity, in order to continually access these gains the qualities signalled by 
punishment must be consistent over the long term (Számadó, 2011b), i.e. a punisher must be 
able to continually demonstrate their reputation as a punisher. This is important as research 
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on conventional signalling mechanism (those that function to induce a behaviour in 
conspecifics) has shown that their ‘honesty’ is continually tested and as a result ‘false-
signalling’ can have severe repercussions (Molles & Vehrencamp, 2001; Számadó, 2011b; 
Tibbetts & Izzo, 2010). This effect also be seen in humans, with those acting ‘above their 
station’ facing significant social penalties (Anderson et al., 2008). Furthermore, for the 
signalling gains of punishment to be accessible, an individual must of course actually engage 
in punishment; a punisher must be willing to spend resources on the act itself and importantly 
be willing to risk the retaliatory actions of the target. The latter especially is perhaps the 
largest cost (Dreber & Rand, 2012) and the reason, as argued in the previous chapter, that 
punishment can be considered a conventional signal of cooperative intent and dominance.  
Interestingly, numerous studies have shown that costly punishment is viable if some 
individuals can punish at a reduced cost compared to others (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; 
Frank, 1996; Nikiforakis et al., 2009), i.e. if there is heterogeneity in the ability to punish. 
One source of this heterogeneity is dominance, or more specifically one’s position in the 
social hierarchy. We spend our lives in both informal and formal hierarchies (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2010; Maestripieri, 2012) and differences in our social position can have profound 
effects on our behaviour (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007; Galinsky et al., 2003; Gambacorta & 
Ketelaar, 2013; Gregory & Webster, 1996; Maner & Mead, 2010). As will be detailed below, 
dominance can be seen as a biological factor that might provide heterogeneity in the costs of 
punishment. Chapter 4 suggested that punishment can signal dominance, and the present 
Chapter 5 will investigate whether costly punishment can signal dominance because only 
dominant individual can actually engage in it. Thus, Chapter 5 directly addresses the indirect 
benefits available to dominants as discussed in 2.3.4. 
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5.1.1 Dominance and costly punishment  
Firstly, we may expect dominance to be associated with costly punishment because, if not an 
aggressive act per se, punishment is certainly a confrontational one: it is an antagonistic 
encounter between a punisher and an aggressor or social defector and dominance is strongly 
associated with antagonistic behaviour. Behaving aggressively can assert dominance and 
ensure that a dominant position is maintained (Silk, 2003), and conversely, reacting 
aggressively against being unfairly treated is vital to maintaining social status: examples of 
such reactions include redirected aggression in non-human primates (in vervet monkeys, 
Cheney & Seyfarth, 1989; and for an overview, see Kazem & Aureli, 2005), and conflicts in 
human societies, which are often explicitly driven by the desire to maintain status and to deter 
future antagonism (Mathew & Boyd, 2011; Topalli et al., 2002). Simply put, instigating 
antagonistic or confrontational interactions is characteristic of the dominant individual and, as 
was shown in Chapter 3, costly punishment was seen as an equally dominant behaviour as 
other non-altruistic aggressive actions.   
In regard to punishment specifically, while there is little evidence of altruistic punishment in 
non-human animals, there is a great deal of evidence of intervention by dominant individuals 
across numerous taxa: examples include growth and reproductive policing (Cant et al., 2010; 
Wong et al., 2007), the disruption of conflicts between subordinates to curtail the winner 
effect (Jennings et al., 2011) and the disruption of affinitive behaviour between subordinates 
to prevent the formation of rival coalitions (De Waal, 1982/2007; Widdig et al., 2000). In all 
these cases intervention limits or prevents the rise of a social challenger, and  directly 
comparable behaviour by dominant individuals can also be observed in humans (Maner & 
Mead, 2010).  
Costly punishment of ‘unfair’ behaviour  may therefore have an evolutionary origin in 
detecting – and responding to – potential social challengers (Brosnan, 2011; Cummins, 
 Dominance rank and observer perceptions of costly punishers 
168 
 
1996a): antagonistic/unfair behaviour may indicate a change in the social hierarchy, and it is 
in a dominant individual’s best interest to recognise and respond to any such change. This 
may explain why dominant or high status individuals in general seem more willing to respond 
to perceived unfairness or the violation of social norms (Cummins, 1999; Lammers et al., 
2010) and why the formidability of the violator is a strong predictor of ‘outrage’ (Jenson & 
Peterson, 2011). 
5.1.2 Dominance and the cost of punishment 
The above gives a theoretical rationale as to why there should be a relationship between 
dominance and punishment. In addition, dominance plays a proximate role in lowering the 
cost of punishment. Punishment can potentially be evolutionarily stable as long as some 
individuals have a greater amount of resources (Frank, 1996) or if some individuals can 
punish more effectively and more cheaply than others (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; 
Roberts, 2013). A dominant position covers a number of attributes that would allow a 
dominant individual to punish more cheaply than others. 
Firstly, dominant individuals do have access to a greater amount of resources. For example, 
their position gives them greater opportunities for reciprocity and cooperation (Jones & 
Rachlin, 2006) and their prominence means that others are willing to both tolerate 
asymmetries in reciprocity and to provide aid in conflicts in order to maintain a close 
relationship with the dominant individual (Barclay, 2013; Schino & Aureli, 2009). Dominant 
individuals also demand that their needs are met above others  (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009), can 
behave coercively in dyadic relationships to ensure this (Hawley, 1999), and are less likely to 
face punishment for behaving unfairly  (Eckel et al., 2010; Kim et al., 1998). Thus, even if 
social status does not affect the absolute individual cost of punishment, the relative cost will 
be lower for dominant individuals.  
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Secondly, dominance may reduce the production cost of punishment by making it more 
effective. Effectiveness of punishment is important to its evolutionary stability (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011) and it has been shown that only effective punishment deters free-riding (for 
example, Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). However, while the latter finding is consistent 
across the experimental costly punishment literature, so far little has been said as to how it 
would manifest outside of the laboratory, i.e. why would individuals be able to punish 
effectively? Dominant individuals can punish more effectively, insomuch as they can inflict a 
greater cost on the target physically (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) or use their social position to 
limit access to resources or information (Maner & Mead, 2010).   
Furthermore, perhaps the most important cost to punishment is retaliation from the target 
(Dreber & Rand, 2012). Where retaliation to punishment is possible, punishment is reduced 
to the point that it no longer sustains cooperation or is evolutionarily stable (Nikiforakis, 
2008; Rand et al., 2010); and, in everyday life, the threat of retaliation is a prime factor in 
preventing otherwise cost-free punishment behaviour such as reporting criminal activity 
(Tarling & Morris, 2010). Dominant individuals are, self-evidently, successful in dyadic 
conflicts and as previously stated, in essence punishment is a dyadic interaction between the 
punisher and the defector/norm-violator. Therefore dominant individuals may be able to 
engage in costly punishment without the risk of reprisals as the target will simply acquiesce 
to their demands. Indeed, when punishment occurs outside of the laboratory, it is carried out 
by formidable individuals (Huston et al., 1981) or by those with the support of allies (Mathew 
& Boyd, 2011); circumstances where the threat of retaliation would be reduced. This also 
suggests that retaliation could be a conventional cost to punishment that may make it a costly 
signal  (Nelissen, 2008), as even if the production cost of punishment is low (for example, 
punishment by gossip, Bazzan & Dahmen, 2010;  by ostracism, Bowles & Gintis, 2004; or by 
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condemnation, Masclet et al., 2003) the retaliatory cost may be severe for anyone in a 
subordinate position.  
Finally, as dominant individuals can punish more effectively and face less risk from 
retaliation, it may be possible for them to lower the cost of punishment further, potentially to 
effectively zero, by establishing a credible threat of punishment (McNamara & Houston, 
2002). Once a reputation for costly punishment has been established, an individual may 
never, or at least rarely, need to actually engage in punishment. In effect this can be seen as 
an extension of “don’t mess with the enforcer” benefit to punishment (Barclay, 2006) to 
“don’t mess with anyone in the vicinity of the enforcer”. 
5.1.3 The current studies 
It has been suggested that punishment can act as a costly signal of an individual’s ‘altruistic’ 
character and their commitment to the group (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008) and can also 
function as a signal of personal formidability (Barclay, 2006; Johnstone & Bshary, 2004). 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that punishers are judged by observers to be both likeable and 
dominant. However the direct costs of punishment provide a potential barrier of entry for 
access to these indirect benefits. So while costly punishment might, in principle, generate 
enough indirect or reputational benefits to be evolutionarily stable (Panchanathan & Boyd, 
2004; Santos et al., 2010), only dominant individuals can access these benefits; subordinates 
may need to find less ‘heroic’ ways to generate a positive reputation (Barclay & Reeve, 
2012). To test this, using a series of vignette studies, this chapter investigates how the 
dominance rank of a punisher affected judgements of success in a punishment situation, 
perceptions of the risk or retaliation, and whether status mediates the reputational benefits to 
engaging in punishment. As with Chapter 4, punishment is carried by ‘third parties’ as they 
are not affected directly or indirectly by the unfair behaviour being punished. 
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5.1.4 Operationalising dominance 
While ‘dominance’ itself can be difficult to define in human (Lewis, 2002), and in non-
human animals is often directly related to size and formidability (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995), here the term is used to cover a range of concepts such as formidability, status, 
prestige and power (Keltner et al., 2003; Lewis, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 2004). As defined 
in 2.1 dominance here implies that, through whatever mechanism, some individuals  “have 
priority of access to resources, especially reproductive resources” (Cummins, 1996a, p. 467) 
or preferential access to “any requisite that adds to the genetic fitness of the dominant 
individual” (Wilson, 1980, p. 129). I.e. dominance is used here to identify an individual who, 
for whatever reason, has a ‘strong position is a social hierarchy’ which results in preferential 
access to these resources.   
While there are likely to be differences between the different ‘paths’ to dominance (Cheng et 
al., 2013) in the effects they have on behaviour, we believe that the benefits of a ‘strong 
social position’ would be comparable whether this position was achieved through, for 
example, aggression or prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). To demonstrate this, in the 
current studies dominance was operationalised to mean a prestigious position rather than one 
based on formidability; if a prestigious individual is judged to be able to punish more cheaply 
because of biologically less tangible characteristics (e.g. ‘seniority’ or ‘talent’), then it is 
likely a physically powerful individual would too. Doing so allows the current studies to 
directly test whether social power, as opposed to physical violence, is seen as a credible 
threat. 
5.2 Study 5: can only dominant individuals enforce a credible threat of punishment? 
Punishment is costly, but Chapter 3 demonstrated that punishers are seen as both likable and 
dominant and these are benefits that could allow a punisher to recuperate the cost of 
punishment. Equally, punishment can also be evolutionarily stable if the cost of punishment 
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is low (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011), and this can be achieved if a threat of punishment is 
credible (Cant & Johnstone, 2009) or through less aggressive punishment such as ostracism 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2004). The current study therefore addressed whether the status of a 
punisher affected the perception of their ability to make the threat of punishment credible, 
whether it affected the risk of retaliation they faced, and whether the type of intervention 
affected how punishers are judged. The current study also addressed how these factors 
affected any reputational gains generated from an act of punishment. 
Also, informed by the results of Study 3 (Chapter 4), to ensure effects other than that of 
dominance and punishment-type were kept to a minimum, the scenario was altered to lower 
the ‘risk’ to participants from the aggressor: participants were described as being within the 
group and the targets for aggression were out-group members. These changes also allowed 
the information regarding status to be integrated more subtly into the vignette. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants & Materials 
108 psychology undergraduate students from the University of Exeter (86 females)
3
 
completed the study. Participants were not offered any incentive for taking part. The survey 
was administered in paper-form by a single researcher. Participants were approached around 
the Psychology building and those who agreed to take part were presented with a paper 
questionnaire containing one of four experimental vignettes and a series of questions 
concerning the punisher in the scenarios. Recruitment began on 1
st
 October 2012 and 
concluded on 12
th
 December 2012. All participants passed the manipulation checks (see 
5.3.4). 
                                                          
3
 A pilot study (n=40) run prior to the current study using the same scenario and questions (with additional 
questions regarding the ‘believability’ of the scenario etc) intentionally achieved an equal sex ratio. There was 
no main effect of sex on the DVs recorded, nor were the study DVs affected by an interaction between sex and 
status/punishment type. 
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5.3.2 Experimental Scenarios 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves as part of a local sports team, who, following 
an evening practice session, had retired to a local bar. The team had occupied a table but 
there were not enough seats for everyone. Therefore some members, including the 
participant, had to stand. Nearby, two strangers were sitting at another table and after a few 
minutes one of them headed to the bar to order drinks. Seeing this, one of the standing 
members of the team went over to the table and proceeded to take the now vacant chair, 
dismissing the objections of the still seated stranger. Upon their return with the chair, another 
member of the team confronted this person about their actions (for the full vignette, see 
Appendix C). 
The study manipulated the status of the confronting team member – the third party - and how 
they carried out their confrontation. They were described as either “popular and the most 
skilled player” (dominant) or “unpopular and the least skilled player” (subordinate), and they 
either threatened to hit the other team member (aggressive punishment) or threatened to 
prevent them playing in all future matches (non-aggressive punishment), giving the study a 
2x2 between-subjects design. Note that ‘third party’ is used here as the punisher can be 
considered to be ‘disinterested’ as the anti-social behaviour did not impact the group. 
5.3.3 Social perception questions  
Following the scenario, participants were asked a series of questions designed to investigate 
how credible the threats from the third party were. Participants were asked to indicate ‘what 
happened next’ from one of two choices; either the punishment was successful with the team 
member returning the chair, or unsuccessful and the team member kept the chair. They were 
also asked to indicate on a on a scale of 1-7 (1=not surprised, 7=very surprised), how 
surprised they were that the specific individual in the scenario intervened and, on a scale of 1-
7 (1=very unlikely, 7=very likely), whether they believed the reprimanded individual would 
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retaliate against the punisher. All participants were then asked the five likability questions 
(current study, α=0.82) and the five social dominance questions (current study, α=0.85) as 
detailed in Study 1. 
5.3.4 Manipulation checks and demographic questions 
Participants were then asked two comprehension/manipulation check questions. They were 
asked to indicate, from a choice of “popular and skilled” or “unpopular and unskilled” how 
the third party was described in the scenario and to indicate, from a choice of “Threatened to 
hit them” and “Threatened to ensure they never played for the team again”, how the third 
party intervened. Finally, participants indicated their age, sex and nationality. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Credible threat of punishment  
Participants were first asked whether they believed the aggressor would ignore or give in to 
the third party’s demands. As shown in Figure 5.1 participants believed that the intervention 
by the dominant punisher would be more successful (Wald χ21=147.53, p<0.001) and did not 
believe that the type of punishment alone would alter the outcome (Wald χ21=0.51, p=0.48).  
Figure 5.1 shows that while participants believed the dominant punisher would be successful 
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Figure 5.1: proportion of participants who believed the intervention by an a) dominant or b) 
subordinate punisher would be successful (grey) or unsuccessful (white). 
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regardless of punishment type, the subordinate punisher was thought to have even a modest 
chance of being successful only when being physically aggressive (Wald χ22=9.80, p=0.002).  
As shown in Figure 5.2, participants were far more surprised when the Subordinate member 
attempted punishment (F1,105=128.16, p<0.001) and believed retaliation from this 
intervention was more likely to follow (F1,105=6.70, p=0.011). 
5.4.2 Perceived dominance and likability 
The dominant third party was, as may be expected, perceived to be more dominant 
(F1,105=111.76, p=0.001; dominant third party, M=5.5, SD=1.1; subordinate third party, 
M=3.6, SD=1.2) but there was no effect of status on how likable they were judged to be 
(F1,105=0.48, p=0.49). Figure 5.3 shows that when the Third Party engaged in aggressive 
punishment they were seen as less likable (F1,105=6.84, p=0.01): however, being more 
aggressive did not lead the punisher to be judged as more socially dominant (F1,105=2.07, 
p=0.10, Figure 5.3). No interaction was found between either status and punishment for 
likability (F1,105=0.83, p=0.77) or perceived dominance (F1,105=0.43, p=0.51). 
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Figure 5.2: participants’ reaction to the intervention for 
a dominant (white) or subordinate (grey) Third Party. 
Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
Figure 5.3: participants’ perception a Third Party’s 
likability and dominance when they engaged in 
Aggressive (white) or Non-aggressive (grey) 
punishment. Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
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5.4.3 Success, likeability and retaliation 
Given the results regarding the insensitivity of participants to the success of punishment 
found in Study 4, a post-hoc analysis was carried out to see if there was any relationship 
between predicted success and likability; none was found (U=1308.5, N1=59, N2=48, p=0.5). 
However, there was a strong relationship between predicted success and retaliation, with 
participants believing unsuccessful punishers to be at greater risk from retaliation (U=856.5, 
N1=59, N2=48, p<0.001). 
5.5 Discussion 
These results clearly suggest that a dominant position can drastically lower the cost of 
punishment. Firstly, only dominant individuals were seen as being able to make a credible 
threat of punishment, that is to say participants believed the aggressor would back down 
when faced with a threat of punishment from a dominant third party. Thus, for dominant 
individuals, the realised costs of punishment can be effectively reduced or even removed 
completely by replacing physical action with a credible threat of punishment. Importantly, the 
credible threat imposed by the dominant group memeber was not based on the type of 
punishment employed; they were seen as equally likely to be successful whether the threat 
was aggressive (threat of physical violence) or non-aggressive (threat of ostracism from the 
group). In fact ostracism has previously been shown to facilitate group cooperation without 
coordinated punishment and at no cost to the punisher (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Masclet, 
2003). Such a threat therefore can be seen as highly credible and effective, but only if it 
comes from a dominant individual 
Secondly, this study found that dominant individuals were judged to be at less risk of 
retaliation than subordinates. Chapter 3 established that individuals who attempt costly 
punishment are seen as more dominant, yet participants in the current study were both 
surprised at the intervention by the subordinate individual and believed they would be at 
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greater risk from retaliation. Even dominant individuals were judged to be at some risk (see 
Figure 4.3) and it may be the case that at least some risk of retaliation is required for any 
punishment to be a costly signal: while their threats may be credible, a dominant individual 
would need to prove on occasion they can actually enforce such threats. Indeed, while 
potentially costly punishment may be important in signalling one’s dominant position, 
participants felt that a subordinate individual attempting to assert themselves in this way 
would be unsuccessful. In both human and non-human animals false-signalling is often 
responded to severely (Anderson et al., 2008; Számadó, 2011b; Tibbetts & Izzo, 2010) and in 
the current study participants believed that attempted punishment by a subordinate would 
lead to a greater risk of retaliation.  
The study also suggested that the social benefits generated by engaging in punishment are 
significantly affected by dominance, specifically the ability to successfully use non-violent 
punishment. Participants disliked the third party who threatened physical violence and only 
the dominant punisher was perceived as being successful when non-violent punishment was 
threatened. Dominant individuals can therefore punish in a more socially acceptable way and 
as a result make greater reputational gains than subordinates.  
Nevertheless, the dominant punisher in this study was only able to punish non-violently due 
to their authority in the groups and this leverage may not always exist in ‘real life’. However, 
that such a restriction exists adds weight to the argument that dominance explains 
heterogeneity in the cost of punishment, because individuals will be more or less dominant 
depending on the circumstances and thus more or less able to punish cheaply (for how 
proximate costs influence punsihment behaviour, see Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis et al., 
2009). Still, while less liked, the violent stance by the dominant punisher was also predicted 
to be successful. In comparison to Chapter 3, where punishers were more well-liked in 
comparison to those engaging in other violent behaviour, the current study suggests that 
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while any punishment of anti-social behaviour is responded to positively by observers, there 
is a preference for less violent intervention.  
The results contradict some of those from Chapter 3. There it was found that success was no 
predictor of ‘likability’, which does suggest that potentially both dominant and subordinate 
individuals could gain a reputational benefit from attempting punishment. However 
participants also believed that failure in punishment would invite retaliation so, for 
subordinates, the retaliatory cost of failure would likely outweigh any benefits from the 
attempt. Again, participants were very surprised at the intervention by a subordinate punisher, 
so while the vignette ‘forced’ a subordinate to punish, it is debatable whether in a real-life 
situation that a low status or subordinate individual would actually engage in any form of 
costly punishment.  
Finally, the criticism above, that ‘non-violent’ punishment would only be available in a 
certain context actually add theoretical support to the suggestion that punishment is a costly 
signal, as individuals not in the context or condition to punish might not do so. While not 
within the purview of the current research, it would be interesting to see how domain-general 
different types of dominance are. Prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), for example, 
requires both reputational and culturally specific knowledge; without such knowledge a 
newcomer would not recognise that certain titles confer dominance (e.g. ‘Lord’), whereas 
fighting ability is fairly easy to assess  (Sell, Cosmides, et al., 2009). Thus, while a Prophet 
may never be respected in his own home town, the Ultimate Fighting Champion probably 
will be. 
5.6 Study 6: Dominance rank, outcome, and observer perceptions of costly punishers 
Study 5 demonstrated that dominance can lower the cost of punishment, both in terms of the 
production cost (i.e. one never has to engage in an actual physical confrontation for it to be 
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effective) and also reduces the risk of retaliation. However, in any conflict, the status and 
condition of both parties should contribute to the outcome (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973). 
Study 6 therefore also manipulated the status of the aggressor in the scenario.  
Also, Study 5 found that while dominance lowered the cost of punishment, the punisher was 
able to generate indirect benefits regardless of success. This implies that any group member 
could access some of the benefits of costly punishment even if they had not established a 
credible threat. One explanation for this is that the study scenario did not allow the third party 
to refuse to intervene: as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the attempt at punishment 
may at least signal a belief that one could win the confrontation regardless of status, whereas, 
in ‘real-life’ a subordinate group member might never actually intervene. The current study 
accounted for this by providing the participants with an additional ‘does nothing’ option 
when asked to predict the outcome of the confrontation. 
5.7 Method 
5.7.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter via a university-wide web-based 
recruitment system (SONA). A total of 119 participants, 26 Males (M age = 24) and 93 
females (M age = 20) with an overall age range of 18 – 46 completed the questionnaire. As 
an incentive, participants who completed the survey were entered into a prize-draw for one of 
several £10 shopping vouchers. Recruitment began on 26
th
 September 2013 and concluded on 
24
th
 October 2013. No participants failed the manipulation checks (see 5.7.5). 
5.7.2 Materials and procedure 
The survey consisted of three sections. The first section presented participants with an 
experimental vignette and the second section collected participants’ responses to these 
vignettes. The third section collected demographic information and contained the 
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manipulation check questions. The survey was conducted using the web-based application 
SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com) and was presented to participants in the order 
shown below (for the full vignette, see Appendix C). 
5.7.3 Experimental vignettes 
Initially, the scenario was identical to Study 5; participants were asked to imagine themselves 
with a group of team members in a local bar when a member of their team committed an anti-
social act, which another member of the group noticed and was visibly angered by it. Unlike 
Study 5 however, the scenario ended there without describing how this third party responded 
to the norm violation. Again, ‘third party’ is used to denote proximate ‘disinterest’ (see 1.1). 
Also, unlike Study 5, the current study manipulated the status of both the chair-taker (the 
‘aggressor’) and the other team member (the ‘third Party’). Depending on the condition, each 
was described as either “a popular and skilled player” (dominant) or “an unpopular and 
unskilled player” (subordinate), giving the study a 2x2 between-subjects design. 
5.7.4 Social perception questions  
Following the scenario, participants were asked to indicate ‘what happened next’ from one of 
three choices. They were asked to indicate whether they believed: the third party would 
intervene successfully, with the aggressor returning the chair; the third party would intervene 
unsuccessfully, with the aggressor keeping the chair; or the third party would not intervene at 
all. The former two options stated that “after a brief exchange, the chair taker…”, that is to 
say it was not specified whether the intervention involved physical or social threats. All 
participants were then asked the five likability questions (for this study, α=0.87) and the five 
social dominance questions (for this study, α=0.86) as detailed in Study 1. Finally, 
participants were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 (not likely at all) to 7 (extremely likely), 
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how likely it was that the aggressor would try and ‘get even’ with the third party then or at a 
later date. 
5.7.5 Manipulation checks and demographic questions  
Participants were then asked the two comprehension questions. They were asked to indicate, 
from a choice of “popular and skilled”, “unpopular and unskilled” or “sort of popular and 
skilled” how the aggressor and the third party were described in the scenario. Finally, 
participants indicated their age, sex and nationality. 
5.8 Results 
5.8.1 Outcome 
Participants were first asked to indicate “what happened next”, whether the third party 
successfully intervened, unsuccessfully intervened or failed to intervene. As shown in Figure 
5.4a, participants believed that for a dominant third party the most likely outcome was a 
successful intervention and that a subordinate third party was unlikely to intervene at all 
(Wald X
2
1= 18.33, p<0.001). As shown in Figure 5.4b, the rank of the aggressor also affected 
perceived outcome, with participants believing that a third party would be less likely to 
intervene when the aggressor was dominant (Wald χ21=5.03, p=0.025). Perceived outcome 
was not affected by an interaction between the rank of the third party and the aggressor (Wald 
χ21= 1.27, p=0.26). However Figure 5.5 does suggest that while the rank of the aggressor was 
important in the perceived outcomes, this was more clearly the case when the third party was 
subordinate. 
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5.8.2 Likability 
The rank of the third party did not affect their likability (F1,115=2.57, p=0.11), however the 
third party was less well liked when the aggressor was dominant (M=4.6 SD=1.2) than when 
the aggressor was low ranked (M=5.0, SD=0.9; F1,115=4.57, p=.0.035). The likability of the 
third party was not affected by an interaction between the ranks of the third party and the 
aggressor (F1,115=0.98, p=0.75). 
How participants predicted the outcome of the scenario had a strong effect on likability 
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(F2,116=4.11, p=0.019), with participants liking the third party who was predicted to be 
successful in their intervention (M=5.1, SD=1.1) more than those predicted to be 
unsuccessful (M=4.7, SD=1.1) or predicted to not intervene (M=4.5, SD=0.9). This may 
explain why participants liked the third party who punished a subordinate aggressor more, as 
punishment was seen to be less successful when directed against a dominant aggressor. 
Therefore, a mediation analysis was conducted with ‘outcome’ as the mediating variable4. 
With the rank of the third party controlled for, the predicted outcome completely mediated 
the relationship between the rank of the aggressor and the likability of the third party (b=0.08, 
BCa CI95=0.03, 0.24, on 5000 samples), with Aggressor Rank no longer effecting likeability 
(b=0.34, t=1.73, p=0.09). Thus, the likeability of the third party was dependent on whether 
their punishment was expected to achieve a successful outcome. 
5.8.3 Dominance  
As shown in Figure 5.6, unsurprisingly the third party was perceived to be more dominant 
when described as dominant as opposed to subordinate (F1,115=16.18, p<0.001). The third 
                                                          
4
 Analyses carried out using linear regressions suggest that the ‘outcome’ categories produce a graded response 
and can therefore be considered as a ‘scale of intervention’, from no intervention to completely successful. 
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Figure 5.6: the perceived dominance of the third party 
depending on the rank of the third party and the aggressor 
(dominant = white, subordinate = grey). Bars = 1 Standard 
Error. 
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party was also perceived to be more dominant when the aggressor they faced was described 
as subordinate (F1,115=3.64, p=0.059, Figure 5.6). The perceived dominance of the third party 
was not affected by an interaction between the ranks of the third party and the aggressor 
(F1,115=0.24, p=0.63). 
As with likeability, what participants predicted about the outcome had a strong effect on 
perceived dominance (F2,116=9.89, p<0.001), with successful third parties being seen as more 
dominant (M=3.8, SD=1.2) than unsuccessful (M=3.0, SD=1.1) or non-intervening (M=2.8, 
SD=1.1) third parties. With the rank of the aggressor controlled for, the predicted outcome 
partially mediated the relationship between the rank of the third party and their perceived 
dominance (b=-0.23, BCa CI95=-0.50, -0.08, on 5000 samples), although the direct 
relationship between the two was still present (b=-0.61, t=-2.75, p=0.007).  
Interestingly, with the rank of the third party controlled for, the predicted outcome of the 
interaction fully mediated the relationship between the rank of the aggressor and the 
perceived dominance of the third party (b=0.11, BCa CI95=0.01, 0.31, on 5000 samples), with 
aggressor’s rank no longer effecting likeability (b=0.29, t=1.40, p=0.17). Therefore, while the 
third party’s described rank affected the perceived dominance, the effect of the aggressor’s 
rank on perceived dominance of the third party was entirely due to how the aggressor’s rank 
affected the predicted outcome. 
5.8.4 Retaliation 
There was a trend towards the status of the punisher affecting the perceived risk of retaliation 
(F1,115=3.31, p=0.07), with dominant third parties being perceived as being at less risk of 
retaliation (M=3.1, SD=1.9) than subordinate third parties (M=3.9, SD=2.1). The rank of the 
aggressor did not affect the perceived risk of retaliation (F1,115=0.04, p=0.84), nor was the 
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risk of retaliation affected by an interaction between the ranks of the third party and the 
aggressor (F1,115=0.67, p=0.412). 
Outcome did not affect the risk of retaliation (F2,116=0.53, p=0.59), and consequently a 
mediation analysis would not be appropriate. However, as an exploratory analysis, outcome 
was entered as a covariate; in this analysis the status of the third party did affect the perceived 
risk of retaliation (F1,114=5.85, p=0.017). 
It should be noted however that, as we assumed a priori that some participants would select 
the ‘do nothing’ outcome, the retaliation item asked participants to “assume the agitated 
person [the third party] did intervene, regardless of your initial decision”. Therefore the 
analysis, with outcome as a covariate, was run again after removing participants who 
indicated that the third party would not intervene. As shown in Figure 5.7, while individually 
the rank of the third party (F1,67=0.005, p=0.94) and the aggressor (F1,67=0.008, p=0.93) did 
not affect the perceived risk of retaliation, retaliation was affected by an interaction between 
the two (F1,67=4.08, p=0.047); participants who predicted the third party would intervene felt 
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that retaliation was more likely when the third party confronted an aggressor of equal rank. 
5.9 Discussion 
Study 6 demonstrated that the rank of individuals involved in a conflict as considered 
important by observers making judgements about those involved, with the rank of the 
punisher being the most vital to a successful outcome. While this is not surprising as such, it 
does support the suggestion made in Study 5 that subordinates are not expected to intervene 
at all. Indeed, the pattern of predicted outcomes as shown in Figure 5.5 suggests that 
participants believed a punishing group member would either intervene successfully or not at 
all.  
More interesting however was how the reputational benefits were affected by the interaction 
between the statuses of the belligerents and the predicted outcome of the intervention. 
Fundamentally, the likeability and perceived dominance of a third party was dependent on a 
successful outcome of the interaction. While a previous study (Study 5) failed to find such an 
effect, this is most likely explained by the lack of a ‘failed to intervene’ option in that study. 
In Study 5 for example, regardless of their other social judgements, participants were very 
surprised when a subordinate individual intervened and in Study 6 this surprise translated into 
participants predicting that subordinates would not intervene at all. It also provides a 
conceptual model of how status interacts with these benefits. While a successful outcome to 
punishment is the most important factor when observers make social judgements, that 
outcome only occurs if the punisher is dominant.  
This point should be stressed as it highlights a wider issue with the economic research into 
punishment and the benefits thereof, as by design all punishment in economic experiments is 
successful, and this not what individuals always expect to occur in social conflicts. The 
results of Study 6 clearly show that whether punishment is successful has a strong impact on 
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any reputational benefits.  While  research has been concerned with downstream effects of 
successful punishment, for example on reputation (Nelissen, 2008), the behaviour of free-
riders (Masclet, 2003) or group efficiency (Gächter et al., 2008), there has been no 
consideration that the attempt at punishment might fail. And both studies in this chapter have 
shown that punishment by dominants, in the perceptions of observers at least, does not fail. 
Thus the conventional experiments are, in effect, modelling the behaviour only of dominant 
individuals. 
In terms of retaliation the initial analysis of the data suggested that, as was found in Study 5, 
dominant punishers were thought to be at less risk of retaliation, with the outcome of the 
interaction also exerting some effect. It should be stressed once again that retaliation-costs are 
possibly the main cost to punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008; Rand et al., 2010) and the most 
overlooked (Dreber & Rand, 2012), and these results suggest that the status of the punisher 
can significantly lower this cost. It was expected that retaliation risk would correspond to 
relative rank, i.e. that a dominant punisher would face lower risk from a subordinate 
aggressor than a dominant one, and that a subordinate punisher would face a greater risk from 
a dominant aggressor than a subordinate one. In the case of the latter however, in the second 
analysis (with the ‘no intervention’ data removed) the opposite was true; the risk of 
retaliation was perceived to be greater when the belligerents were of equal rank.  As within 
dominance hierarchies conflict should occur more between those of similar ranks (Wilson, 
1980, pp. 141-142), this results suggests that participants perceived the encounter as a 
dominance contest rather than as a (purely) moralistic act.  
Thus, the effect of dominance on the outcome of punishment, and in turn the indirect 
reputational gains from punishment, suggests that dominance is an important variable in 
calculating the benefit from the behaviour. At the very least, the results suggest that costly 
punishment can be seen (and is perceived by those witnessing it) as a dyadic conflict between 
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individuals that is governed by the rules and motivations of such conflicts (Clutton-Brock & 
Parker, 1995; Johnstone & Bshary, 2004; Silk, 2003) as opposed to being  a selfless act that 
requires idiosyncratic group-level explanations for its motivation and existence (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000). 
5.10 General Discussion 
The studies in this chapter suggest that dominance greatly lowers the cost of punishment and 
hence increases the likelihood that it will occurAs a result the clear reputational benefits that 
can be gained from punishment are only open to dominant individuals. The results suggest 
that only dominant individuals can lower the production costs via the effective use of non-
violent and cost-free threats of punishment (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; de Weerd & Verbrugge, 
2011) and only dominant individuals can punish with a reduced risk of retaliation.  The costs 
of retaliation especially may stretch beyond the initial act of punishment. Humans are very 
good at reputation scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), and if punishers’ are ‘scored’ in a 
similar fashion as altruistic individuals (Tennie, 2012), then a reputation for enforcing 
fairness, while potentially beneficial for attracting some cooperative partners, could act as an 
reputational badge that may invite aggression from others (Számadó, 2011b), akin to the 
sheriff in a Western or the eponymous character of a super-hero film; i.e., the person who 
needs to be ‘taken out’ to allow the exploitation of others. In this instance a reputation for 
enforcing fairness might work against a punisher, or at least one who could not resist such 
future actions.  
The suggestion that only more dominant individuals are able to access the reputational 
benefits of costly punishment moves beyond the idea that punishment can signal fairness 
alone (Nelissen, 2008). Only dominant individuals are capable of giving this signal credibly, 
meaning that the reputational benefits from punishment are inextricably linked to dominance.  
At a further level, the results of the studies suggest that individual variation in dominance and 
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status may have played an important role in the evolution of costly punishment and that it is 
an important factor in any calculation of the economics of punishment. Punishment can be 
evolutionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the cost of punishment (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996; Roberts, 2013) and we suggest that dominance causes 
sufficient heterogeneity in both the cost and rewards of punishment to make this behaviour 
evolutionarily stable. 
5.10.1 Dominance and the origins of costly punishment 
Pedersen et al (2013) recently suggested that any account of the evolution of  ‘moralistic’ 
punishment in humans must be relatable to behaviour seen in non-human animals. As 
previously stated, punishment can be seen as an antagonistic dyadic interaction between a 
third party and the social defector/aggressor and such encounters are predominantly 
instigated and won by dominant individuals (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Silk, 2003): 
indeed, in Studies 5 & 6, participants believed a dominant punisher, and only a dominant 
individual, would be successful in their punishment. More directly in line with the assertion 
of Pederson et al, while there is very little evidence of altruistic punishment in non-human 
animals, dominance determines intervention and policing across numerous taxa (for example, 
Fallow deer, Jennings et al., 2011; Barbary macaques, Widdig et al., 2000; and in coral fish 
queues, Wong et al., 2007), and these interventions by a dominant individual limit or prevent 
the rise of a social challenger. Therefore punishment can potentially be seen as having an 
origin in recognising and responding to social challenges (Brosnan, 2011), with only 
dominant individuals possessing the freedom of action to act upon this recognition. This is 
important as, firstly, punishment as a tool to maintain social position provides an additional 
motivation for an individual to engage in the behaviour and, secondly, the benefits an act of 
punishment provides can be seen as independent from cooperation (Rand et al., 2010). 
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However, the data concerning likeability may suggest that the use of costly intervention 
purely to signal dominance may be where humans and other animals diverge. The non-human 
examples given above are from species with a relatively steep social hierarchy, yet the 
relatively flat social hierarchies of modern hunter-gatherer human societies, which likely 
reflect early human social systems, prevent one individual (or group of individuals) from 
becoming too dominant (Boehm, 1997; Gavrilets et al., 2008). While costly punishment may 
have an origin as purely a dominance behaviour, punishment in humans has become a more 
complex and  strategic behaviour, in much the same way that human reciprocity and 
cooperation has an origin in the more limited cooperative behaviour of other animals (Melis 
& Semmann, 2010). As coalitions became more important to an individual’s survival 
(Gavrilets et al., 2008), punishment allows an individual to attract cooperative partners by 
displaying both personal cooperative tendencies (Nelissen, 2008) and the ability and 
willingness to police free-riders (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006), while at the same time 
preventing the rise of social challengers without losing positive attitude to the point where 
coalitions are mobilised against them or group members simply leave (Betzig, 2014). Thus, in 
terms of social bargaining (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009), punishment allows an individual to 
signal they are both useful to others, and capable of inflicting costs upon others should the 
need arise. 
5.10.2 Intervention or punishment? 
A theoretical criticism that can be made of the studies in this chapter is that, in terms of the 
strict economic definition of punishment of ‘paying a cost to inflict a cost on another’, the 
studies and the scenarios contained within concern an intervention by a group member rather 
than a punishment per se (Kurzban, personal communication). However, while there may 
have not been any material costs inflicted, in both studies the described scenario would have 
resulted in costs to the aggressor in terms of social humiliation due to being publically 
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shamed for, and forced to retract, an ‘unfair’ behaviour (Barr, 2001). Equally, it should be 
noted that even within the economic literature, verbal or other non-monetary responses to 
unfairness or non-cooperation are considered to be ‘punishment’ (for example, Masclet et al., 
2003; Ostrom et al., 1992). 
Furthermore, we would argue that the imposition of actual material costs is an anticipated 
downstream effect of the subsequent action taken by the target of any punishment. As an 
illustrative example, if an individual came across someone smoking on public transport 
(illegal in the UK) and demanded they stop, this would still be an act of costly punishment in 
the classic Fehr (2004) sense (i.e. the desire and subsequent behaviour to uphold a social 
norm) even if the smoker apologised and snubbed out the cigarette with no further interaction 
taking place, because of the implied threat to escalate matters if this demand was not met. In 
such a situation there is only physical punishment if the ‘intervention’ is challenged. Indeed, 
Levine, Taylor, & Best (2011) showed that violence after the intervention by a third party 
only occurs after a series of escalating behaviours by the parties involved, each of which 
gives the opportunity for one party to back down. As is the case in animal dominance 
contests (Maynard-Smith & Parker, 1976; Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973).  
Perhaps most importantly, the fact that potential punishment costs might not be realised is 
one of the core arguments as to how dominance affects the cost/benefit of costly punishment: 
essentially, a position of dominance, and its implied ability to inflict effective punishment on 
others, functions as a credible threat. Our smoker above would be well aware of the potential 
costs (further social embarrassment and/or a physical confrontation) and thus chose to 
acquiesce. We believe that people’s understanding of this implication was demonstrated by 
both studies in this chapter, as when faced with a challenge from a dominant individual, the 
transgressor was predicted to back down rather than have cost of punishment realised. 
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5.10.3 General conclusion 
The current studies strongly suggest that variations in dominance played an important role in 
the evolution of costly punishment. Dominant individuals are able to punish more effectively 
and at a lower cost than others and therefore dominant individuals can access the signalling 
or reciprocal benefits generated by punishment at a much cheaper rate.  We suggest that 
taking dominance into account may help answer some of the questions and debates around 
the evolution of this behaviour, specifically in terms of how some individuals can overcome 
the costs of punishment. At the very least, these results demonstrate that social dominance is 
an important factor in overcoming the proximate costs of; however we also believe that these 
results point to human costly punishment having an evolutionary origin as dominance-based 
behaviour rather than having evolved to specifically promote cooperation. 
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6 Chapter 6: dominance and the behaviour of costly punishers 
 
Chapter 6 investigates whether simulating some of the characteristics of a dominant position, 
specifically a greater amount of resources (1.1.2 and 2.3.2) and a disproportionate benefit 
from group cooperation (2.3.3), would result in more costly punishment by ‘dominant’ 
individuals. Study 7 manipulates the amount of additional resources certain participants 
received based on the group product. Study 8 manipulates both the source of the additional 
resources, i.e. whether they came at the direct expense of others in the group, and the stability 
of the ‘dominant’ position. Study 8 therefore also investigates whether dominants use 
punishment strategically to ensure   continued benefit from the public good. 
6.1 General introduction 
The previous chapter found that varying the dominance of punishers can have a dramatic 
effect on observer expectations and perceptions of costly punishment behaviour. Dominant 
individuals were seen as being at less risk of retaliation from the target of punishment and, 
perhaps because of this, only dominant individuals were predicted to engage in punishment a) 
successfully and b) at all. In fact, the indirect reputational benefits highlighted in Chapter 4 
were found to be dependent on a successful outcome to punishment in Chapter 5. As it has 
been repeatedly demonstrated by others that punishers do respond to the potential for a 
reputation to be established, either by increasing  (Bering, 2008; Kurzban et al., 2007) or 
decreasing (Nikiforakis, 2008; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011) punishment, it is safe to 
assume that those who punish are concerned about the way their actions are perceived and 
responded to by others. 
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Nevertheless, while these findings show that dominance plays an important part in shaping 
the judgements and expectations of observers, the question still remains as to whether 
individuals in a dominant position are actually more likely to engage in costly punishment. 
This chapter will attempt to simulate a dominant position by manipulating some of the 
advantages of dominant position suggested in 2.3. 
6.1.1 Dominance and the cost of punishment 
As detailed in Chapter 5 (5.1.1) and the literature review (2.3), dominant individuals can 
potentially experience a lower cost of punishment. Perhaps the most used method of lowering 
the cost of punishment in the economic and evolution literature is making punishment 
‘effective’, where each unit of resources spent on punishment inflicts a greater amount of 
harm on the target (for a review see,  Balliet et al., 2011; see also, Bowles & Gintis, 2004; 
Egas & Riedl, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a; Nikiforakis & 
Normann, 2008; Roberts, 2013). Those in a dominant position are able (and willing) to inflict 
meaningful costs upon others (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009; Silk, 2003) and outside of the 
laboratory punishment is generally restricted to formidable individuals (Huston et al., 1981). 
Dominants are also in a position to inflict greater social penalties on others as their position 
can represent a bottleneck in connectivity between group members (Maner & Mead, 2010; 
Scott, 2007, pp. 86-87). Furthermore, as dominants have more social allies these can be 
employed to punish effectively: the presence of social allies lowers the threat potential foes 
are perceived to be (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013), lowers the likelihood of being a victim of 
aggression (Smith et al., 2004), and when punishment takes place in non-state societies, it 
does so after a sufficient number of allies have been gathered (Mathew & Boyd, 2011). 
Indeed, spreading the cost of punishment between individuals has been suggested as an 
alternative way for punishment to evolve (Boyd et al., 2010), and while Chapter 2 suggested 
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that a ‘cheap’ verbal signal from a conspecific does not coordinate punishment, a dominant 
position might allow for more direct and overt coordination of group activity (Gillet et al., 
2010; Van Vugt, 2006). 
Because of the factors summarised above, dominant individuals can monopolise resources as 
they can behave coercively (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Hawley, 1999) or because others 
are willing to tolerate asymmetries in reciprocity to maintain a close relationship with them 
(Barclay, 2013; Schino & Aureli, 2009). The resource-controlling ability of dominant 
individuals (Hawley, 1999) therefore allows them to punish at a lower net cost than 
subordinates, which alone might allow punishment to be evolutionarily stable (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996). The fact that individuals are less inclined to retaliate against 
dominants for behaving ‘unfairly’ in dyadic interactions (see also, Eckel et al., 2010; Kim et 
al., 1998) might also lower the cost to a dominant individual from retaliation/counter-
punishment. While counter punishment is one of the main costs to punishment (Dreber & 
Rand, 2012; Nikiforakis, 2008), a subordinate would be as unlikely to respond 
antagonistically to punishment as they are to other forms of aggression from a dominant 
individual (Silk, 2003). This was demonstrated in Study 6. 
6.1.2 Dominance and the direct benefit of punishment 
Nevertheless, even if dominant individuals experience a lower cost of punishment because 
they can punish more effectively, at a lower relative resource cost, and can avoid the cost of 
retaliation, it is argued that over evolutionarily time those who punish will still be 
outcompeted by second-order free riders, those who cooperate but do not pay the cost of 
punishment
5
 (Dreber et al., 2008; Yamagishi, 1988), however slight it might potentially be. 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted here that, as discussed in Chapter 5, a further cost-mitigating advantage of a dominant 
position is the ability to enforce a ‘credible threat’ of punishment. However, it is unlikely that such a credible 
threat could be established without at least some punishment (Barclay, 2006). In principle this can be seen in the 
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Indeed, this is a fundamental argument as to why costly punishment might require an 
idiosyncratic group-level section mechanism in order to evolve (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
Gintis, 2000). 
However, this conclusion is based on two premises that need not be true. The first is that 
individuals are homogeneous in the cost of punishment, which as described above is not the 
case when dominance is considered. The second, and perhaps more important, premise is that 
individuals are homogeneous in the benefits derived from punishment
6
. This also need not be 
the case. Heterogeneity in either the cost or benefit might make punishment evolutionarily 
stable (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Roberts, 2013). We 
cannot manipulate a true dominance hierarchy directly in an economic experiment, although 
the next chapter (Chapter 7) attempted to circumvent this by making use of naturally-
occurring group position. However it is possible to incorporate the advantages of a dominant 
position into game mechanics, for example the ability to punish or preventing retaliation. The 
studies in this chapter focused on another much less experimentally studied method of 
lowering the cost of punishment that we believe also represents an advantage of a dominant 
position: allowing certain participants to have disproportional access to resources. The 
current chapter investigated how this aspect of a dominant position, and specifically how 
heterogeneity in marginal benefit from group cooperation, might influence the willingness to 
punish. 
In non-human primates and other social animals, dominant individuals monopolise resources 
such as food or reproduction, and while one might hesitate to compare the following 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pattern of punishment in many of the public goods games mentioned above, i.e. when punishment is effective, 
there is initial free-riding and corresponding punishment, however as the game progresses punishment decreases 
as cooperation increases in response to the punishment. 
6
 For the moment I am ignoring indirect benefits open only to the punisher, for example reputation (Nelissen, 
2008; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004, and see Chapters 3 & 4 of this thesis), preventing future exploitation 
(Barclay, 2006; Jensen, 2010) or the benefits of behaving spitefully (Gardner & West, 2004b; Jensen, 2010). 
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examples to human ‘norm enforcement’ (but see, Cummins, 2005), dominant individuals 
certainly benefit from the punishment of non-dominant breeders (Cant et al., 2010; Clutton-
Brock & Parker, 1995), ‘cheating’ conspecifics (Raihani et al., 2010), the prevention of 
association between conspecifics (Widdig et al., 2000)  and growth policing (Wong et al., 
2007). The history of human society has been characterised by disparities in dominance, 
status and in the distribution of resources (see, for example, Betzig, 2014; Turchin et al., 
2013; Turchin & Gavrilets, 2009). One need only to look at the now infamous graphs 
demonstrating the disparity between general increases in productivity and the pay gap 
between CEOs and the average worker to see this is still very much the case (Anderson, 
Benjamin, Cavanagh, & Collins, 2006; Berman, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it is traditionally assumed that public goods cannot be divided insomuch as the 
products of the public good cannot be actively kept from non-contributors (Davis, 1993). 
However, as suggested by Reuben & Riedl (2013), while everyone in a community might 
benefit to some extent from public good activities such as dams and irrigation systems, the 
downstream benefits from the increase in productivity such a project may cause will vary 
amongst the population, either based on relative distance to that project or from the land one 
already holds. A good example from history, due to the informality of the hierarchy, might be 
found in the notorious Pirates of the Caribbean whereby those in positions of authority and 
control received an additional share of any loot taken (Cordingly, 2006). While the crew must 
cooperate to achieve an outcome (e.g. the capture of a Spanish treasure ship), the flow of 
resources from that activity can be divided. A further example would be work on flood or 
territorial defence; again everyone benefits from a lack of flooding or invasion, but some 
individuals have a larger amount of resources to lose to a disaster.  
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Thus, heterogeneity in the marginal benefit (or indeed, loss) from group-level activities may 
alone make investing in punishment an effective solution for more dominant individuals. 
However, few studies have explicitly examined how heterogeneity in resources affects 
punishment and cooperative behaviour, and those that have demonstrate conflicting results. 
Using heterogeneity in endowment, as opposed to marginal returns (i.e. additional benefit 
from cooperation) Burns & Visser (2006) found that participants who received lower 
endowments contributed more to the public good, whereas Reuben & Riedl (2013) found that 
who received higher endowments contributed more. The same is also true for studies that 
provided different marginal returns from group cooperation; Reuben & Riedl (2013) and Tan 
(2008) found no difference in contributions between high and low earners, while Nikos 
Nikiforakis, Noussair, & Wilkening, (2012) and Reuben & Riedl (2009) found that high 
earners contribute more, but only when punishment was not possible.  
Interestingly however, of the aforementioned studies all but Tan (2008) did not report any 
differences in punishment behaviour between those who received higher or lower marginal 
benefits from group-level cooperation. This is likely because punishment was effective, 
spanning from a lower effectiveness of a 1:3 ratio (Reuben & Riedl, 2009) up to a 1:5 ratio 
(Burns & Visser, 2006), so punishment was still cheap even for participants who received 
less resources. Indeed, in the latter study, low earning participants proved very willing to 
spend their resources to reduce the income of higher earners regardless of the latter’s 
contributions to the public good (see also, Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008). 
6.2 Study 7: additional benefit from group cooperation increases punishment 
behaviour 
Study 7 addressed whether receiving additional resources as a result of group success would 
be enough on its own to encourage punishment, and therefore cooperative, behaviour. To test 
the effect of marginal return from group production alone, the study set the parameters of a 
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public goods game to ensure that punishment was as unlikely as possible to occur without the 
presence of these additional resources for punishers; the groups were organised using the 
stranger method, i.e. they were randomly reorganised after each round, and the punishment 
ratio was set to 1:1. This also meant that punishment could not be strategic, i.e. punishment 
could not be used with the expectation of future gains from group cooperation through 
changing the behaviour of free-riders (Masclet, 2003; Shinada et al., 2004). 
The study mechanism also allowed only a single individual in a group to punish (Baldassarri 
& Grossman, 2011; O'Gorman et al., 2009). On the one hand, this is because, as mentioned 
previously, dominant individuals are able to monopolise resources, and specifically resources 
derived from group cooperation, so the current simulation of dominance required a single 
punisher. Equally, limiting punishment to one individual, allowed the punisher the freedom 
of action dominant individuals have (Galinsky et al., 2003; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; 
Keltner et al., 2003; Van Vugt, 2006), including removing the prospect of being altruistically, 
spitefully or counter-punished.  
It was predicted that punishers who received higher marginal returns from group cooperation 
would engage in more severe and more frequent punishment than those who did not. Because 
punishment severity and frequency were predicted to increase with marginal benefit for the 
punishers, it was also predicted that cooperation should increase when punishers receive 
additional resources, as participants would respond to the more severe punishment meted out 
by a well-resourced punisher. However, as a 1:1 punishment ratio does not normally increase 
cooperation (Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), we predict there should only be a difference in 
cooperation between groups with the most well-resourced punisher and groups where 
punishers were given no additional resources. 
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6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
112 undergraduate psychology students (87 female) were recruited through the University of 
Exeter’s internal email system. Due to a technical problem, age of participant was not 
recorded, however based on previous studies mean ages were likely to be between 18-21 
years. In total, eight experimental sessions were conducted with a range of 8-20 participants 
in each session. The mean payment received by participants was £5.14 and the mean duration 
of each session was 45 minutes. All participants passed the comprehension check included 
with the experiment instruction sheet. 
6.3.2 Experimental design  
The study used a modified version of a Public Goods Game with Punishment (PGG+P) and 
used the stranger method. The study contained two phases, and participants played both one 
after the other. Participants played each phase for 8 rounds, but to avoid any end-round effect, 
were told there would be between 5-10 rounds in each phase. Phase 1 proceeded like a 
standard PGG: in each round, the participants were randomly divided into groups of 4 and 
given an allocation of 20 points, which they could then contribute to the ‘group pot’ or keep 
for themselves. Participants had 20 seconds to make this decision (and all subsequent 
decisions) before a conspicuous warning began to flash. At the end of the round the amount 
in the group pot was doubled and then divided equally between the group members. 
Participants were then presented with a list of the contributions made by other group 
members (who were arbitrarily labelled in each round as ‘Player 1’, ‘Player 2’, or ‘Player 3’), 
the group pot total, and their individual earnings for that round. 
In Phase 2, (PGG+P), after making contribution decisions identical to those in Phase 1, one 
individual in each group was randomly selected to have the ability to punish other 
 Dominance and the behaviour of costly punishers 
201 
 
participants in their group at a ratio of 1:1, i.e. every point they removed from another player 
would cost them one of their own points. This selection took place after contributions had 
been made, and the selection was random each round, so participants did not know whether 
they had been selected for this role when making their initial contribution decisions.  
Participants played in 1 of 4 conditions: in the 0% bonus condition (N=20) the punisher 
received no additional resources; in the 10% bonus condition (N=32), the punisher received 
additional points worth 10% of the value of the Group Pot (after it has been doubled), with 
corresponding consequences for the 25% (N=36) and 50% (N=24) bonus conditions. These 
were additional points, i.e. points were not removed from other participants to fund the 
‘bonus’. Therefore, unlike other studies that have varied marginal benefits, participants not in 
the punisher role received the same amount as they would have in a standard PGG. This 
ensured that any pattern of contribution from the conditions in Phase 2 could be directly 
compared to both Phase 1 and studies that use a homogeneous benefit, i.e. behaviour would 
only be affected by the resources potentially available to a punisher. 
Those selected to be the Punisher were informed of all group members’ contributions and 
their own total earnings for the round. Punishers were told this total included the bonus, but 
to avoid any anchoring around this value, they were not specifically told how much of the 
total the bonus represented. While nothing would have directly stopped participants working 
this out, they were (as stated above) under some time pressure. The study had a mixed-model 
design with participants acting as their own control group; all participants played Phase 1 
before Phase 2 as it has been previously demonstrated that the order of presentation does not 
affect behaviour in the punishment rounds in this situation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). The study 
was run on a collection of networked PCs using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and at the end of 
the experiment, points were converted at a ratio of £1 for every 100 points. For a full version 
of the instructions, see Appendix D. 
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6.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were each seated in an experimental cubicle (walled to a height of 1.5 meters on 
three sides) that contained a computer terminal and an instruction sheet that gave a 
description of both Phase 1 and Phase 2. After 10 minutes these instructions were read out 
verbatim by the experimenter, and participants were asked to raise their hand if there was 
anything they did not understand. After the instructions had been read out, participants were 
presented with a series of questions about contributions and payoff mechanisms to ensure 
they understood the mechanics of the experiment. All participants answered these questions 
correctly. Before the study proper began, participants played practice rounds consisting of 4 
rounds without punishment and 4 rounds with punishment appropriate to their experimental 
condition. The practice rounds were included as early decisions made in economic games can 
be seen as ‘mistakes’ made by participants due to unfamiliarity with the situation (Anderson, 
Goeree, & Holt, 1998; Houser & Kurzban, 2002). In total therefore participants played 24 
rounds of the Public Goods Game. 
6.3.4 Statistical Analysis 
The analysis used Generalised Estimating Equations (G.E.E.) modelling in SPSS 20. This 
approach allows for the potential non-independence of data that could arise because 
behaviour in rounds will be influenced by the previous one. It also allows for the dependent 
variables being non-normally distributed as contributions and punishment decisions were 
skewed towards zero. Non-independence was handled by using an auto-regressive correlation 
matrix and distribution was corrected for using a Tweedie model. Unless otherwise stated, 
Round and Phase were entered into the model as within-subject factors, and Bonus as the 
between-subject factor. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Punishment severity 
Only Phase 2 contributed data for the following analyses, since no punishment took place in 
Phase 1. Out of 194 opportunities to punish, punishment occurred in 91 (47%) cases with 
participants spending a mean of 2.4 points on punishment (See Table 6.1). The mean 
contribution difference between punisher and punished was 4.3 points (SD=5.4). Of the 91 
cases of punishment, in 15 (16%) the punisher contributed less than the target; however, in 4 
of these cases both punisher and target were very low contributors (for example, the target 
contributed 2 points, and the punisher 1 point), and in these and 4 further cases the punished 
participants was the next-lowest contributor in the group. Thus 7 cases of punishment (8% of 
total punishment and 3% of total possible punishment opportunities) can be considered anti-
social punishment. Overall, the majority of punishment in the current study can be considered 
altruistic. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, participants spent more on punishment in the conditions where they 
received a greater bonus (Wald χ23=13.25, p=0.004). With the 0% condition as a comparison, 
punishers in the 50% (β=3.36, s.e.=1.6, p=0.043) and the 25% (β=1.56 s.e.=0.89, p=0.053) 
conditions punished more severely. Compared to the 50% condition, only those in the 0% 
condition spent less on punishment. As we assumed a priori that the bonus mechanism would 
affect punishment severity, a series of pair-wise contrast analyses were performed and found 
a significant difference in severity of punishment between the 0% condition and 25% 
(p=0.004) and 50% (p=0.007) conditions. There were also significant differences between the 
10% condition and the 25% (p=0.029) and 50% (p=0.028) conditions. As shown in Table 6.1, 
Rounds marginally affected punishment spending, (Wald χ27=12.83, p=0.08) with less  
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Table 6.1: mean contributions and spending on punishment across conditions. 
                      
  Phase 1 (without punishment)  All rounds Round 1  Rounds 2 Rounds 3 Rounds 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Rounds 8 
Contributions 0% 3.8 (4.9) 6.5 (6.3) 5.8 (6.4) 3.2 (3.4) 3.9 (4.2) 3.8 (4.2) 2.6 (3.6) 3.1 (5.5) 2 (3.3) 
 
10% 4.5 (4.6) 7.9 (5.3) 6.0 (5.5) 4.7 (4.2) 5.2 (4.7) 4.2 (4.6) 3.0 (3.3) 2.2 (3.3) 2.8 (3.1) 
 
25% 5.4 (5.2) 7.9 (4.9) 6.4 (5.7) 5.6 (4.6) 6.0 (5.5) 5.1 (4.5) 4.9 (4.3) 3.6 (4.1) 3.7 (5.2) 
 
50% 6.3 (4.7) 7.3 (4.2) 7.6 (4.2) 7.6 (5.2) 6.0 (4.5) 6.1 (5.4) 6.9 (5.1) 5.3 (4.7) 3.7 (3.7) 
  Phase 2 (with punishment)                   
Contributions 0% 3.1 (4.3) 5.8 (5.8) 4.0 (5.1) 3.9 (3.6) 2.3 (2.9) 2.4 (4.1) 1.9 (3.2) 2.3 (4.5) 1.9 (3.5) 
 
10% 4.8 (3.9) 6.2 (4.1) 6.0 (3.9) 4.9 (3.8) 5.4 (4.2) 4.6 (3.9) 4.0 (3.3) 3.3 (3.3) 3.8 (3.6) 
 
25% 5.8 (4.5) 6.4 (4.6) 6.9 (6.1) 6.4 (4.6) 6.4 (3.9) 6.0 (4.3) 5.0 (4.4) 4.7 (3.4) 4.6 (3.5) 
 
50% 7.2 (5.0) 7.0 (4.3) 6.4 (4.4) 7.4 (5.3) 8.7 (5.3) 7.6 (5.9) 6.3 (5.5) 7.0 (4.8) 7.2 (4.8) 
                      
Punishment 0% 0.8 (1.9) 1.4 (1.9) 2.8 (4.3) 0.4 (0.8) 0.2 (0.4) 1.0 (1.3) 1.0 (2.2) 0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 
 
10% 1.2 (1.4) 1.6 (1.9) 2.5 (1.6) 1.5 (1.5) 1.4 (1.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.8 (0.8) 0.7 (1.1) 0.8 (1.2) 
 
25% 2.2 (3.9) 2.0 (4.7) 1.8 (2.9) 1.8 (2.1) 1.8 (2.4) 0.8 (1.7) 5.0 (8.6) 1.2 (.7) 3.2 (4.3) 
  50% 2.6 (3.9) 2.5 (2.5) 3.1 (4.0) 4.8 (6.2) 1.3 (1.6) 2.5 (3.8) 4.0 (5.7) 1.8 (4.0) 1.0 (2.0) 
Means were calculated for all rounds and for individual rounds. Standard deviations are in the parenthesis.  
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punishment occurring in the later rounds. Punishment spending was not affected by an 
interaction of Round and Bonus (see Table 6.2 for full model summery). 
6.4.2 Punishment frequency 
As shown in Figure 6.2, participants who received any Bonus also punished more frequently 
than punishers in the 0% condition (Wald χ23=9.14, p=0.027). Compared to the 0% condition, 
those in the 10% (β=1.45, s.e.=0.53, p=0.006), 25% (β=1.15, s.e.=0.51, p=0.024) and 50% 
(β=1.50, s.e.=0.58, p=0.01) conditions all punished more frequently. There were no 
differences between the Bonus conditions. Rounds did not affect punishment frequency, nor 
was frequency affected by an interaction between Round and Bonus (see Table 6.2). 
6.4.3 Contributions (phases 1 & 2) 
Table 6.1 shows the mean contributions made by participants across the different conditions. 
Bonus strongly affected contributions (Wald χ23=11.89, p=0.008), with those in the 50% 
condition contributing more than those in the 25%, 10% and 0% conditions. Regression 
coefficients derived from the GEE model show that all bonus conditions differed significantly 
from the 0% condition (50%, β=1.36, s.e=0.44, p=0.002; 25%, β=0.9, s.e.=0.45, p=0.038; 
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Figure 6.1:  punishment severity across punisher 
bonus conditions. Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
Figure 6.2: percentage of punishment opportunities 
taken by punishers. Grey=punishment occurred, 
blank=no punishment occurred. 
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10%, β=0.72, s.e.=0.45, p=0.01), and compared to the 50% condition, participants 
contributed less in the 10% (β=-0.42, s.e.=22, p=0.049) and 25% condition (β=-0.64, 
s.e.=0.21, p=0.03). As is expected in public goods games, cooperation at the beginning of an 
experimental phase was greater than at the end (Wald χ27=112.21, p<0.001; Round 1 vs 
Round 8, β=-1.14, s.e.=0.40, p=0.005). However the phase participants were playing did not 
affect average contributions (See Table 6.2). 
As shown in Figure 6.3, contributions were affected by an interaction between Bonus and 
Phase (Wald χ23=13.11, p=0.004). All bonus conditions showed a difference in contributions 
between Phase 1 and 2 compared to the 0% condition (50%, β=0.31, s.e.=0.11, p=0.01; 25%, 
β=0.24, s.e.=0.09, p=0.008; 10%, β=0.27, s.e.=0.09, p=0.005). Compared to the 50% 
condition the difference in contributions between Phase 1 and 2 for the 0% and 10% was less 
(0%, β=-0.82, s.e.=0.25, p=0.001; 10%, β=-0.37, s.e.=0.15, p=0.017), with the 25% condition 
showing a smaller non-significant difference between (β=-0.22, s.e.=0.15, p=0.1). 
As shown in Figure 6.4 an interaction of Rounds and Phases also affected contributions 
(Wald χ27=19.58, p<0.007). Compared to Phase 2 (where punishment was possible) 
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Figure 6.3: mean contributions by participants to the public pot in Phase 1 (blank) 
and Phase 2 (grey). Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
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Table 6.2: model summaries 
     Punishment severity Factors Wald χ2 df p 
 
Bonus 13.25 3 0.004** 
 
Rounds 12.83 7 0.08 
 
Bonus*Rounds 14.24 21 0.86 
Punishment frequency         
 
Bonus 9.14 3 0.027* 
 
Rounds 9.23 7 0.24 
 
Bonus*Rounds 9.24 21 0.98 
Contributions         
 
Bonus 11.89 3 0.008** 
 
Phase 0.40 1 0.53 
 
Rounds 112.21 7 <0.001*** 
 
Bonus*Phase 13.11 3 0.004** 
 
Bonus*Rounds 73.939 21 <0.001*** 
 
Phase*Rounds 19.58 7 <0.007** 
 
Bonus*Phase*Rounds 44.32 21 0.02 
Phase 1 contributions         
 
Bonus 7.61 3 0.06 
 
Rounds 121.40 7 <0.001*** 
 
Bonus*Rounds 70.411 21 <0.001*** 
Phase 2 contributions         
 
Bonus 14.78 3 0.002** 
 
Rounds 42.89 7 <0.001*** 
  Bonus*Rounds 48.77 21 0.001*** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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contributions started higher in Phase 1 but also dropped off more steeply. As shown in Figure 
6.5, contributions were also affected by an interaction between Bonus and Rounds (Wald 
χ221=73.94, p<0.001), with contributions remaining higher in the 50% bonus condition 
compared to the other conditions. There was a significant three-way interaction between 
Phases, Rounds and Condition (Wald χ221=44.32, p=0.002). As shown in Figure 6.5 while 
participants in the 50% condition, and to a lesser extent the 25% condition, were more 
cooperative overall, the level of contributions in these conditions was more stable across 
rounds in Phase 2. 
6.4.4 Phase 2 Contributions 
As shown in 6.4.3 there was no main effect of Phase on contributions. Given the interaction 
between Phase and the other variables, and where the differences lie within these analyses, 
this is likely because contributions were not maintained in the 0% and 10% conditions, but 
increased in the 25% and 50% conditions. Also, there may have been some effect of the 
practice rounds played by participants prior to the experimental rounds (See 6.3.1). Since the 
study was primarily interested in whether the additional resources changed punishment and 
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Figure 6.4: mean contributions over time in Phase 1 (without 
punishment - dashed lines) and Phase 2 (with punishment - solid lines). 
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contribution behaviour, rather than the difference between the potential for punishment and 
no punishment, the results for Phase 2 were also analysed independently (See 6.4.5 for Phase 
1). 
As shown in Table 6.1 the bonus that punishers received affected overall contributions with 
participants in the 0% condition contributing the least and those in the 50% condition the 
most (Wald χ23=14.79, p=0.002). Compared to the 0% condition, participants in the 25% 
(β=0.89, s.e.=0.44, p=0.046) and the 50%, (β=1.36, s.e.=0.44, p=0.002) bonus conditions 
contributed more. Participants in all other bonus conditions contributed less when compared 
to the 50% condition, (10%, β=-0.64, s.e.=0.21, p=0.003; 25%, β=-0.48, s.e.=0.20, p=0.016). 
There was also a significant main effect of Rounds on contributions (Wald χ27=42.89, 
p<0.001) with cooperation decreasing as the number of rounds increased (See Table 1). As 
shown previously in Figure 6.5b, contributions decreased more in the 0% bonus condition 
than in the other conditions, with contributions remaining steady in the 50% condition, 
however this interaction was not significant. 
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Figure 6.5: contributions over time in Phase 1 (no punishment) and Phase 2 (with punishment) by bonus 
conditions: diamond=0% Bonus, squares=10% Bonus, triangles = 25% bonus, crosses = 50% bonus. 
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6.4.5 Phase 1 contribution data 
While theoretically there should be no effect of condition on the Phase 1 data, as the actual 
mechanisms in Phase 1 were identical between conditions, the previous analyses suggests 
that cooperative behaviour might have been influenced by being exposed to differing 
mechanism in the practice rounds; participants completed practice rounds for both Phase 1 
and Phase 2 before beginning the study proper.  Therefore the Phase 1 contribution data were 
also analysed separately (See Table 6.1 for descriptive data).  
Condition showed a trend towards Bonus affecting contributions (Wald χ23=7.61, p=0.06) 
with participants in the 50% condition contributing more compared to the 0% condition 
(β=0.64, s.e.=0.39, p=0.09). Rounds strongly affected contributions (Wald χ27=121.40, 
p<0.001) with contributions decreasing as the number of rounds increased (Rounds 1 Vs 8, 
β=0.69, s.e.=0.17, p<0.001; Round 2 Vs 8, β=0.72, s.e.=0.19, p<0.001; Round 3 Vs 8, 
β=0.72, s.e.=0.14, p<0.001; Round 4 Vs 8, β=0.47, s.e.=0.16, p<0.004). However, a series of 
Bonferroni-corrected pair-wise comparisons found no differences between any of the 
conditions. 
Contributions were affected by an interaction between Bonus and Round (Wald χ221=70.41, 
p<0.001). As shown in Figure 6.5a, contributions decreased more in the 0% bonus condition 
than in the other conditions, with contributions decreasing the least over time in the 50% 
condition. 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Punishment 
Dominant individuals have greater access to resources compared to others, and are also in a 
position to benefit to a greater degree from group cooperation. This can be either because 
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they can actively monopolise and/or control how others access the results of individual or 
group activity (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Cummins, 2005) or because their level of pre-
existing resources provides a higher marginal return from group cooperation (Reuben & 
Riedl, 2013). As a result, individuals in such a position experience a lower net cost in 
punishment. As the cost of punishment is the key predictor of its occurrence (McCullough et 
al., 2013; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), the current study investigated whether individuals 
who received an additional benefit from group cooperation would be more willing to engage 
in costly punishment. This was found to be the case; those who benefitted more from group 
cooperation punished more severely and more frequently than those who did not.  
By providing punishers with more resources, the study made punishment cheaper for them, 
and as a result these individuals were more willing to punish free-riding within their group. 
The majority of previous research has made punishment cheap by making it effective, for all 
(Egas & Riedl, 2008; Falk et al., 2005; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), or for certain 
members of a group (Nikiforakis et al., 2009).  The results of the current study can therefore 
be seen as the opposite side of the coin. That is to say, it has been shown that within and 
between group variations in effectiveness alters punishment behaviour, and the current study 
found that variation in resources derived from group-cooperation had a similar effect.  
Interestingly however, the finding of the current study contradicts other studies that found 
that individuals punished at comparable levels regardless of the benefit they received 
(Reuben & Riedl, 2013). More likely, additional resources did not affect punishment in those 
studies punishment was effective and was thus cheap even for those who possessed fewer 
resources. Nevertheless, Reuben & Riedl (2013) did suggest that, regardless of resource 
allocation, individuals still agree on what sort of behaviour should be punished. This is 
evident to an extent in the current study, as all participants who received additional resources 
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tended to punish only non-co-operators (there were only 7 cases out of 194 where punishment 
was not directed towards the lowest contributing group-member). This supports the more 
general finding that when punishment is ineffective, it is almost always directed towards free-
riders (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Falk et al., 2005; Sigmund, 2007). Thus, providing a punisher 
with additional resources did not affect this aspect of an ineffective punishment ratio. 
The results therefore support the suggestion that a dominant position can lower the cost of 
punishment. Dominance plays an important role in individuals’ absolute resource levels 
(Ellis, 1995) and the ability of individuals to access resources or sequester/monopolise any 
group resources (Cummins, 2005; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Hawley, 1999). Here it was 
demonstrated that one way to encourage punishment is to provide a punisher with such 
additional resources, specifically resources generated from increased marginal returns from 
group cooperation. Thus, the results of the current study also provide behavioural-data 
support to the observer/perception results gathered in the Chapter 4. There, dominant 
individuals were perceived as being more likely to punish social defection and, in the current 
study, individuals who varied on one dimension of a dominant position (greater marginal 
returns from group cooperation) did punish more. At the very least, Study 7 demonstrated 
that one property of a dominant position, access to additional resources, it facilitated a 
behaviour that all individuals would engage in if they could afford to.  
It was also suggested that when disproportionate benefits are derived from group success, this 
should act as an additional motivation to punish non-cooperation. At this point however, it is 
not possible to deduce such a motivation. Because group composition and the punisher 
position were randomised, anyone assigned that role did not have any strategic incentive to 
punish non-cooperation; they would not benefit from any change in behaviour of the 
individual they punished because a) they might never interact with this person again, and b) 
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they might never be in the punisher/bonus role again. Therefore, punishment could have been 
entirely altruistic (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002); individuals do feel the 
desire to punish (Crockett et al., 2010; Falk et al., 2005), and punishment still occurs when 
there is no possibility of the punishment affecting future behaviour (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). 
Thus, giving punishers a bonus lowered the cost of punishment enough so that individuals 
were able and willing to act on this altruistic motive. 
However, it should be remembered that participants in a public goods-style games are not 
disinterested observers of the outcome of group cooperation, and that the current study linked 
the additional resources available to punishers to the result of group cooperation. So while the 
random group structure meant punishment could not have been used strategically to alter 
behaviour (Masclet, 2003), non-cooperative behaviour did impact the punisher.  An 
alternative motivation is therefore less pro-social; participants may have been motivated to 
punish out of spite (Jensen, 2010; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2011) because free-riders had 
explicitly cost them additional points in that round. The primary purpose of spite is to harm 
the target rather than to directly benefit the punisher (Jensen, 2010; West et al., 2007) and 
therefore it would not be affected by the lack of strategic benefit from punishing. Therefore 
punishment in random-group settings  (for example, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) might not be 
a result of anger caused the violation of cooperation or fairness norms per se, but because 
such violations directly cost the punisher resources. This would explain why punishment 
frequency was equal across the benefit conditions - all lost more resources compared to the 
0% Bonus condition - and why severity scaled with the benefit; punishers in the higher bonus 
conditions could inflict spiteful punishment at a lower cost.  
Finally the pattern of results also partially rebuts an alternative, demand characteristics, 
explanation. It is possible that, when given additional benefits and additional responsibilities, 
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participants assumed they were expected to use the former for the latter.  Such an explanation 
may account for some of the observed behaviour; when alternative options are available to 
participants, for example the ability to reward co-operators (Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, 
Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009), punishment spending does drop. However if this had been the 
case here it would be logical to expect both spending and frequency of punishment to 
increase with the value of the bonus. In practice, whereas punishment severity did scale with 
the value of the bonus (i.e. the relative cost of punishment), punishment frequency did not. 
All those who received additional resources punished at a similar frequency, i.e. punishment 
decisions were not simply the result of a lack of other behavioural options. 
6.5.2 Cooperation 
While not the focus of the study, it was predicted that because a well-resourced punisher 
would punish more severely, their presence would also increase cooperation. This proved to 
be partially the case; average contributions were higher when the punisher received any 
bonus, and contributions over rounds were more stable, especially in the 25% and 50% bonus 
conditions. Thus, while ineffective-punishment (1:1 ratio) generally does not maintain 
contributions over time (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), in the current 
study contributions were greater (relative to the no-bonus condition) when the punishers 
received additional resources.  This might suggest that participants did believe the well-
resourced punishers would punish free-riding in their groups, i.e. that individuals with the 
means to punish would punish more severely – as indeed was the case (See 6.4.2.)  
This result supports the suggestion introduced in previous chapters that individuals will not 
want to provoke a response from a dominant group member, when they might be willing to 
do so from a subordinate or weak one.  In Chapter 5, participants predicted that individuals 
would withdraw their attempt at anti-social behaviour when a dominant group member 
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indicated an interest. Here, the increased level of contributions to the public good does 
suggest that individuals were responding to the likelihood of being punished for non-
cooperation by a more dominant individual. In this case, what made the punisher dominant 
was the amount of resources they held, rather than their ability to punish effectively.  
Providing punishers with an additional benefit from group cooperation resulted in more 
sustained group cooperation. It should be noted however that while cooperation did not decay 
in the higher resource conditions, it did not increase either. In reference to Nikiforakis & 
Normann (2008, Figure 2) specifically, the pattern of results resembles the contributions seen 
when punishment was moderately effective (ratio of 1:2). Therefore, punishment that was 
cheap-relative-to-resources did not result in the level of cooperation seen for punishment that 
is cheap due to its effectiveness, but the former did maintain cooperation compared to 
moderately effective punishment (see also, Egas & Riedl, 2008). This comparison is 
important partly because very little research has investigated how heterogeneity in resources 
alone affects behaviour: studies that have varied heterogeneity in marginal benefit have done 
so using highly or moderately effective punishment (for example, Burns & Visser, 2006; 
Nikiforakis et al., 2012). The current study does suggest that when the cost of punishment is 
lowered via accessible resources alone, ineffective punishment can at least moderately 
promote cooperation.  
Nevertheless, there are a few issues with the cooperation data that must be mentioned before 
any firm conclusions can be drawn. A punisher’s additional benefit was predicted to have 
some effect on cooperation, but in the overall model there was no difference in contributions 
between Phase 1 and 2. The lack of a difference may partly be explained, as shown in Figure 
5.3, by the fact that contributions in Phase 1 started at a higher level, but there is some 
evidence that contributions were affected by way the study was introduced to participants. It 
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is likely that experiencing the Phase 2 practice round prior to the Phase 1 experimental 
rounds affected behaviour in the latter. Without such an effect, the Phase 1 rounds would not 
have demonstrated a difference between conditions, because there was no punishment. Yet, 
as shown in Figure 6.4, the pattern of cooperation in Phase 1, if not the actual amount, is 
consistently arranged by the Bonus value that would be available in Phase 2; i.e. those in the 
50% condition contributing the most, followed by 25% etc. This does suggest that giving the 
participants the full instructions for both Phase 1 and 2 at the start of the experiment had 
some influence on their behaviour in Phase 1.  
In Phase 2, there could be a separate, more economic, explanation for the variation in 
cooperative behaviour between conditions. Public goods games are a measure of cooperation 
insomuch as, in a 4-player game, for each point an individual contributes to the group, they 
lose 0.5 while all others gain 0.5. Hence, it is beneficial to free-ride on the cooperation of 
others. However, the mechanism used in Phase 2 of the current study altered this payoff ratio. 
An individual in the 50% condition, for example, had a ¼ chance of becoming the punisher, 
and thus receiving 50% of the group pot, equivalent to a 33% return on every point they 
themselves contributed to the group pot, regardless of the activity of other group members. 
E.g. had they contributed 10 points and everyone else 0, the punisher would still have 
received 15 points. Those in the 25% condition had ¼ chance of not losing any points 
regardless of their contributions, and those in the 10% had a ¼ chance of losing only 0.3 
points per contribution. It has been suggested that individuals might choose to invest in the 
public good if it is the only way for them to protect or increase their resources (Barker, 
Barclay, & Reeve, 2013; Burns & Visser, 2006), and the bonus was an opportunity for 
participants to gamble to receive an additional reward.  And while it is unlikely participants 
did the specific calculations for risk and rewards of contributing to the group pot, the 
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recognition of some potential gain may still have increased contributions to the levels 
observed.  
Finally, perhaps cooperation was affected by punisher bonus because the bonus itself was an 
inducement to cooperate, as opposed to the fear of punishment by a well-resourced punisher. 
Even if this was the case, it has been demonstrated that experiencing a benefit from the public 
good is itself a possible reason why dominant individuals might be more cooperative 
(Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014).  However, it should be noted that Reuban & Riedl (2013) 
found that individuals who received a similar 50% bonus did not contribute more than others, 
despite a fixed group structure that guaranteed them a greater return per investment in the 
public good (see also, Tan, 2008). Therefore, if individuals who were guaranteed a higher 
return on their contributions, and in the presence of effective punishment which could be 
directed towards them, did not increase their contributions, it is questionable whether such an 
effect would occur in the current study, when the bonus was uncertain and the punishment 
ineffective. 
6.5.3 Conclusion 
Heterogeneity in both the effectiveness of punishment and the net cost of punishment has 
been shown to be important for the evolution of costly punishment (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 
2011; Frank, 1996).  Such heterogeneity can be caused naturalistically by differences in 
dominance within a social hierarchy. Dominant individuals are certainly able to inflict 
effective punishment on others through physical prowess (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; 
Huston et al., 1981), number of social allies (Gavrilets et al., 2008; Mathew & Boyd, 2011), 
or prestige/political power (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Dominant individuals are also in a 
position to access resources (Jones & Rachlin, 2006), to receive them as part of social 
bargaining (Barclay, 2013), and to acquire them coercively (Hawley, 1999; Sell, Tooby, et 
 Dominance and the behaviour of costly punishers 
218 
 
al., 2009). Yet while effective punishment has been well studied over the years, the effect of 
resources on punishment has received substantially less attention. The current study found 
that, when provided with a greater marginal return from group-level cooperation, and thereby 
given one of the attributes of a dominant position, participants were more willing to engage in 
punishment, and spent more on punishment, as the amount of addition resources increased. 
Making punishment relatively cheap for some participants made them more likely to punish.  
This may be because the lowering of the cost of punishment allowed individuals to act 
altruistically by punishing free-riders because they behaved contrary to social norms of 
fairness and cooperation. Alternatively, marginal benefit may have encouraged punishment 
out of spite because, by free-riding, other group members deprived the punisher of a good 
amount of additional resources. Both these mechanisms are consistent with dominance 
playing a role in this behaviour. 
 
6.6 Study 8: Private gain and the public good - monopolisation of group resources by 
punishers’ increases spending on punishment 
Study 7 simulated a dominant position by providing punishers with greater marginal return 
from group cooperation. It found that providing punishers with such an additional benefit 
increased the frequency and severity of punishment. However, the motivation for this remains 
in doubt; were punishers acting in such a way because their resource-level simply allowed 
them to punish more cheaply, or because they had a higher stake in the outcome of any group 
cooperation? This is important to answer as, if it is the latter, then this would suggest that 
dominant individuals punish not simply because they have the resources to, but because a 
dominant position gives individuals an strategic motivation to punish non-cooperation and 
‘unfairness’ that is not present in subordinates. This would show a stronger direct link 
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between costly punishment and dominance, and would support the suggestion that the 
punishment of anti-social behaviour can be seen as a fundamentally selfish behaviour tied to 
dominance, rather than to altruistic and other-regarding preferences. Study 8 investigated this 
by varying the strategic potential of punishment; as well as giving punishers a greater return 
from punishment, punisher role and groups were also fixed in some conditions.  
Study 8 also added an additional benefit mechanism. While punishers in Study 7 received a 
greater marginal return on cooperation, they did not do so at the expense of other group 
members. This is not the case in real-life dominance hierarchies, where dominant individuals 
tend to monopolise resources (Cummins, 2005) or otherwise attract them over others 
(Barclay, 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001); obviously, by taking additional resources, 
dominant individuals are depriving those below them in the hierarchy of them. Thus Study 8 
sought to simulate this by making it clear to all participants that the additional resources 
available to the punisher were at the expense of the non-punishers. This is referred to below 
as the ‘monopoly’ condition. 
It was predicted that participants would punish with greater frequency and severity when they 
received either a bonus (as they were in Study 7) or a monopoly-bonus as opposed to no 
additional resources. No predictions were made concerning the difference between the two 
types of bonus mechanism. It was also predicted that when groups were fixed, punishment 
would be more severe and more frequent than when groups were random (as in Study 7), 
with punishment being the most severe and frequent when the punisher also received an 
additional benefit from group cooperation. Again, no predictions were made about any 
differences between the two types of benefit. 
In terms of cooperative behaviour it was predicted that participants in the fixed groups should 
be more cooperative than those in random groups (see, Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Also, in 
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reference to fixed groups specifically, in response to questions raised in Study 7 it was also 
predicted that punishers who were received the greater benefits from group-level cooperative 
behaviour would contribute more than those who did not. Also in regards to Study 7, it was 
predicted that punishers who received any form of bonus in the fixed groups would contribute 
the most. 
6.7 Method 
6.7.1 Participants 
144 undergraduate students (99 female) were recruited through the University of Exeter’s 
paid-participant recruitment website. Mean age of participants was 20. In total, seven 
experimental sessions were conducted with a range of 12-24 participants in each session. The 
mean payment received by participants was £5.52 and the mean duration of each session was 
40 minutes. All participants passed the comprehension check included with the experiment 
instruction sheet. Prior to analysis, two additional groups were removed because, despite 
warnings on the study advertisement, members of these groups were discovered to have taken 
part in a previous session of the study. These groups are not included in the data given above. 
6.7.2 Experimental design  
The experiment consisted of a modified version of a public goods game with punishment 
using the zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007). At the start of each round, participants were 
randomly sorted into groups of 4. They were given an allocation of 20 points and had the 
option to contribute between 0-20 points to a group pot. This total was then doubled and 
divided amongst all group members. Once this had occurred, all participants were shown the 
contribution decisions of others in their group.   
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Following this, one participant in each group was randomly assigned the ability to punish, 
referred to as being able to “assign deduction points” in the instructions. They could do so at 
a ratio of 1:1; every point they removed from another player would cost them one of their 
own points. The selected group member was presented with a list of the contributions made 
by other members and their own total earnings from the round (see below), and could choose 
to spend between 0-20 points on punishing a single group member of their choice. Once this 
decision had been made the punished group member was informed they had been punished 
and by how much, but not who punished them. At this point the round was over and the next 
began.  
The study manipulated both the ‘Stability’ (Stranger or Partner protocol) of the groups and 
the mechanism by which the punisher received their additional resources, henceforth 
‘Benefit’ (25% bonus, 25% monopoly-bonus, or no-bonus - described below), giving the 
study a 2x3 design. At the end of the experiment, the total points earned by each participant 
were converted to pounds at a ratio £1:100 points. 
6.7.3 Benefit mechanisms7 
Participants played in one of three conditions which manipulated how the punisher’s 
additional resources were generated. In the ‘bonus’ condition, the punisher received 
additional points to the value of 25% of the group pot total, i.e. of the total was 80 points, the 
punisher would receive 20 points and the 80 points were divided equally between all four 
group members. As in Study 7, these points were not deducted from any other member of the 
group.  
                                                          
7
 Strictly speaking, the conditions represent different marginal gains between participants from group 
cooperation. However, the conditions are described below as they were described to participants. Also, keeping 
these descriptions throughout emphasises the specific differences in how resources were divided. 
 Dominance and the behaviour of costly punishers 
222 
 
In the ‘monopoly’ condition, punishers also received additional points to the value of 25% of 
the group pot total. However this value was taken from the group pot prior to its division, i.e. 
if the total pot was 80, 20 points would be removed and given to the punisher, and the 
remaining 60 points were divided equally between all four group members.  
In the ‘no-bonus’ (control) condition, the punisher did not receive any additional resources. 
i.e. if the total was 80 points, the punisher would receive 25% of these, 20 points, with other 
group members each receiving 20 points.  
At the punishment screen punishers were shown their total earnings for the round so far and 
told this total included the bonus, if any. However, to avoid any anchoring effect, they were 
not told how many points were represented by the additional benefits, if any, they received.  
The 25% value was chosen for four reasons a) in Study 7 this value produced similar results 
as the 50% bonus, b) in terms of the punisher’s own contributions, the return on investment is 
zero, c) individuals in standard 4-player public goods games receive 25% of the group pot, 
and d) it was felt that 50% provided such a difference in resources that it might have 
overshadowed any differences between the experimental conditions. 
6.7.4 Stability 
Participants played in either ‘Random’ groups (groups were randomly organised each round) 
or ‘Fixed’ groups, (groups comprised of the same individuals each round). This corresponds 
to the ‘stranger’ and ‘partner’ protocols respectively in standard terminology (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000). These terms are not used here due to the punisher-selection mechanism 
employed in the current study.  In the case of the fixed groups, the punisher remained 
constant throughout the game, however in the random groups the punisher was randomly 
selected each round. For a full version of the instructions, see Appendix D. 
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6.7.5 Procedure 
Participants were each seated in an experimental cubicle (walled to a height of 1.5 meters on 
three sides) that contained a computer terminal and an instruction sheet that gave a 
description of Stage 1. After 10 minutes these instructions were read out verbatim by the 
experimenter, and participants were asked to raise their hand if there was anything they did 
not understand. After the instructions had been read out, participants were presented with a 
series of questions about contributions, payoffs and the group structure to ensure they 
understood the mechanics of the experiment. All participants answered these questions 
correctly. Participants played for 10 rounds and, to avoid any end-round effect, were told 
there would be between 6-12 rounds the game. 
It has been suggested that many decisions in economic games are due to the novelty of the 
situation or a lack of understanding of the game rules by participants (Andreoni, 1995). 
Therefore, before the study proper began, participants played practice rounds consisting of 4 
rounds in their experimental condition. In the Partner protocol, participants were told that 
while the punisher role would be fixed in the actual game [emphasis as in instructions], in 
the practice rounds it would be randomly assigned. This was to ensure that, potentially, every 
group member had a change to practice-play the punisher role. In total therefore participants 
played 14 rounds of the Public Goods Game. 
6.7.6 Statistical analysis 
The analysis used Generalised Estimating Equations (G.E.E.) modelling in SPSS 20. This 
approach allows for the potential non-independence of data that could arise because 
behaviour in rounds will be influenced by the previous one. It also allows for the dependent 
variables being non-normally distributed as contributions and punishment decisions were 
skewed towards zero. Unless otherwise stated, non-independence was allowed for by using 
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an auto-regressive correlation matrix and distribution was corrected for by using a Tweedie 
model. 
Due to the nature of the data, analysis was conducted at the group level (N=36). In the 
stranger conditions groups and punisher were random, and in the partner conditions groups 
and punishers were fixed. Analysing behaviour at the group level therefore can be seen as 
comparing group-level cooperative and punishment behaviour between two extremes, 
completely random groups (random punishers and groups) where there could be no strategic 
motivation to punish, and completely fixed groups (fixed punisher and groups), where there 
was a strong strategic motivation. To reduce the effects of random fluctuations, Rounds were 
condensed into pairs, i.e. Round 1-2, Rounds 3-4 etc for the analysis. Unless otherwise stated 
Round was entered into the model as a within-subject factor, with Bonus and Stability 
entered as between-subject factors. 
6.8 Results 
6.8.1 Punishment severity  
Out of 360 opportunities to punish, punishment occurred in 139 (39%) cases with participants 
spending a mean of 4.4 points on punishment (See Table 6.3). The mean contribution 
difference between punisher and punished was 5 points (SD=7), and of the 139 cases of 
punishment in 22 (16%) the punisher had contributed less than the target; however, in 12 
cases both punisher and target were very low contributors (for example, the target contributed 
2 points, and the punisher 1 point), and the punished participant was the next-lowest 
contributor in the group. 
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Thus 10 cases of punishment (7% of total punishment and 2% of total possible punishment 
opportunities) can be considered anti-social punishment. As with Study 7, overall the 
punishment behaviour of participants in the current study can be considered altruistic. 
As shown in Figure 6.6, punishment severity was affected by the benefit received by the 
group punisher (Wald χ22=21.21, p<0.001). Compared to the 0% benefit condition, only those 
in the 25% monopoly condition spent significantly more on punishment (β=2.29, s.e.=0.7, 
p=0.01). As we hypothesised a priori that the bonus mechanism would affect punishment 
behaviour, a series of pair-wise contrast analyses were performed and found a significant 
difference in punishment spending between the No-bonus and Monopoly groups (p=0.001) 
and between the no-bonus and bonus conditions (p=0.002). There was also a marginal 
difference in punishment severity between the bonus and monopoly conditions (p=0.07). 
However there was no significant difference between the bonus and monopoly-bonus 
conditions (p=0.1). Participants in the fixed groups did not spend any more on punishment 
overall than those in the random groups (See Table 6.4 for full model summery). 
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Figure 6.6: severity of punishment across the different 
types of benefit available to punishers, when groups were 
random (blank) or fixed (grey). Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
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Table 6.3: mean of group-level contributions and spending on punishment across conditions. 
                
  Contributions All rounds Rounds 1-2  Rounds 3-4 Rounds 5-6 Rounds 7-8 Round 9-10 
Random 
groups 
No bonus 7.7 (3.8) 11.3 (3.9) 10.0 (4.3) 8.9 (4.0) 9.1 (3.8) 8.6 (4.8) 
 
25% bonus 7.7 (3.2) 11.0 (3.6) 10.1 (3.5) 8.5 (3.1) 8.3 (3.8) 7.8 (4.1) 
 
25% monopoly bonus 7.9 (2.8) 11.9 (2.8) 10.7 (3.4) 10.1 (3.5) 8.4 (2.9) 7.8 (3.8) 
Fixed groups No bonus 11.1 (3.9) 12.5 (3.5) 11.5 (4.0) 9.4 (4.6) 11.2 (2.6) 10.8 (4.8) 
 
25% bonus 10.2 (3.8) 12.0 (4.1) 11.0 (4.3) 9.4 (2.4) 9.5 (3.2) 9.3 (4.5) 
 
25% monopoly bonus 12.0 (3.1) 14.0 (1.9) 12.9 (2.3) 12.6 (2.6) 10.5 (2.5) 9.8 (4.0) 
  Punishment             
Random 
groups 
No bonus 1.0 (2.3) 0.9 (1.6) 0.8 (2.3) 0.2 (1.1) 0.4 (1.1) 0.6 (2.2) 
 
25% bonus 1.3 (3.1) 1.9 (1.9) 2.9 (5.4) 1.6 (2.7) 1.2 (2.2) 1.1 (2.3) 
 
25% monopoly bonus 2.1 (4.4) 4.0 (6.0) 2.0 (3.9) 1.7 (3.1) 4.3 (5.9) 2.0 (3.1) 
Fixed groups No bonus 0.3 (0.8) 0.8 (0.3) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.2) 0.3 (0.6) 
 
25% bonus 2.0 (3.1) 2.2 (2.0) 3.6 (5.2) 1.8 (2.0) 1.8 (2.7) 0.9 (2.6) 
  25% monopoly bonus 3.6 (5.1) 5.0 (7.4) 3.2 (4.8) 2.3 (3.2) 5.3 (6.0) 2.4 (3.1) 
Means were calculated for all rounds and for individual rounds. Standard deviations are in the parenthesis. 
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As also shown in Figure 6.6, punishment severity was affected by an interaction between 
Stability and Benefit (Wald χ22=10.16, p=0.006). Specifically, compared to the No-benefit 
condition there was a marginally significant difference in severity between random and fixed 
groups for those in the Monopoly condition (β=1.82, s.e.=1.0, p=0.08). Punishment severity 
was not affected by an interaction between Stability and Rounds, nor was it affected by an 
interaction between Benefit and Rounds. There was also no three-way interaction effect of 
Stability, Benefit and Round on punishment severity (see Table 6.4).  
6.8.2  Punishment frequency 
We also investigated whether Stability and Benefit affected the frequency of punishment i.e. 
whether punishers within the groups chose to spend any amount above zero punishing. The 
‘Frequency’ with which an individual in a group/round did or did not punish was entered into 
the G.E.E. using a binary logistic model. Due to the number of comparisons and the nature of 
the data the three-way interaction resulted in instability in the model, therefore it was 
excluded from the analysis.  
As shown in Figure 6.7, punishers who received any sort of bonus punished more frequently 
compared to those in the no-bonus groups (Wald χ22=18.37, p<0.001). Compared to the no-
bonus condition, punishers in the bonus (β=1.56, s.e.=0.78, p=0.06) and monopoly (β=2.54, 
s.e.=0.96, p=0.033) conditions punished significantly more often. Monopoly and bonus 
conditions did not differ significantly in the frequency of punishment (β=-0.98, s.e.=0.83, 
p=0.24). Punishment was more frequent in Rounds 1-2 (52% of opportunities) than at Rounds 
9-10 (33%; Wald χ24=11.63, p=0.02), however the regression coefficients generated by the 
G.E.E. showed no specific differences between Rounds 9-10 and other Round pairs. Fixed 
groups did not punish more often than random groups.  
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Table 6.4: model summaries 
     Punishment severity Factors Wald χ2 df p 
 
Benefit 21.21 2 <0.001*** 
 
Stability 0.49 1 0.48 
 
Rounds 7.87 4 0.09 
 
Benefit*Stability 10.16 2 0.006 
 
Benefit*Rounds 10.77 8 0.22 
 
Stability*Rounds 3.62 4 0.46 
 
Stability*Benefit*Rounds 9.84 8 0.20 
Punishment frequency         
 
Benefit 18.37 2 0.001*** 
 
Stability 0.24 1 0.63 
 
Rounds 11.63 4 0.02* 
 
Benefit*Stability 3.27 2 0.15 
 
Benefit*Rounds 3.70 8 0.16 
 
Stability*Rounds 1.02 4 0.22 
Contributions         
 
Benefit 1.88 2 0.28 
 
Stability 30.39 1 <0.001*** 
 
Rounds 46.81 4 <0.001*** 
 
Benefit*Stability 0.85 2 0.65 
 
Benefit*Rounds 3.54 8 0.90 
 
Stability*Rounds 6.43 4 0.17 
 
Stability*Benefit*Rounds 5.80 8 0.67 
Punisher contributions         
 
Benefit 6.95 2 0.031* 
 
Stability 8.62 1 0.003** 
 
Rounds 15.55 4 0.004** 
 
Benefit*Stability 2.92 2 0.23 
 
Benefit*Rounds 7.22 8 0.18 
 
Stability*Rounds 5.97 4 0.51 
 
Stability*Benefit*Rounds 17.72 8 0.023* 
Fixed Punishers 
contributions         
 
Benefit 8.30 2 0.016* 
 
Rounds 13.36 4 0.01** 
  Benefit*Rounds 7.14 2 0.52 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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The decision to punish was not affected by an interaction between Stability and Bonus (Wald 
χ24=3.27, p=0.15). However, as shown in Figure 6.7, the punishment frequency did show a 
trend towards a significant difference between unstable and stable conditions in the 
Monopoly condition compared to  the no-bonus condition (β=1.78, s.e.=1.0, p=0.09). Rounds 
did not have any effect on the decision to punish, nor did Rounds interact with Benefit or 
Stability. In both these cases there were effect sizes that approached significance but did not 
reach it. 
6.8.3 Contributions 
The stability of the group affected overall contributions, with random groups behaving less 
cooperatively (M=7.8, SD=3.2) than fixed groups (M=11.0, SD=3.7; Wald χ21=30.39, 
p<0.001; β=-0.45, s.e.=0.2, p=0.036). As shown in Table 6.3, as is often the case in public 
goods games, contributions decreased as the game progressed (Wald χ24=46.81, p<0.001), 
with participants being more cooperative at the beginning of the game (Round 1 Vs Round 
10, (β=0.36, s.e.=0.18, p=0.041). Benefit did not affect overall cooperation. Contributions 
were not affected by any second or third order interactions (See Table 6.4). 
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Figure 6.7: percentage of punishment opportunities taken by punishers across benefits 
conditions when groups were random or fixed. Grey =punishment occurred, Blank = 
punishment did not occur.  
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6.8.4 Punisher behaviour  
A question raised in Study 7 was whether individuals were strategically raising their 
contributions in the hopes of receiving additional resources if they were assigned the punisher 
role. To test this initially, contributions by participants assigned as Punishers were entered as 
a dependent variable into the model. While those in a random group could not have known 
they would receive the additional resources, by comparing the randomly selected punisher to 
those who knew they would receive the benefit, it is possible to see whether at a group level 
behaviour differed.  
As might be expected given the group-contribution data (see 6.8.3), punishers in the fixed 
conditions (M=11.03, SD=6.3) contributed more than those in the random conditions (M=8.6, 
SD=5.8; Wald χ21=8.62, p=0.003; β=0.4, s.e.=0.32, p=0.1). Contributions were also higher at 
Round 1-2 (M=11.94, SD=5.0) than Rounds 9-10 (M=8.43, SD=6.7; Wald χ24=15.55, 
p=0.004; β=0.24, s.e.=0.1, p=0.1). Interestingly, as shown in Figure 6.8 there was also an 
effect of Benefit (Wald χ22=6.95, p=0.033), with those in the Bonus condition contributing 
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Figure 6.8: mean contributions by punishers across benefit conditions, when 
groups were Random (blank) or fixed (grey). Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
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less than those in Monopoly condition (β=-0.67, s.e.=0.34, p=0.05).  
Given the lack of a main effect of Benefit on overall contributions (see 6.8.1), this suggests 
that the effect in the punisher-only data was being driven by behaviour in the Stable 
condition, however while Figure 6.8 suggests a trend in this direction, there was no 
interaction between Stability and Benefit on punisher contributions. There was also no 
interaction effect of Stability and Rounds (Wald χ22=5.97, p=0.23) or Benefit and Rounds. As 
shown in Figure 6.9, there was however a three-way interaction (Wald χ28=17.72, p=0.023), 
with a clearer difference seen between the benefit conditions when the groups were stable. 
Thus, the effect of Benefit might be driven by the fixed group. To test this, a separate analysis 
was run on this subset of the data (N=19). To control for the general cooperation-enhancing 
effect of stability, a new variable ‘deviation from group mean’ was created by subtracting the 
punisher’s contribution from the mean group-level contribution of the three other participants 
in that group/round; thus a positive figure suggests punishers contributed less than the group 
as a whole, and a negative figure that they contributed more. Due to the normal distribution 
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Figure 6.9: contributions by punishers over time when groups were random (a) or fixed (b): 
Circles = no-benefit condition, crosses = bonus condition, triangles = monopoly condition. 
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of the deviation data, a linear model was used.  
 As shown in Figure 6.10, Benefit affected the difference in punisher contributions (Wald 
χ23=8.30, p=0.016). Punishers in the Monopoly condition contributed more compared to the 
group mean than those in the Bonus (β=5.72, s.e.=1.4, p<0.001) and No-benefit conditions 
(β=4.95, s.e.=1.31, p<0.001). Punisher contributions matched the group-mean more at the 
start of the game (M=0.01, SD=3.5) than at the end (M=1.0, SD=4.6; Wald χ24=8.30, 
p=0.016). However the regression coefficients did not demonstrate individual differences 
between Rounds 9-10 and other rounds. An interaction between Benefit and Rounds did not 
affect relative difference. 
6.9 Results 2: group level effects 
The current study (and the current chapter overall) are primarily concerned with the effects 
that additional resources and the method of their accumulation would have on punishment 
and cooperative behaviour. Thus, group-level efficiency was not a concern per se. However, 
punishment does strongly affect group efficiency  (Gächter et al., 2008), and this is the 
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Figure 6.10: difference between punisher contributions and 
mean of other group-members between benefit conditions. 
A negative value suggests the punisher contributed more 
than the mean of non-punishers. Bars = 1 Standard Error. 
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mechanism by which group selection is suggested to act (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Denga et 
al., 2011). Equally, there has been debate as to the role of leadership in coordinating 
collective action and in the cost/benefits of such a position (Gillet et al., 2010; Maner & 
Mead, 2010). Therefore, an additional set of analyses investigated the group efficiency and 
actual earnings of participants in the current study. 
6.9.1 Group efficiency  
Group efficiency, i.e. a measure of the social product of the group was calculated by 
subtracting the amount of punishment (given and received) from the group pot. This was 
carried out as punishment can be considered a ‘waste’ of group resources. These data were 
normally distributed and accordingly a linear model was used in the analysis. 
As shown in Figure 6.11a, Stability affected group efficiency with fixed groups being more 
efficient (Wald χ21=18.47. p<0.001; β=29.02, s.e.=14.01, p=0.038). As also shown in Figure 
6.11a, Benefit affected group efficiency (Wald χ22=5.53. p=0.06), although the regression 
coefficients did not show any significant differences between conditions. Round also affected 
group efficiency, with efficiency being greater in the early rounds compared to the later 
rounds. (Wald χ24=34.35. p<0.001; Rounds 1-2 vs Rounds 9-10, β=33.83, s.e.=15.28, 
p=0.027). There was also a marginally significant interaction between Benefit and Stability 
(Wald χ22=4.91. p=0.08). Group efficiency was not affected by interactions between Benefit 
and Rounds, Stability and Rounds, nor was efficiency affected by a three-way interactions 
between Benefit, Stability and Rounds (See Table 6.5 for model summery). 
6.9.2 Group punisher earnings 
Group-punisher earnings were calculated by adding the additional return from the benefit 
mechanism to their share of the group pot, minus punishment. As with 6.8.4, while those in a 
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random group could not have known they would receive the additional resources, by 
comparing the randomly selected punisher to those who knew they would receive the benefit, 
it is possible to see whether at a group level, the study IVs affected earnings. These data were 
normally distributed and accordingly a linear model was used in the analysis. 
As shown in Figure 6.11b, Stability affected punisher pay-off, with punishers in fixed groups 
earning more (Wald χ21=17.53. p<0.001; β=12.92, s.e.=6.23, p=0.04). Unsurprisingly, 
Benefit affected punisher pay-offs (Wald χ22=69.50. p<0.001), with punishers in the 
monopoly condition earning marginally more than those in the no-bonus condition (β=12.34, 
s.e.=6.90, p=0.07). Rounds also affected punisher earnings (Wald χ24=43.23. p<0.001), with 
efficiency being greater in the early rounds compared to the later rounds (Rounds 1-2 vs 
Rounds 9-10, β=16.02, s.e.=5.95, p=0.007). 
As also shown in Figure 6.11b, punisher earnings were marginally affected by an interaction 
between Stability and Benefit (Wald χ22=5.63. p=0.06). Punisher earnings were affected by 
an interaction between Rounds and Benefit (Wald χ28=18.16. p=0.02), the earnings of 
punishers in the bonus conditions reduced between Round 1-2 (Bonus, M=39.79, SD=11.56; 
Monopoly, M=42.08, SD=10.58) and Rounds 9-10 (Bonus, M=28.21, SD=14.99; Monopoly, 
M=26.93, SD=13.38), while those in the no-bonus condition remained consistent (Round 1-2, 
M=22.52, SD=7.89; Rounds 9-10, M=17.25, SD=9.66). An interaction between Stability and 
Rounds did not affect Punisher earnings, nor were Punisher earnings affected by a three-way 
interaction between benefit, Stability and Rounds. 
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Table 6.5: group level analysis - model summaries 
     Group efficiency Factors Wald χ2 df p 
 
Benefit 5.53 2 0.06 
 
Stability 18.47 1 <0.001*** 
 
Rounds 34.35 4 <0.001*** 
 
Benefit*Stability 4.91 2 0.08 
 
Benefit*Rounds 6.10 8 0.64 
 
Stability*Rounds 4.60 4 0.33 
 
Stability*Benefit*Rounds 11.69 8 0.17 
Punisher earnings         
 
Benefit 69.50 2 <0.001*** 
 
Stability 17.53 1 0.04* 
 
Rounds 43.23 4 <0.001*** 
 
Benefit*Stability 5.63 2 0.06 
 
Benefit*Rounds 18.16 8 0.02* 
 
Stability*Rounds 2.81 4 0.59 
 
Stability*Benefit*Rounds 8.20 8 0.41 
Non-punisher earnings         
 
Benefit 7.42 2 0.02* 
 
Stability 15.86 1 0.04* 
 
Rounds 7.42 4 0.02* 
 
Benefit*Stability 2.76 2 0.25 
 
Benefit*Rounds 4.37 8 0.82 
 
Stability*Rounds 4.96 4 0.29 
  Stability*Benefit*Rounds 12.56 8 0.13 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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6.9.3 Mean non-punisher earnings  
Mean non-punisher earnings were calculated by dividing the group-pot by 3, once the 
punisher share (and, for the monopoly condition, the punisher bonus) was removed, as was 
the value of any punishment. As above while those in a random group could not have known 
they would receive the additional resources, by comparing the randomly selected non-
punishers to those who knew they would not be selected, it is possible to see whether at a 
group level, the study IVs affected earnings. These data were normally distributed and as 
such a linear model was used in the analysis. 
As shown in Figure 6.11c, Stability affected non-punisher earnings, with those in the fixed 
groups earning more (Wald χ21=15.86. p<0.001; β=5.54, s.e.=2.69, p=0.04). As also shown in 
Figure 6.11c, Benefit also affected non-punisher earnings (Wald χ22=7.42. p=0.02), however 
there were no specific differences between conditions. Rounds also affected non-punisher 
earnings (Wald χ22=7.42. p=0.02), with earnings being higher in the early Rounds (Round 1-2 
Vs Round 9-10, β=6.86, s.e.=2.69, p=0.007). Non-punisher earnings were not affected by 
interactions between Stability and Benefit, Benefit and Rounds, Stability and Rounds, or a 
three way interaction between Stability, Benefit and Rounds (See Table 6.5 for model 
summery). 
6.10 Discussion 
6.10.1 Punishment 
Dominant individuals are in a position to benefit to a greater degree from group cooperation 
(Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014). This can be either because they can actively monopolise 
and/or control how others access the results of individual or group activity (Clutton-Brock & 
Parker, 1995; Cummins, 2005) or because their level of pre-existing resources provides a 
higher marginal return from group cooperation (Reuben & Riedl, 2013). Because of this 
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greater stake in the outcome of any collective activity, dominant individuals may be more 
motivated to punish non-cooperation. The current study investigated this by providing some 
participants with one of the attributes of dominance, additional resources, and by 
manipulating how strategically beneficial punishing non-cooperation would be for them. 
Study 8 successfully replicated the results of Study 7; participants who received additional 
resources punished more severely and with greater frequency than those who did not. 
Individuals are more likely to punish when the cost is low (McCullough et al., 2013) and by 
providing punishers with more resources, the studies in this chapter lowered the net cost of 
punishment for some individuals and, as result, those punishers were more willing to punish 
free-riding within their group. As with Study 7, this result suggests that one simulated aspect 
of a dominant position, access to additional resources from group cooperation, at the very 
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least facilitated a behaviour that all individuals would engage in if they could, due to other-
regarding (Camerer & Fehr, 2006) or spiteful (Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2011) motives. 
However, the results demonstrated a strategic motivation behind punishment behaviour; 
participants punished more severely and more frequently when they received additional 
resources and when groups were fixed. One of the main proximate purposes of punishment is 
to change the behaviour of free-riders (Masclet, 2003; Shinada et al., 2004) or otherwise 
exclude them (Bowles & Gintis, 2004), and when groups were fixed punishers were in a 
position to continually reap the benefits from any subsequent pro-social behavioural change 
in the target of punishment. When punishers were guaranteed to repeatedly benefit from 
group cooperation, they were more willing to punish non-cooperation. This demonstration of 
strategic motivation complements other research which has shown that individuals will 
punish non-cooperation when faced with inter-group competition (Abbink et al., 2010), and 
that dominant individuals specifically will vary their behaviour in response to personal gain 
(Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Maner & Mead, 2010). Thus, because of this greater stake in 
the outcome of any group-beneficial activity, dominant individuals may be more motivated to 
punish behaviour that prevents such activity.  
Furthermore, the current results also contradicts the suggestion made regarding the results of 
Study 7, that punishers only act out of anger and spite due to the heightened loss of resources 
for that round that free-riding represented. This is not to say such motivation could not 
account for some punishment, as punishers do often show malicious behaviour and/or 
motivation (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992; 
Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). Again, the interaction between Benefit and Stability suggests that, 
rather than being driven by altruistic or spiteful motivations per se, punishment has a strategic 
motivation: individuals will engage in costly punishment if it is both cheap and beneficial for 
them to do so.  
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A position of dominance therefore provides self-serving motivation for encouraging group-
level cooperation. Indeed, a dominant position eliminates the problem of second-order free-
riding, as it does not matter whether others benefit from punishment, as long as the punisher 
does so to a greater degree. The results suggests that a) lowering the relative cost of 
punishment increases punishment, and b) punishment increases when it can be used 
strategically. Both these conclusions are consistent with dominance playing a role in 
punishment behaviour. 
6.10.2 Cooperation 
Perhaps surprisingly, increases in punishment frequency and severity in response to the 
available resources did not affect group-level cooperation. In fact, cooperation consistently 
fell across rounds in the same way as when punishment is not possible (Camerer, 2003), or 
indeed when an ineffective punishment mechanism is employed (Egas & Riedl, 2008; 
Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). Even with the increase in punishment seen in the Benefit 
conditions, the overall amount spent on punishment, and therefore its impact on the target, 
was still low (see Table 5.3). As a result participants did not respond as if punishment itself 
constituted enough of a threat to their own earnings to force them to contribute. That 
punishers did not increase their absolute spending on punishment proportionally to their 
bonus could be partly explained by loss aversion and endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
& Thaler, 1990); individuals would rather spend 1 point to punish by three points, than spend 
three points to punish by three (as shown by Egas & Riedl, 2008)), even if they had three 
times the available resources of non-benefit punishers – which was not the case here. Even 
though the cost of punishment was lowered to the point that participants were willing to 
punish, the cost was still relatively monetarily, and psychologically, high compared to 
effective punishment. 
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However, in Study 7, and specifically in the 50% bonus condition, participants who were 
faced with the prospect of a punisher who received a large amount of additional resources did 
contribute consistently across rounds. Thus, while a well-resourced punisher can be 
considered enough of a threat to encourage cooperation, the additional resources available 
clearly have to be sufficiently high for this to be the case. Some models have suggested that 
heterogeneity in resources is the most important factor in punishment behaviour (de Weerd & 
Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996; Kahneman et al., 1990), but the results from Study 8 suggest 
that punishment still needs to be effective in order to have any proximate effect on 
cooperation. This suggests that the threat of punishment has to feel credible, as well as be 
possible. Still, we would argue that dominant individuals can also punish more effectively, 
insomuch as they are, for example, physically formidable (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) or have 
priority access to information (Maner & Mead, 2010). Furthermore, in Chapter 5, the threats 
by a dominant individual were seen as credible insomuch as participants felt their 
intervention would alter the behaviour of a social defector. Thus, while in the present study, 
cooperation was not maintained by an individual in a ‘dominant position’ punishing 
ineffectively, it is unlikely that someone in an actual position of dominance could not punish 
effectively. 
6.10.3 Group efficiency and group-member earnings 
While not a direct aim of the study, group efficiency and member earnings provided some 
interesting data. Perhaps unsurprisingly, results of Study 8 clearly show that punishers did 
earn more than subordinate group members even though they spent resources on punishment. 
What is surprising however is that the highest earners were those in the monopoly condition, 
even though mathematically they earned less per unit of contribution than those in the bonus 
condition; those in the latter condition should have had a greater incentive to invest in group 
cooperation (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014). This result was likely driven by higher 
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contributions by the monopolypunishers themselves (see Figure 6.10, and for a more detailed 
discussion, see 6.10.3). This is surprising. In the stable condition, as with Study 7, punishers 
who received a bonus would not lose any points regardless of the investment of others, i.e. if 
they invested 1 point into the group pot, they were guaranteed at least 1 point back regardless 
of the behaviour of others. However bonus-punishers contributed less than those in the 
monopoly condition even though the latter received a return of 0.87 on each point they 
invested. Indeed, given the difference between returns from investment, we may have 
expected those in the Bonus condition to punish more readily as they received a flat bonus of 
0.25 points for every point others in the group invested. However, this was also not the case 
(see 6.10.1). It seems as if the monopoly-punishers were uniquely motivated to spend 
resources on the public good (both contributions and punishment), and this resulted in them 
subsequently gaining greater rewards, but also benefitted other group members in the process. 
 
The Strong Reciprocity theory of punishment is based on group-level selection (Gintis, 2000) 
that is, self-evidently, dependent on groups out-competing one another, either directly or due 
to different levels of survival when faced with environmental disasters (Bowles & Gintis, 
2004; Boyd et al., 2003). Punishing groups do indeed have a competitive advantage over non-
punishing groups (Gächter et al., 2008; Gürerk et al., 2006), and Strong Reciprocity theory 
argues that, as a result, altruistic punishment was selected for even though punishing free-
riders is disadvantageous for the individual punisher. What is interesting about the present 
results (see Figure 6.11a) is that they show a competitive advantage for punishing groups 
without the need for altruism. Despite the unequal disruption of resources within the group, 
the monopoly and no-benefit groups had the same level of group efficiency, i.e. we found that 
a selfishly motivated dominant individual can maintain a group’s competitive advantage even 
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while sequestering resources for themselves. While some have suggested that such a 
coordination/‘leadership’ role might be disadvantageous (Gillet et al., 2010), this need not be 
the case as long as the ‘leader’ can monopolise the product of any group-level cooperation. 
Because dominants have both the means to mitigate the immediate costs of punishment and a 
selfish motive to engage in punishment, no group-level mechanism is needed to explain why 
they would punish to increase group efficiency (see also, Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; 
Powers & Lehmann, 2014). 
6.10.4 Conclusion  
As well as having additional overall resources compared to others, dominant individuals also 
benefit disproportionally from group success. This can be either because they can actively 
monopolise and/or control how others access the results of individual or group activity 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Cummins, 2005) or because their level of pre-existing 
resources provides a higher marginal return from group efficiency (Reuben & Riedl, 2013). 
Because of this greater stake in the outcome of any collective activity, dominant individuals 
may be more motivated to punish. In Study 8 it was demonstrated that giving some 
participants such a greater stake in group-cooperation increased their tendency to punish 
more severely and frequently. Together, these results suggests that a) lowering the relative 
cost of punishment increases punishment, b) punishment can be an individually-beneficial 
strategic act, and c) it is a position of dominance that allows both the former points to occur. 
6.11 General discussion 
6.11.1 Dominance and costly punishment 
Punishment is costly to the punisher, yet as long as there is heterogeneity in the cost of 
punishment, either through reduced cost relative to resources (Frank, 1996), through the 
effectiveness of punishment (Roberts, 2013) or in the likelihood of retaliation (Rand et al., 
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2010), then punishment can be stable at the individual level. Equally, if there is heterogeneity 
in the benefit individuals derive from group cooperation, this will overcome the remaining 
second-order free-rider problem (Dreber et al., 2008; Yamagishi, 1988), as it does not matter 
whether others benefit from punishment, as long as the punisher does so to a greater degree. 
We believe an individual’s position in a dominance hierarchy can furnish the various 
heterogeneities in cost and benefit described above. The current chapter addressed the role of 
greater resources in punishment decision making.  
By definition, a dominant position reflects that an individual has “…priority of access to 
resources” (Cummins, 1996a, p. 467)  or preferential access to “any requisite that adds to 
the genetic fitness of the dominant individual” (Wilson, 1980, p. 129). Fundamentally, 
whether because dominant individuals can monopolise resources as they can behave 
coercively (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Hawley, 1999) or because others are willing to 
tolerate asymmetries in reciprocity to maintain a close relationship with them (Barclay, 2013; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Schino & Aureli, 2009), dominants have a high resource-
controlling ability (Hawley, 1999). The resource-controlling ability of dominant individuals 
also means they gain an increased marginal return on any group activity should invest in the 
public good more than others (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014), including investing more in the 
punishment of non-cooperation (which can be considered a public good, Nikiforakis & 
Normann, 2008). 
Both studies in this chapter found that when a dominant position was simulated by providing 
some individuals with additional resources, they punished non-cooperation more frequently 
and more severely.  While the motives of punishers in Study 7 might be up for debate (see 
5.5.1), the results of Study 8 clearly show punishment to be a strategic behaviour; participants 
punished more severely and more frequently when groups (and their position) were stable, 
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i.e. when it was both cheap and beneficial for them to do so. Thus, a dominant position not 
only provides the means to punish, it also provides a motivation. Importantly, this additional 
benefit provides a means to overcome the second-order free-rider problem, which is the crux 
of the debate around the evolution of punishment: it does not matter, to a degree at least, what 
the cost to the punisher is as long as they benefit disproportionally from their actions 
compared to non-punishers. 
6.11.2 A single (ineffective) punisher 
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, a dominant position provides an individual with 
multiple paths by which the cost of punishment can be reduced. Effectiveness of punishment 
is a key mechanism that reduces the cost of punishment (Balliet et al., 2011; Egas & Riedl, 
2008), and a dominant position allows individuals to punish effectively insomuch as they are, 
for example, physically formidable (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009) or have priority access to 
information (Maner & Mead, 2010). Chapter 5 demonstrated that participants believed the 
threats from dominant individuals to be credible and successful.  
This is why the current studies kept punishment ineffective, and this is likely why, unlike 
other studies that investigated punishment when there was heterogeneity in marginal benefit 
(Reuben & Riedl, 2009, 2013; Tan, 2008), heterogeneities in resources did lead to more 
punishment in Studies 7 & 8. Effective punishment lowers the cost of punishment and as a 
result even those who have relatively low resources can punish cheaply. Effective 
punishment usually produces a great deal of punishment, altruistic or otherwise 
(Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008) and according to some, 
punishment far in excess of that which occurs in everyday life (Guala, 2012).  It is no 
surprising therefore that when this ‘dominant’ ability was removed in the current studies that 
the effect of heterogeneity in resources on punishment was revealed. 
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More importantly, the fact that individuals are less inclined to retaliate against dominants for 
behaving ‘unfairly’ in dyadic interactions (see also, Eckel et al., 2010; Kim et al., 1998) 
might also lower the cost to a dominant individual from retaliation/counter-punishment. Such 
counter punishment is one of the main costs to punishment (Dreber & Rand, 2012; 
Nikiforakis, 2008) yet a target who receives punishment from a dominant individual would 
be expected to be as disinclined to respond antagonistically against dominants as they would 
be in other dyadic interactions.  To implicitly simulate this, a single-punisher mechanism was 
employed (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011; O'Gorman et al., 2009), as this would prevent the 
punisher from being altruistically, spitefully or counter- punished (see, Ostrom et al., 1992; 
Ottone, 2008); i.e. the punisher had the freedom of action open to dominant individuals (Van 
Vugt, 2006), including whether or not to contribute (see 5.10.3).  
Additionally, previous studies have found that a single punisher (with effective punishment) 
can sustain cooperation (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011; O'Gorman et al., 2009) and there 
have been questions raised as to whether an informal peer-sanctioning mechanism represents 
actual group dynamics. It has been suggested that groups of individuals tend to self-organise 
towards some individuals having discretionary/leadership roles (see, Baldassarri & 
Grossman, 2011), and even in egalitarian societies dominant individuals do have a louder 
voice in group decisions (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Traulsen et al. (2012) found that 
individuals prefer an environment of pool punishment, where a single authority dispenses 
punishment, even at the expense of group efficiency. Therefore the current chapters 
mechanism, whereby resources were concentrated in one dominant/despotic individual (as 
opposed to the automated central authority of Traulsen et al., 2012), could be seen as a 
stepping stone between the peer-punishment of non-state societies and the formalised 
policing of state societies.  
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Still, why non-dominant group members tolerate such sequestering of both resources and 
power is another matter. It has been suggested that inequality in resource distribution might 
be a fair price for free-riding on norm enforcement  (see, Roberts, 2013), especially if there 
are limited outside options (Gavrilets, 2012; McNamara & Houston, 2002). In fact a recent 
model of the shift from an egalitarian social structure to a more familiar hierarchical one in 
humans depends on the latter especially (Powers & Lehmann, 2014). It could be suggested, if 
speculatively, that such an acquiescence to the punishing power to dominant individuals 
could be compared to other forms of asymmetry between dominants and subordinates that the 
latter just have to tolerate (Barclay, 2013; Schino & Aureli, 2009). 
6.11.3 Beyond dominance: a case of Noblesse Oblige? 
We have suggested that dominance might play an important role in the evolution of costly 
punishment; from a certain perspective dominance does relate to various factors that have 
been shown to encourage costly punishment in the literature, and specifically in Study 7 & 8 
in how resources are gained from group cooperation encourage punishment. Study 8 found 
that punishers in stable groups who benefitted directly at the expense of the group (i.e. the 
monopoly condition) behaved in the most pro-social way. These punishers contributed to the 
public good by both punishing free-riders more frequently and severely than those in other 
groups, and also contributed more than other group members. This is interesting as while 
(spiteful) punishment of higher earners (Burns & Visser, 2006; Van De Ven et al., 2010; 
Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) might drive some cooperation, here there was no opportunity for this 
to happen here because only the high earner could punish.  
An explanation for this is that a dominant position can be precarious, especially in human 
groups. While a strong individual could demand a greater share of any resource (Sell, Tooby, 
et al., 2009; Zak et al., 2009), humans respond negatively to being on the disadvantaged side 
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of resource distribution (Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008, 2011; Van’t Wout et al., 2006; 
Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) and the prevention of such exploitation likely played a strong role in 
the evolution of our social/coalitional psychology (Cummins, 1996a; Gavrilets et al., 2008). 
Dominant behaviour therefore might lead to either a withdrawal of cooperation by 
individuals, the dissolution of a group, or rebellion by subordinates (Brandt, Hauert, & 
Sigmund, 2006; Hirschman, 1970; Van Vugt et al., 2004) 
In fact the threat from revolutionary coalitions is main reason for the relatively flat 
dominance hierarchy of pre-state tribes (Boehm, 1997). To circumvent the threat of a 
coalition forming, dominant individuals might therefore have to behave in a pro-social and 
generous way (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007). This is supported by the results of Chapters 5 & 
6, which demonstrated that that punishment is not only an activity that dominant individuals 
can do, but also one they are expected to take part in. By placing punishers in a position 
where their success was at the expense of others (the monopoly condition), the study 
activated the psychology designed to ward off the negative reactions of subordinates, even 
though no reaction was actually possible. While the data supporting this suggestion is 
exploratory (see 6.5), punishers who knew they were benefiting at the expense of other group 
members behaved in the most pro-social way; they both contributed and punished more than 
other group members or punishers in different conditions. This does suggest on some level 
they were acting with a sense of noblesse oblige. 
It should be remembered that individuals do actively prefer an environment where 
punishment is possible (Gürerk et al., 2006) and that having a single individual ‘in charge’ 
can lead to more efficient use of punishment to promote cooperation (Baldassarri & 
Grossman, 2011; O'Gorman et al., 2009), and can improve general decision-making  (Gillet 
et al., 2010; King et al., 2009). Because such a dominant position can be exploited (Maner & 
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Mead, 2010), it is likely that a lot of the ‘moral’ emotions surrounding fairness evolved to 
ensure we and our allies were not exploited by others and to keep track of any potential social 
challengers or threats (Boehm, 1997; Brosnan, 2011; Byrne & Whiten, 1997; Cummins, 
1996a; Jenson & Peterson, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Thus, the inter-dependent group structure 
of our evolutionary past (Boehm, 1997; Charlton, 1997), rather than producing a psychology 
of  group-level egalitarian motives (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), has instead more finely honed 
the ability to form coalitions for our own gains and to watch out for competitors (Cummins, 
1996a, 2005). This would certainly explain the emergence of despotism once the ‘Mexican 
stand-off’ of our pre-state /pre-agricultural existence was broken (Powers & Lehmann, 2014; 
Turchin et al., 2013).  
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that engaging in costly punishment could be 
seen as the price of a dominant position, i.e. anyone who is determined to extract more than 
an equal share of resources from individuals or the group as a whole is tolerated as long as 
some of these resources are used for the public good. In fact, it has been suggested that 
subordinates will tolerate inequality for the opportunity to free-ride on public good spending 
and norm enforcement (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Roberts, 2013), and it is probably no 
coincidence that the reputation gained from an act of punishment (trustworthy, group-
focused; Barclay, 2006) is similar to the set of traits demanded in a leader (Hogg et al., 2012). 
Costly punishment can be seen as a strategic tool signal and ensure a dominant position 
without the negative consequences of being seen as too despotic and therefore risking the 
dissolution of any group or coalition. There are clear advantages to being in environments 
where punishment is possible (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gürerk et al., 2006), and, to state the 
argument from a Hobbesian perspective, individuals are willing to sacrifice freedom of action 
for benevolent protection or, in a more contemporary fashion, no one ever voted for ‘soft on 
crime’. 
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6.11.4 General conclusion 
Chapter 4 found that those who engage in punishment are thought of as likeable and 
dominant, and Chapter 5 found that dominant individuals are expected to punish and that the 
aforementioned reputational benefits are dependent on this punishment being successful. 
Nevertheless, those results did not demonstrate that dominants would actually punish. The 
studies in the present chapter aimed to investigate whether dominant individuals, or rather, 
participants experiencing one advantage of a dominant position, would actually punish. The 
studies simulated an advantage of a dominant position by a) providing punishers with 
additional resources (Study 7) and, b) by varying the strategic motive for punishing (Study 8). 
The studies found that gaining additional resources from group cooperation motivated 
individuals to engage in more severe and more frequent punishment, and that this behaviour 
further increased when there was a strategic benefit for doing so.  
These results support the suggestion that a dominant position leads to greater punishment and 
represents the individual heterogeneity in the cost of punishment that might allow it to be 
evolutionarily stable. Furthermore the current study demonstrated that a dominant position 
provides a selfish incentive to maintain group cooperation that is not available to 
subordinates. Finally, Study 8 specifically, suggests that dominant costly punishers are not 
simply motivated by the direct benefits from group cooperation they receive alone but, 
potentially at least, are acting in an altruistic way in order to maintain their position in a 
social hierarchy, i.e., investing in the public good is the price one has to pay for a dominant 
position. 
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7 Chapter 7: dominance and behaviour 2 - naturally occurring dominance 
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that dominance is potentially an important factor in 
costly punishment. Chapter 7 therefore does not manipulate dominance experimentally, but 
investigates whether those in a ‘real life’ dominant social position will engage in a greater 
amount of punishment. 
7.1 General introduction 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that there are individual-level reputational and 
material advantages to engaging in costly punishment, and that these advantages are 
inextricably linked to a dominant position. Chapter 4 suggested that costly punishment makes 
one appear dominant and likeable in the eyes of observers, Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
dominant punishers are expected to punish and that their position can lower the cost of 
punishment, and Chapter 6 demonstrated that those in a position to benefit disproportionally 
from group success will punish to enforce group cooperation. However, the studies in 
Chapter 6 did not manipulate dominance as such, but rather experimentally manipulated the 
payoffs of an economic game in order to simulate an aspect of dominance, access to higher 
resources. The question still remains as to whether those actually in a dominant social 
position will engage in a greater amount of costly punishment. Therefore, unlike previous 
chapters that have tested a specific characteristic of a dominant position, the final empirical 
chapter will address the question of whether a real-world position of dominance affects 
punishment behaviour. 
7.1.1 Cooperation and dominance 
Social connections have an important impact on general cooperative behaviour, with 
individuals behaving far more altruistically towards friends than non-friends (Brañas-Garza et 
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al., 2010; Jones & Rachlin, 2006). Participants will, for example, endure discomfort for close 
reciprocal friends (Harrison et al., 2011)  and will work hard to maintain relationships with 
them (Roberts & Dunbar, 2010). While we are clearly generous to those closest to us, status 
in a group may decrease an individual’s level of cooperation and altruism when dealing with 
other members; specifically dominant individuals often behave less ethically and less fairly 
(Lammers et al., 2010; Piff et al., 2012).  
Dominant individuals might behave less fairly as they do not fear the punishment associated 
with unfairness. High status individuals have access to greater resources (Ellis, 1994) and a 
greater number of social allies (Von Rueden et al., 2008), and this may help guard them from 
any antagonism their behaviour invites. For example being central to a group is a strong 
negative predictor of victimisation and exploitation (Figueredo et al., 2001). While selfish 
behaviour itself is cheap, if others are willing to respond aggressively to that behaviour the 
retaliatory cost may be very high. Yet when faced with an uncooperative partner, participants 
are less likely to punish those perceived as being of high status (Eckel et al., 2010; Kim et al., 
1998). Also, dominant individuals are far more willing than others to respond aggressively to 
any action against them (Griskevicius et al., 2009; Silk, 2003). Dominant individuals are 
therefore more free to behave in either a cooperative or coercive manner towards other 
members of the group as needed, and can use their dominant position to manipulate group 
interactions to ensure a favourable outcome for themselves (Dasgupta, 2011; Maner & Mead, 
2010). 
Finally, dominant individuals may be too important, due to their connections or resources, to 
alienate. Ostracism has been suggested as a mechanism to deter non-cooperation without 
resorting to costly punishment (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Masclet, 2003; Rand, Ohtsuki, et al., 
2009), but such studies have assumed there is no cost associated with removing someone 
from a social circle. It may be in an individual’s best interest to stay in proximity to a 
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dominant individual regardless of their behaviour. This may be especially true if 
uncooperative dominant individuals have attained their position due to a useful skill set 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Petersen et al., 2012), but it would also apply if proximity to a 
physically dominant individual ensures safety (for example, Snyder et al., 2011). Thus lower 
status individuals may have to simply endure an unbalanced relationship with more dominant 
peers, as is the case in non-human primate societies (Schino & Aureli, 2009; Watts, 2002). 
7.1.2 Punishment and social status  
The desire to inflict retribution on those who behave unfairly seems to be an automatic 
response (Crockett et al., 2010). Yet there is great variation in the willingness to actually 
punish others for their behaviour, and dominance may play a role in this decision making. As 
mentioned, social position gives high status or dominant individuals an advantage in dyadic 
interactions and dominant individuals are very sensitive to any unfairness directed towards 
them (Brosnan, 2011; Burnham, 2007) as this may indicate a challenge to their position. 
Equally, while it is advantageous for all members of a social group to track the dominance 
relationships between conspecifics  (Cummins, 1996a), it might be advantageous for 
dominant individuals to be especially sensitive to these interactions as, again, they could 
represent the rise of a social challenger. This may explain why socially dominant individuals 
seem more willing to respond to perceived unfairness or the violation of social norms 
(Cummins, 1999; Lammers et al., 2010).  
Yet, because of their ability to monopolise resources, dominant individuals do benefit 
disproportionally from group success. They should therefore be motivated to encourage 
group cooperation. This may be due to capital return, because their position means, for 
example, they have more land or property and therefore any group benefit from an action is 
multiplied by this fact (Reuben & Riedl, 2013), or, in a less formal environment, because 
their central position in a social group allows dominants to take advantage of the flow of 
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resources or information that closer ties brings (Harrison et al., 2011; Jones & Rachlin, 2006). 
A series of recent models (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Roberts, 2013) have suggested that, 
because of the additional benefits from group efficiency that dominance provides, dominant 
individuals should always invest in both cooperation and punishment. This prediction was 
empirically tested in Study 8 and supported by that study’s results. 
Finally, as well as possessing additional motivation to punish, as has been discussed at length 
in previous chapters a dominant individual experiences a lowers the cost of punishment. Both 
the additional resources available to dominant individuals and the ability to punish effectively 
lower the cost of punishment, which in turn makes in more likely to occur. Furthermore, as 
with the reduced risk of a response to unfair behaviour, a dominant position may lower the 
threat to an individual from retaliation, because their social allies, physical prowess, or 
general willingness to respond to a confrontation would make retaliation from the target of 
punishment less likely. 
7.2 Study 9: cooperation and punishment in an informal social network 
Thus a dominant position would both allow and motivate an individual to engage in costly 
punishment. While the arguments above are empirically based, few studies have explicitly 
examined the role of actual status within a group; the effects of a dominant position have 
been simulated through specific experimental manipulations (e.g. Chapter 6). The current 
study therefore investigated directly what effect an individual’s status within a group had on 
cooperative and punishment behaviour.  Rather than experimentally manipulating the 
advantages of being dominant by, for example, by varying resource levels (Reuben & Riedl, 
2013) or the effectiveness of punishment (Nikiforakis et al., 2009), the current chapter 
measured actual status by investigating social relationships in a closed social network. 
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Social network analysis (see Krause et al., 2007, and; Scott, 2007 for review) can offer one 
means of measuring status by identifying how central an individual is in a group. A simple 
measure of centrality is degree centrality, which indicates the amount of connections an 
individual receives (InDegree) and sends out (OutDegree). Of particular interest is InDegree 
as this indicates prestige/dominance (Wasserman, 1994): high InDegree suggests that an 
individual is being watched and approached by others; behaviour strongly connected to high 
status and dominance (Hawley, 1999; Rege, 2008). Because of this the current study focused 
on InDegree alone. 
Being in a dominant position affects how environmental and interpersonal events are 
perceived. For example, dominance changes belief about the distribution of resources 
(Cummins, 2005): specifically, dominant individuals feel entitled to a greater share of 
resource and are more willing to endorse the use of force both interpersonally and 
internationally in order to achieve this (Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). The dominance of a 
competitor influences both our own responses to their behaviour (Jenson & Peterson, 2011) 
and the way we behave towards them (Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013). Yet, interestingly, 
formidable individuals (Watkins et al., 2010) those who are primed to feel dominant 
(Watkins & Jones, 2012) no longer respond to cues of formidability in potential competitors, 
and those who are surrounded by allies perceive potential foes to be less threatening (Fessler 
& Holbrook, 2013). Finally, it is important to note that we are very aware of our status within 
a social group (Anderson, Srivastava, et al., 2006; Cummins, 1996a), with social penalties for 
being perceived to have stepped beyond our status (Anderson et al., 2008). 
These effects of a dominant position may be due to environmental feedback, i.e. learning 
what one can get away with, may reflect proximate social norms on how dominants should 
behave (for example, Fiddick & Cummins, 2007), or they may result from instinctive 
condition-dependent evolved behaviours. For whatever reason, a position of dominance 
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fundamentally changes the cost/benefit analyses of our behaviour. Behaviour in economic 
games is expected to reflect individual differences (for example Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002) 
and differences in the social environment from which participants are drawn (For example 
Henrich et al., 2010), and also to reflect real world behaviour (Rustagi, Engel, & Kosfeld, 
2010). Therefore, even without any direct motivations (for example, reputational gain, see 
Chapter 4; or benefit from group success, Chapter 6), individuals who occupy a 
dominant/prestigious position within a group should be expected to act within an economic 
game in accordance with that position. 
In the present experiment, therefore, individuals who were members of a closed social 
network took part in a third-party punishment game. It was predicted that an individual’s 
behaviour would be related to their social position, with dominant individuals behaving more 
unfairly and being more likely to engage in costly (in this instance ‘third party’) punishment 
than subordinate individuals. It was also predicted that the effectiveness of punishment would 
interact with status in participants’ decision making; dominant individuals would behave less 
pro-socially under high punishment effectiveness, and would punish more when effectiveness 
was low. 
7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Participants and research context 
Participants were 2nd year undergraduate students from the University of Exeter who were 
attending a week-long field course at a Field Study Council site in South Wales, UK. In total, 
29 students (23 females, 6 males; mean age=20) attended the course and completed the social 
network questionnaire. Twenty-one of the students (17 females, 4 males; mean age=20) took 
part in a Third Party Punishment Game (TPPG). Although the sample size was small, the 
situation represented a rare opportunity to study a closed-network of individuals where there 
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was no existing formal or semi-formal hierarchy, as there might be, for example, in a sports 
team due to ability or playing position. Data collection took place in April 2011. 
7.3.2 Design 
In a standard TPPG, participants play in one of three roles, that of the Proposer, Receiver or 
Third Party. Participants in the Proposer role are given an allocation of 20 points and can 
chose to send between 0-20 of these points to the participant in the Receiver role. The 
participant in the Third Party role is given 10 points and observes this interaction; they then 
decide whether to spend their own points to punish the Proposer. The receiver plays no active 
part in the game and earns only the points sent to them. The Proposer and Third Party keep 
any points they don’t send to the Receiver or spend on punishment.  
Due to the small sample size, a pen-and-paper strategy method version of the TPPG was used 
(Fehr, 2004) with participants being asked to make proposal and punishment decisions 
simultaneously. Also, when making proposal decisions, participants could only transfer 
between 0 to 10 points to the Receiver, rather than the full 20. This limit  was implemented as 
individuals rarely send more than half their points during such decisions (Fehr, 2004) and to 
limit the number of strategic decisions participants had to make in the Third Party role. 
7.3.3 Procedure 
The study took place on the 6th day of the field course. Participants were informed that 
participation was entirely voluntary and that they had the potential to earn up to £30 by taking 
part. Once all participants were seated in the main teaching room, the instruction sheet was 
handed out. This sheet explained the various roles and how payment would be generated (see 
7.3.4 Matching & Payment Procedure). Instructions were read out verbatim, and participants 
were instructed to raise their hand if they were unclear about any details. None did. 
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Participants were asked to make proposal and punishment decisions for two levels of 
punishment effectiveness: An “effective” condition whereby one point assigned by a Third 
Party removed three of a Proposer’s points (1:3 ratio), and an “ineffective” condition where 
one point assigned by a Third Party removed one point of a Proposer’s points (1:1 ratio). The 
Receiver had no active role in the game but participants were made aware that part of their 
payoff for the experiment would depend on what others had sent to them. Thus, the number 
of points (and therefore, money) participants earned depended on a) their proposal decision, 
b) points they received from a Proposer, c) their behaviour AS the Third Party, and d) the 
punishment received FROM a Third Party. 
Participants were then randomly assigned into two groups, with one half being led to another 
teaching room nearby. Following this, no further explanations were given by the researchers. 
One of the groups was given the Proposer decision card first, and the other the Third-Party 
decision card first. The order of presentation had no effect on Prosper and Third Party 
decisions, and therefore was not included in any analyses. 
The Proposer card asked participants to indicate how many points they wished to send to the 
Receiver “If each deduction point assigned to me by a Third Party removes one of my points” 
or “... three of my points”.  The Third Party card asked participants to indicate “The amount 
of points I would assign to the Proposer” for each effectiveness, with boxes available for each 
possible offer the Proposer could make (0-10). Once all participants had completed their first 
decision card, it was collected and the other was handed out. The experimental session lasted 
approximately 25 minutes. 
7.3.4 Matching & Payment Procedure 
After the experiment, participants were randomly matched into triads (containing a Proposer, 
a Third Party, and a Receiver). Twenty-one triads were generated as each participant was 
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assigned once in each role and acted in each role in a different triad. Furthermore, each triad 
was randomly assigned a punishment condition, i.e. whether that triad would use the strategic 
decisions participants had made for effective (1:3) or ineffective (1:1) punishment. Based on 
the decisions made in each triad, a point total was generated for each participant. Half of the 
participants were randomly selected to receive payment and their points were converted at a 
ratio of 5:1 (5 points = £1 pound sterling). Two participants were randomly selected to 
receive payment on a 1:1 ratio of points to £. Payment was made privately to those selected 
the following day and those selected to receive their payment at a ratio of 5:1 earned a mean 
amount of £4.40. Participants selected to receive payment at a ratio of 1:1 earned a mean 
amount of £18.00. 
7.3.5 Generating the social network 
On the 7
th
day of the field course, participants were asked to complete the social network 
questionnaire. After being informed that participation was entirely voluntary they were 
handed the booklet containing the questionnaire and a list of those attending the course. As 
with the TPPG, instructions on the sheet were also read out verbatim, and participants were 
instructed to raise their hand if they were unclear about any details. The questionnaire asked 
participants to indicate who they believed to be the most influential individuals on the field 
course, who they socialised with on the field course, who (of those attending the course) they 
socialised with at home (i.e., in Exeter), and who they thought of as close friends. There was 
no limit on the number of individuals participants could identify for each question. These 
questions were chosen as an attempt to capture the different relationships between 
participants, for instance a few individuals may be recognised as the most influential in a 
group, but friendship groups may be more dispersed. The individual network questions, 
“Close Friends”, “Most Influence”, “Socialise at Home”, “Socialise on Trip”, correlated on a 
scale with high reliability (α=0.851), therefore the additional measure “Total Network” was 
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created by summing the ties indicated by participants in the network questions. This last 
measure was a ‘weighted/valued network’ (Scott, 2007, p. 65) and represented the overall 
strength of associations between group members. For the full questionnaire, see Appendix E. 
7.3.6 The Trait Dominance-Submissiveness Scale (TDS) 
At the end of the social network questionnaire, participants were presented with the Trait 
Dominance-Submissiveness Scale (Mehrabian, 1994). The TDS is a 26-item scale designed 
to measure trait dominance independent of arousal or extraversion and contains questions 
such as “When I am with someone else, I usually make the decisions”. The version used here 
asked participants to indicate their agreement with such statements on a 9-point scale (1= 
Very strong disagreement, 9= Very strong agreement) with a ‘1’ response subsequently being 
scored as -4 and a ‘9’ response scored +4. This measure was used as an alternative way of 
measuring dominance. The alpha reliability for this measure was 0.92. 
7.3.7 Statistical analysis  
The software package UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) was used to generate 
the network variables. As social network data violate assumptions of independence (Lusher, 
Robins, & Kremer, 2010), it was not possible to use standard software such as SPSS for the 
analysis. Therefore UCINET was also used to analyse the effects of the network variables on 
behaviour, as the program takes into account the non-independence of the network data when 
conducting statistical tests. Due to the limited range of analytical tests available within the 
package, we were unable to perform a direct analysis of the relationship between the social 
network data and punishment effectiveness on participant’s behaviour. Therefore, in order to 
conduct the mathematical equivalent of an analysis of covariance, additional calculations 
were performed on the data prior to correlational tests being carried out within UCINET. 
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7.4 Results 
Table 7.1 shows the relationship between the TDS and Network matrices measurements of 
dominance.  Dominant personality scores correlated with the social network metrics, 
suggesting that the use of InDegree can be seen as an accurate measure of dominance. 
Table 7.1: the relationship between trait dominance and social network position 
7.4.1 Cooperation and social status  
The overall mean Proposer offer was 4.8 points (SD=3.2). The mean proposer decision under 
effective punishment was 5.7 points (SD=3.4) and under ineffective punishment was 3.8 
points (SD=2.8). When making proposer decisions under effective punishment, two 
individuals made offers of zero, and under ineffective punishment four participants (including 
the previous two) sent zero offers to the Receiver. 
In order to investigate whether there was a relationship between overall Proposer behaviour 
and the social network variables, the sum of participant offers across both efficiencies was 
calculated. The correlation of this sum with the network-position variables was used to 
indicate how much variance in overall Proposer behaviour could be explained by the 
covariates (network position). The  
  r (n=29) p 
Friends 0.46 0.019* 
Influence 0.5 0.01** 
Socialise on Trip 0.32 0.08¥ 
Socialise at 
Home 
0.34 0.07¥ 
Total Network  0.48 0.014* 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ¥p<0.09) 
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Table 7.2: the relationship between social network position and Proposer offers under 
different punishment effectiveness. 
correlations are shown in the left two columns of Table 7.2. They show that the network 
variables ‘Influence’, ‘Socialise on Trip’ and the ‘Total Network’ score accounted for a 
significant amount of variance in Proposer behaviour; those with a stronger network position 
made lower overall offers than lower ranking members of the network. The variables ‘Close 
Friends’ and ‘Socialise at Home’ also showed similar trends that approached significance.  
To investigate whether social network position differentially affected Proposer offers under 
different levels of punishment effectiveness, the difference between participants’ offers under 
ineffective and effective punishment was calculated by subtracting the former from the latter. 
Again these data were correlated with the network variables. The network variables 
‘Socialise on Trip’ and ‘Socialise at Home’ explained a significant amount of the variance in 
the interaction between Proposer offers and punishment effectiveness (see figures 7.1 & 7.2). 
This interaction is further highlighted by the correlation data (see Table 7.3): individuals with 
low network status gave significantly higher offers than high prestige individuals only when 
punishment was effective, i.e., the risk from punishment was high. 
  
Aggregate 
Proposer Offers 
Difference between 
Proposer Offers under 
effective and ineffective 
punishment 
  
r 
(n=21) 
p r (n=21) p 
Friends -0.40 0.074¥ 0.20 0.394 
Influence -0.54 0.011* 0.19 0.392 
Socialise on 
Trip 
-0.53 0.014* 0.49 0.025* 
Socialise at 
Home 
-0.42 0.059¥ 0.45 0.041* 
Total Network  -0.58 0.006** 0.37 0.102 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ¥p<0.09)   
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7.4.2 Punishment and social status 
The mean number of points allocated across the possible punishment decisions was 2.6 
(SD=1.7). When punishment was effective, the mean number of points was 2.2 (SD=1.4) and 
when ineffective, 3.0 (SD=2.0). All participants indicated they would punish at least one 
possible proposer-offer when punishment was effective, but two participants did not punish a 
single possible proposer-offer when punishment was ineffective.  
To investigate whether a participant’s social network position explained any of the variance 
in punishment behaviour in response to the potential offers made by Proposers, the gradients 
of the regression lines relating to punishment responses to each potential offer were 
calculated for both ineffective and effective punishment. The correlations between these 
gradients and the social network variables were then computed, and are displayed in Table 
7.4. As shown in Figure 7.3, the variable ‘Influence’ significantly accounted for the variance 
in punishment behaviour in response to  
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Figure 7.2: relationship between 'Socialise at 
home' InDegree network position and Proposer 
offers when punishment was effective (Circles, 
dashed line) or ineffective (Crosses, solid line). 
Figure 7.1: relationship between 'Socialise on 
Trip' InDegree network position and Proposer 
offers when punishment was effective 
(Circles, dashed line) or ineffective (Crosses, 
solid line). 
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Table 7.3: correlation between social position and Proposer offer under effective or 
ineffective punishment 
potential Proposer offers. Individuals who were thought of as influential were significantly 
more sensitive to Proposer offers, i.e., they tended to assign more punishment points for 
low/unfair offers and fewer points to fairer offers.  
 
  
Offer under effective 
punishment 
Offer under ineffective 
punishment 
  r (n=21) p r (n=21) p 
Friends -0.41 0.071¥ -0.22 0.215 
Influence -0.52 0.013* -0.42 0.061¥ 
Socialise on 
Trip 
-0.65 0.002** -0.26 0.266 
Socialise at 
Home 
-0.53 0.016* -0.16 0.475 
Total 
Network  
-0.63 0.003** -0.37 0.103 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ¥p<0.09)   
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Figure 7.3: relationship between regression slope 
for punishment spending in response to Proposer 
offers and influence InDegree network position. 
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Table 7.4: the relationship between network position and third party punishment behaviour 
under effective and ineffective punishment conditions 
We investigated whether the difference in overall punishment behaviour between the 
punishment effectiveness levels was affected by social network position. The mean of 
participant spending on punishment across potential Proposer offer levels was calculated for 
ineffective and effective punishment and then the former subtracted from the latter. These 
differences were then correlated with the individual network variables. As the central two 
columns in Table 7.4 show, social network position did not significantly affect the difference 
in average punishment behaviour between the two punishment effectiveness levels.  
Finally, to investigate whether social network position interacted with effectiveness of 
punishment in determining the severity of punishment to potential Proposer offers, the 
difference between the punishment response gradients was calculated for each participant by 
subtracting the ineffective gradient from the effective gradient. The correlations between the 
gradient differences and the social network variables were then computed. As shown in the 
  
Gradient of punishment 
responses to potential 
Proposer Offers 
Influence of punishment 
effectiveness on 
aggregate punishment 
behaviour 
Difference between 
gradient of punishment 
responses to punishment 
effectiveness 
  r (n=21) p r (n=21) p r (n=21) p 
Friends -0.22 0.35 -0.29 0.194 0.1 0.672 
Influence -0.52 0.04* -0.38 0.097 -0.01 0.955 
Socialise on 
Trip 
-0.27 0.244 -0.06 0.801 0.11 0.65 
Socialise at 
Home 
-0.31 0.178 -0.21 0.352 0.23 0.343 
Total Network  -0.38 0.088¥ -0.23 0.301 0.1 0.657 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ¥p<0.09)         
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right hand columns of Table 7.4, there were no significant correlations, suggesting that social 
network position did not interact with punishment effectiveness. 
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Cooperation and social status 
One of the fundamental assumptions made about economic games is that behaviour within 
them reflects how individuals behave outside of the laboratory (Henrich et al., 2010; Levitt & 
List, 2007; Rustagi et al., 2010) and individuals do have a strong sense of their position 
within a group (Anderson, Srivastava, et al., 2006) which would include the ‘appropriate’ 
way to behave (Anderson et al., 2008). The current study therefore used an individual’s 
position in an informal social network, as defined by their InDegree score - the number of 
others who identified them in response to various social measures. InDegree is metric that 
represents prestige/dominance within the group (Scott, 2007), and it was used to investigate 
whether group position would have an effect on cooperative and punishment behaviour. A 
dominant position did affect behaviour within the Third Party Punishment Game, and by far 
the strongest relationships were found between the proposer behaviour and social status. 
Across the measures of social position, dominant/prestigious individuals made significantly 
smaller offers overall, and for a number of measures there was a significant interaction 
between social position and effectiveness of punishment. 
One interpretation of these results is that low status individuals may behave pro-socially to 
raise their status within the group. By definition, individuals of low network status lack 
connections to other members, and sacrificing resources may be an attempt to instigate such 
reciprocal relationships. This is consistent with behaviour seen in non-human primates where 
low ranking members are willing to sacrifice resources in order to associate with higher 
ranking conspecifics (Stevens, Vervaecke, de Vries, & Van Elsacker, 2005; Watts, 2002). 
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Humans actively compete to improve their reputation within a group (Barclay & Willer, 
2007; Roberts, 1998) and low ranking individuals may especially benefit from doing so. In 
fact, such ‘mundane’ cooperative/altruistic behaviour might be the preferred option for 
individuals without the status or the ability to perform more ‘heroic’ acts (Barclay, 2013).   
Conversely, rather than low status individuals behaving more pro-socially, the results could 
be explained by high status individuals being more selfish. Being in a dominant position 
changes the way individuals interact with the environment and conspecifics (Maestripieri, 
2012): dominant individuals see themselves as deserving a greater share of any resources 
(Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009), make less generous offers in economic games (Zak et al., 2009); 
and in everyday life they behave in a more selfish way than lower status individuals (Piff et 
al., 2012). Thus, the results of the current study can be seen as confirming this self-serving 
bias in the behaviour of dominant individuals, as prominent individuals kept more of their 
allocation for themselves. 
Additionally, the results could explain what property of a dominant position affected how 
participants reacted to the specific game mechanisms. The established findings that there are 
differences in altruistic and/or cooperative behaviour depending on the presence of a third 
party (Henrich et al., 2010; Kim et al., 1998) and in response to the effectiveness of 
punishment (Falk et al., 2005) clearly show that the potential for punishment is factored into 
social decision making. While there was an overall effect of status on Proposer offers, the 
current study also found some interactions between status and the effectiveness of 
punishment, indicating that status altered how individuals responded to this ‘threat’. If this 
was just a general effect of cooperative opportunities as described above, there should not 
have been a relationship between status and effectiveness.  
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Therefore, a more specific explanation for the results might be that dominant individuals did 
not fear the repercussions their unfair behaviour may incite. Dominance is defined as the 
ability to have priority access to resources (Cummins, 1996a) and dominant individuals can 
use both aggressive and coercive tactics to achieve this  (Jensen, 2010; Little, Henrich, Jones, 
& Hawley, 2003) because they are aware others will not react to this behaviour. Indeed, we 
are very unwilling to punish those who are labelled as ‘high status’ (Eckel et al., 2010; 
Petersen et al., 2012). In essence, a dominant position means one does not have to feel 
threatened by others (see, Watkins et al., 2010; Watkins & Jones, 2012). Furthermore, Fessler 
and Holbrook (2013) recently demonstrated that simply being surrounded by allies lowers the 
perceived threat of a potential adversary, and conversely, the lack of allies is a strong 
predictor of being a victim of harassment (Sapouna et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2004). Thus, 
when asked to make decisions that might lead to punishment, more dominant individuals in 
the group did not perceive punishment, and especially effective punishment, to be as 
threatening as lower status individuals did. It should be noted however, that the latter result 
should be treated with caution as, while Table 3 shows that the relationship between network 
status and cooperation only occurred under effective punishment when analysed separately, 
only two variables (Socialise on Trip and Socialise at Home) showed a clear interaction 
effect. 
Nevertheless, the results of the current study support the suggestion that dominant individuals 
feel able to behave in a selfish manner in general. It also offers some support for the 
suggested that this effect occurs because dominant individuals feel insulated by their social 
position from the anger and recrimination that low cooperation or other acts of unfairness 
invite, and that low status individuals may cooperate more fully to avoid punishment rather 
than to help generate social ties. 
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7.5.2 Punishment and network position  
The threat of counter-punishment/retaliation might be the key cost to punishment behaviour 
(Nikiforakis, 2008; Rand et al., 2010). So, if more dominant individuals do feel less 
threatened by the possible recriminations from their actions, we might expect that dominant 
individuals would also be intrinsically less afraid of any possible retaliation from punishment, 
and would therefore punish more. As with the cooperative decision making, being in a 
dominant position was expected to bias the behaviour of dominant individuals when they 
made third party punishment decisions, and we expected that dominant individuals would 
punish unfairness more severely than low status individuals. The current study found some 
evidence for this relationship between punishment behaviour and social position. Participants 
who showed the greatest dominance for the ‘Influential’ variable did show a greater 
sensitivity to unfairness when making their punishment decisions. There was a marginal 
effect when the entire weighted network, i.e. ‘overall’ status, was compared to punishment 
behaviour, with more central individuals showing greater sensitivity to unfairness.  
It has been suggested that dominant individuals should be more sensitive to unfairness 
between conspecifics in their social environment (Cummins, 1999) as they have an extra 
incentive to track the changes in the social hierarchy as indicated by acts of unfairness 
(Brosnan, 2011; Cummins, 1996a). Thus, more dominant individuals should be more 
sensitive to unfair behaviour in their vicinity. This was demonstrated to a certain extent by 
the results of the current study.  While there were no actual in-game mechanisms to motivate 
or otherwise trigger this behaviour (for example, the potential to lose position, Maner & 
Mead, 2010); as stated previously, the study investigated whether just being in a dominant 
position would lead to dominant-type behaviour, and more dominant individuals did display 
the expected behaviour to an extent.  
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As also suggested for the cooperation data, individuals who were central in the network felt 
insulated from any repercussion for their actions, specifically the threat of retaliation which, 
when present, reduces instances of costly punishment (Janssen & Bushman, 2008; 
Nikiforakis, 2008; Rand et al., 2010). Because of the cost of retaliation, only high status 
individuals may feel able to punish because they can absorb the costs; here, because they had 
a large amount of social support (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013). While there was no explicit 
retaliation cost (see below), participants did make decisions in close proximity to one 
another. Punishment does respond to the possibility of being identified (Kurzban et al., 2007; 
Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011) and if the presence of ‘eye-like’ images can effect behaviour 
(Bateson et al., 2006) then the presence of other participants should have had a similar effect 
(for a general discussion on anonymity in lab experiments, see Levitt & List, 2007).  
However, the effect of social status on the tendency to punish was limited, especially when 
compared to the strong association between cooperation and social status. One potential 
reason may be the lack of opportunity for actual retaliation. There was a clear effect of social 
status on cooperation because punishment was possible and effective, i.e. the punishment 
mechanism (effective and ineffective) within the game was clearly salient in participants 
cooperative decision making and this direct risk of punishment robustly established a 
relationship between altruistic/fair behaviour and social position. While, as stated previously, 
the presence of others could suggested reputational gain and therefore the risk of retaliation 
(but see, Fehr & Schneider, 2009), this vague risk might not have been salient to participants, 
and therefore the insensitivity to threat shown by dominant individuals was not a factor when 
participants made their punishment decisions. 
7.5.3 Conclusion 
The current study investigated the effects social status on cooperative and punishment 
behaviour. The study found that position in a social network significantly affected 
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cooperation, with dominant individuals making substantially lower offers than subordinates. 
This was especially apparent when potential punishment from a third-party was effective, and 
suggests that more dominant individuals behave more selfishly because they implicitly fear 
punishment less than those of low status. In regard to actual punishment behaviour, there was 
some evidence that higher status individuals were more sensitive to acts of unfairness taking 
place within the group; they punished unfairness more severely than low status. These results 
suggest that status in a social hierarchy can affect sensitivity to acts of unfairness between its 
members which results in the altruistic punishment of defectors and free-riders. 
7.6 Study 10: reputation, cooperation and punishment in an informal social network 
Study 9 found that position in an informal social network did have an effect on participants’ 
behaviour. Those in a dominant social position were overall less likely than others to behave 
altruistically towards other members of the group and seemed less sensitive to the threat of 
punishment. As discussed above, these results support other studies which have demonstrated 
how dominant individuals generally behave less altruistically (Piff et al., 2012; Sell, Tooby, 
et al., 2009; Zak et al., 2009) and it therefore also validates the use of social network data, 
specifically InDegree data, as a measure of dominance. However, while theoretically more 
dominant individuals might be expected to be more sensitive to unfairness (Brosnan, 2011; 
Cummins, 1999) and thus punish more, there was only slight evidence that this occurred. 
One potential reason for the strong effect of social position on cooperation, but not 
punishment, seen in Study 9 was the lack of any game mechanic that might have made 
punishment a riskier decision. While the rationale of (evolutionary) economic games is partly 
that individuals ‘bring in’ general social behaviours from the outside world to the lab, we 
have argued previously that the mechanics of games might allow individuals to behave ‘out 
of character’, for example that effective (and anonymous) punishment in laboratory 
experiments gives everyone the ability to punish cheaply in a way they could not in everyday 
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life (see Chapter 6, 6.1, and Guala, 2012). With this in mind, the current study added an 
additional cost to engaging in punishment.  
It was not feasible to add another level to the game mechanism, such as a strategy-method 
retaliation-to-punishment round so, instead, to increase the prospect of a social penalty of 
behaviour, the current study made all decisions non-anonymous. Studies on how reputation 
affects costly punishment have given contradictory results. Several studies have demonstrated 
that punishers gain a positive reputation from the act (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008), and 
that the potential for reputational gain can motivate punishment (Bering, 2008; Kurzban et 
al., 2007). However, other studies have found that individuals are willing to hide punishment 
(Ostrom, 1990; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011), possibly because of an implicit fear of 
retaliation.  Thus, the addition of a reputation mechanism of sorts
8
 could have a two-fold 
effect. On the one hand it might induce participants to punish because punishers of unfairness 
are well liked, and on the other, the risk of (social) retaliation from the target of punishment 
might make subordinate individuals less willing to do so, despite the rewards.  
Study 9 only found limited evidence that social position affected punishment behaviour. 
Based on our interpretation of how dominance affects punishment, adding the reputation 
mechanism was expected to extenuate these marginal results. Accordingly, it was predicted 
that dominant individuals in the social network would behave less altruistically but would 
punish unfairness more severely than subordinate group members. 
                                                          
8
 ‘Of sorts’ because the mechanism is not embedded within the study itself per se; the reputational information 
was not used by participants to make future experimental decisions.  Instead it relies on participants feel 
uncomfortable with their behaviour being discovered by other members of the group. Ideally all decisions 
should be incentivised (Balliet et al., 2011; Levitt & List, 2007, and see the discussion at the end of this chapter) 
however this would not have been possible given the study location.  
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7.7 Method 
7.7.1 Participants and research context 
Participants were a different group of 2nd year undergraduate students from the University of 
Exeter who were attending a week-long field course at a Field Studies Council site in South 
Wales, UK. Data collection took place in April 2013, two years after Study 9. In total, 32 
students (20 females, 12 males; mean age=21) attended the course and completed the social 
network questionnaire. All students took part in the Third Party Punishment Game (TPPG). 
7.7.2 Design 
As with Study 9, a pen-and-paper strategy method version of the third party punishment 
game was used (Fehr, 2004) with participants being asked to make proposal and punishment 
decisions simultaneously. In the present version of the TPPG, Proposers were given 30 points 
and could transfer between 0 to 15 points to the Receiver. This limit was implemented as 
individuals rarely send more than half their points (Fehr, 2004) and to limit the number of 
strategic decisions participants had to make in the Third Party role. Third Parties still 
received 10points. This alteration was made to extend the maximum effective spending on 
punishment decisions, i.e. only by spending ten points would a third party remove all the 
points from a very selfish Proposer. 
7.7.3 Procedure 
On the 6th day of the field course participants were informed that the study was taking place 
later that evening. The study took place in the dining hall of the field centre with participants 
spaced widely apart. They were informed that participation was entirely voluntary and were 
told that they had the potential to earn up to £40 by taking part. Once all participants were 
seated, the instruction sheet was handed out. This sheet explained the various roles and how 
payment would be generated (see 7.7.4 Matching & Payment Procedure). Instructions were 
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read out verbatim, and participants were instructed to raise their hand if they were unclear 
about any details.  
Participants were then informed that their decisions would not be anonymous. Participants 
were told that when they received payment, they would be told how many points they 
received from a named Proposer and how many deduction points they were awarded by a 
named Third Party. Furthermore, the information would be displayed on a classroom white-
board. The instructions stressed that the “DECISIONS ON THE SCORE CARDS ARE 
NOT ANONYMOUS” [Emphasis and capitalisation as in instructions].  
Unlike Study 9, punishment was always effective; i.e one point assigned by a Third Party 
removed three of a Proposer’s points (1:3 ratio). The Receiver had no active role in the game 
but participants were made aware that part of their payoff for the experiment would depend 
on what others had sent to them. Thus, the number of points (and therefore, money) 
participants earned depended on a) their proposal decision, b) points they received from a 
Proposer, c) their behaviour AS the Third Party, and d) the punishment received FROM a 
Third Party. 
At this point the Proposer decision card was handed out. As Study 9 found no presentation 
order effects, all participants made their Proposer decision first, and once all participants had 
made their allocation decision this card was collected by the experimenters and the Third 
Party decision card was handed out.  The Proposer card asked participants to indicate “How 
many points did they wish to send to the Receiver” and The Third Party card asked 
participants to indicate “The amount of points I would assign to the Proposer in response to 
their possible behaviour” with boxes available for each possible offer the Proposer could 
make (0-15). The experimental session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
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7.7.4 Matching & Payment Procedure 
After the experiment, participants were randomly matched into triads (containing a Proposer, 
a Third Party, and a Receiver). Twenty-one triads were generated as each participant was 
assigned once in each role and acted in each role in a different triad. Based on the cooperative 
and punishment decisions made in each triad, a point total was generated for each participant. 
Half of the participants were randomly selected to receive payment and their points were 
converted at a ratio of 5:1 (5 points = £1 pound sterling). Two participants were randomly 
selected to receive payment on a 1:1 ratio of points to £. Payment was made privately to those 
selected the following day and those selected to receive their payment at a ratio of 5:1 earned 
a mean amount of £5.78. Participants selected to receive payment at a ratio of 1:1 earned a 
mean amount of £22.25. 
7.7.5 Generating the social network 
In the same session, and prior to taking part in the TPPG, participants were asked to complete 
the social network questionnaire. As with the TPPG, instructions on the sheet were also read 
out verbatim, and participants were instructed to raise their hand if they were unclear about 
any details. The questionnaire asked participants to indicate who they believed to be the most 
influential individuals on the field course, who they socialised with on the field course, who 
(of those attending the course) they socialised with at home (i.e., in Exeter), and who they 
thought of as close friends. There was no limit on the number of individuals participants 
could identify for each question. The individual network questions, “Close Friends”, “Most 
Influence”, “Socialise at Home”, “Socialise on Trip”, correlated on a scale with high 
reliability (α=0.70), therefore the additional measure “Total Network” was created by 
summing the ties indicated by participants in the network questions. This was a weighted 
network, i.e. it represented the overall strength of associations within the group, rather than 
just their presence or absence. For the full questionnaire, see Appendix E. 
 Dominance and the behaviour 2: naturally occurring dominance 
 
276 
 
7.7.6 Statistical analysis  
The software package UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) was used to generate the network 
variables. As social network data violate assumptions of independence (Lusher et al., 2010), 
it was not possible to use standard software such as SPSS for the analysis. Therefore 
UCINET was also used for the analysis of the effects of the network variables, as it takes into 
account the non-independence of the network data when conducting statistical tests. 
7.8 Results 
While all 32 participants took part in the TPPG, data from three participants were removed 
from the analyses as their responses indicated they either did not understand the instructions 
or were filling out the 15 strategy decisions at random, for example using a pattern (2,0,2,0 
etc) or with extreme variation (1,0,0,8,0,10,2 etc). 
7.8.1 Cooperation and social position 
The mean allocation made by participants in the proposer role was 9.6 points (SD=4.7). Only 
one participant sent an offer of zero. A series of simple linear regressions were carried out on 
the data; no network variable predicted a significant amount of the variance in proposer 
behaviour. 
7.8.2 Punishment and social position 
Eleven of the 29 participants did not engage in any punishment, and the mean amount spent 
on punishment by those who did engage in any punishment was 2.3 points (SD=1.2). To 
investigate whether a participant’s social network position explained any of the variance in 
punishment behaviour, the average points assigned as punishment across the punishment 
decisions was calculated. The gradients of the regression lines relating to punishment 
responses to each potential offer were also calculated, where a large negative number would 
indicate participants punished unfair offers far more severely than fairer offers.   
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A series of simple linear regressions were carried out with the average overall punishment as 
the outcome variable; no network variable predicted a significant amount of the variance in 
average spending on punishment. A further series of simple linear regressions were carried 
out with the slope data as the outcome variable; again no network variable predicted a 
significant amount of the variance in sensitivity to unfairness.  
As over a third of participants chose not to punish, punishment was also coded for whether it 
occurred at all. A series of binary logistic regressions were carried out within SPSS 20 found 
that network position did not predict whether participants would spend any points at all on 
punishment. It was not possible to conduct this analysis within UCINet, however given the 
nature of network data (see 7.7.6), analysis within SPSS can be considered less conservative. 
Thus the lack of significant findings can be seen as evidence that the decision to punish or not 
was not affected by group position. 
7.9 Discussion 
The current study investigated whether adding the possibility of reputational gain to a Third 
Party Punishment Game would magnify the differences found in Study 9 between higher and 
lower status members of a social group. This proved not to be the case, as the results showed 
no effect of network status on either cooperative or punishment behaviour. 
7.9.1 Cooperation and social status 
Study 9 found a strong association between selfish behaviour and a dominant position within 
the group, with more dominant individuals contributing less overall and being less sensitive 
to the threat of effective punishment. It was suggested that this was the result of a) higher 
status individuals behaving in a way implicitly biased by their status (Piff et al., 2012; Sell, 
Tooby, et al., 2009) and, b) specifically because they were less sensitive to the risk of 
behaving unfairly than lower status individuals (Watkins & Jones, 2012). There is good 
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reason for this trend, as high status individuals are less likely to face punishment for their 
behaviour (Petersen et al., 2012; see also, the world - the banking sector; celebrities; and the 
millionaire’s son who killed a family of four while DUI, Walker, 2013). Accordingly, in the 
current study, we predicted that adding the threat of gaining a negative reputation would 
magnify this result. This was not the case. 
Humans care a great deal about our reputation (Felson, 1982) and are very good at tracking 
the behaviour of others (Nowak, 2008; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). This information is vital 
when making decisions regarding trust and cooperation (Duffy & Feltovich, 2002; Sylwester 
& Roberts, 2013), in fact the ability to the ability to avoid free-riders is another factor that 
can encourage cooperation (Rand et al., 2011; Santos et al., 2006). Therefore, one 
interpretation of the results is that the risk to their reputations ensured all participants acted in 
a pro-social manner, i.e. that the threat of being seen as ‘mean’ by members of the group was 
enough to prevent the selfish behaviour seen in Study 9. It should be noted, that just such a 
motivated was evident in Study 2 (Chapter 3). While differences in the mechanics of the 
games preclude a direct comparison, for illustrative purposes the mean offer in Study 9 under 
effective punishment was 57% of the total possible offer (48% under ineffective punishment), 
and in the current study the mean offer was 65%. Nevertheless, even with this increased 
‘threat’, the explanations given in Study 9 should still apply, i.e. dominant individuals should 
feel more immune from the repercussions of their actions.  
An alternative explanation is that introducing a reputation mechanism led to competitive 
altruism (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Roberts, 1998) whereby all individuals in the group 
wanted to be seen as behaving pro-socially (see also, Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). Indeed, 
while under every day circumstances only high status individuals are generally successful in 
such contests (Barclay, 2013; Bird & Smith, 2005b), here all participants had equal resources. 
Also, while generally dominant individuals find it easier to gain a reputation because they are 
 Dominance and the behaviour 2: naturally occurring dominance 
 
279 
 
under surveillance (Rege, 2008), the fact all that answers would be made public may have 
also ‘levelled the playing field’ in a similar fashion that effective punishment mechanism 
allow everyone to punish as if they were dominant. Therefore, when reputation was at stake, 
individuals behaved pro-socially to gain a positive reputation and this masked any effect of 
sensitivity to the fear of being punished may have had. 
7.9.2 Punishment and social status 
The inclusion of a reputation mechanism did not have the predicted effect on punishment. It 
was predicted that by providing the possibility for reputation/retaliation from the target of 
punishment, that only dominant individuals would punish unfairness, or punish at all. This 
was not the case. 
The literature on the effect of reputation on punishment is mixed. On the one hand, a number 
of studies have demonstrated that punishment can be evolutionarily stable if there is some 
indirect benefit from reputation (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Santos et al., 2010), and that 
individuals do punish more when under surveillance (Bering, 2008; Kurzban et al., 2007), 
although any positive gain is contingent on others believing the punishment was justified 
(Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008). However, when punishers can be identified (even simply as ‘the 
person who punished you’) they are retaliated against (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; 
Nikiforakis, 2008) and this restricts any act of punishment. Rockenbach and Milinski (2011) 
recently demonstrated that if given the choice individuals will openly display generosity but 
will pay to hide punishment, and Ostrom (1990) found that a great deal of ‘policing’ takes 
place covertly, probably because of the threat of retaliation. Therefore, because more 
dominant members of the group can be seen as being at a lower risk of retaliation, we 
expected that more dominant individuals would punish more than subordinate individuals, 
and in turn access the positive reputation from punishment. However, the current study found 
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that when it was possible to gain a reputation as a punisher, status within the group did not 
affect punishment behaviour.  
One reason might be that, regardless of status, the willingness of disinterested third parties
9
 to 
engage in punishment might be overstated. While punishment is common in the laboratory 
generally (Guala, 2012), when given the opportunity individuals will hide their punishment 
behaviour (Ostrom, 1990; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011) and in everyday life individuals are 
actually very unwilling to confront others for breaking social norms, for example in response 
to racist comments (Kawakami et al., 2009), or in reporting criminal activity (Tarling & 
Morris, 2010). In fact, when given a choice, participants would rather assist victims of 
unfairness or reward co-operators than punish unfairness (Ottone, 2008; Rand, Dreber, et al., 
2009). Therefore in the current study it may have been the case that all involved were simply 
unwilling to punish. 
Even so, given that Study 9 did find some relationship between a dominant group position 
and sensitivity to unfairness also without a direct motivation to punish, it is therefore be more 
parsimonious to suggest the inclusion of a reputation led to an overall lack of punishment 
because all participants were unwilling to be seen as punishing a group member. This does 
however raise an interesting question as to whether this unease at being seen as a punisher 
would have been overcome by more dominant individuals if a) there was a direct benefit 
from punishing within the experiment (for example through a reward round, Nelissen, 2008), 
or b) the position as identified by InDegree had additional effects on an individual’s  
endowment and payoff within the TPPG. 
                                                          
9
 The role of a motivated punisher will be discussed below in the General Discussion (6.11.1, see also 1.1 and 
the definition of ‘costly’ and third party’ punishment). 
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7.9.3 Conclusion 
The current study investigated whether a dominant position in an informal social network 
would affect cooperative and punishment behaviour when these behaviours would be visible 
to all other individuals in the group. In contrast to the relationships found in Study 9, where 
decisions were anonymous, the current study found no such connections between dominance 
and behaviour in the TPPG. This could indicate that concern about the negative reputational 
effects of costly punishment, for example retaliation from the target, occur regardless of an 
individual’s social position. Alternatively, the results might suggest that while dominant 
individuals should face less of a threat from retaliation, when there is no direct additional 
incentive to punish, even this lesser risk is too much. 
7.10 General discussion 
Using a strategy-method Third Party Punishment Game, Study 9 found some evidence that 
dominant individuals, as measured by their InDegree centrality in a closed social network, 
were more sensitive to unfair offers than subordinates. That is to say dominant individuals 
punished low offers more compared to more generous offers. In doing so, it provided some 
support for the suggestion that when in a dominant position, individuals become more 
sensitive to unfairness in the social environment. Study 10 introduced a reputation-like 
mechanism into the TPPG in which the decisions participants made would be made known to 
one another. As there are positive reputational gains to be made from engaging in 
punishment, and because a dominant position was theorized to make participants feel 
insulated from any reprisals, we expected this addition to magnify the effect seen in Study 9. 
This was not the case. These results need to be considered in the light of the other chapters. 
Chapter 3 found that punishers are seen as both likeable and dominant, Chapter 5 found that 
dominant individuals are expected to punish unfair behaviour and are expected to face less 
risk from retaliation, and Chapter 5 found that when individuals receive a benefit associated 
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with dominance they are also willing to punish more than others. Given these results, the 
question is why these effects did not emerge when actual metrics of dominance were 
measured? 
7.10.1 The selfish punisher: dominance and the motivation to punish 
Humans are angered by acts of unfairness, and anger is a strong predictor of costly 
punishment behaviour (Falk et al., 2005). It has been suggested that punishment of unfair or 
un-egalitarian behaviour is a human universal (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). An alternative 
explanation is that punishment is a spiteful behaviour from which group beneficial effects are 
a secondary outcome (Jensen, 2010): individuals are not sensitive to inequality, but to 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. when they themselves are worse off once all interactions are 
over (Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2008, 2011); and it has been suggested that such spiteful 
behaviour is beneficial in the long run if it supresses any more prosperous conspecific’s 
advantage (see also, Gavrilets, 2012; Van De Ven et al., 2010). Regardless of the motive, it is 
an inescapable fact that punishment is costly to the punisher (the threat of retaliation, Dreber 
& Rand, 2012; production costs, Egas & Riedl, 2008; the need for it to be effective, 
Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008; and the overall cost of second-order free-riding, Yamagishi, 
1988). If only by facilitating innate altruistic or spiteful motivations, a dominant position 
allows these costs to be mitigated and thus should affect punishment behaviour. This did not 
occur in the current chapter’s studies.  
Perhaps the main reason was that the studies in the current chapter offered no proximate 
motivation to punish. In Chapter 5, for example, while additional resources did lead to an 
increase in punishment, the effect was most pronounced when the punisher was in a position 
to derive continuing benefit from enforcing cooperation. This effect can also be seen when 
any benefit is dependent on winning an inter-group conflict (Abbink et al., 2010). Further 
support for this can be found in a recent model by Roberts (2013), who specifically suggested 
 Dominance and the behaviour 2: naturally occurring dominance 
 
283 
 
that as long as dominant individuals receive addition benefits from group cooperation, then 
punishment should always be in a dominant individual’s interest. Indeed, even if individuals 
are behaving spitefully alone, there should be some advantage gained from that behaviour, 
such as the ability to give oneself the best relative outcome (Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 
2011). 
According to this line of reasoning, in the absence of a specific in-game mechanic that would 
provide a benefit to the behaviour there was no motivation for dominant individuals to 
punish. In fact this is the rationale as to why economic games should provide incentive 
rewards structures for participants (Balliet et al., 2011; Levitt & List, 2007). Other studies 
have shown that game mechanisms can alter behaviour based on individual difference, for 
example dominant (Maner & Mead, 2010) and Machiavellianism (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 
2002).  Study 9 found that dominant individuals made low offers and this predicted result 
occurred because this decision had direct in-game repercussions, the game mechanism 
provided a salient threat that dominant individuals did(not) react to. While Study 10 added a 
reputation-like mechanism was an attempt to introduce a ‘threat’ from punishment, the 
reputation gained or lost from punishment did not have any direct ramifications 
experimentally, i.e. there was no additional game mechanic that depended on this 
information.  
If punishers are primarily sensitive to direct cost and rewards of their actions, this raises the 
question as to whether the reputation gained from an act of punishment is an actual 
motivating benefit from punishment. As mentioned previously, the results of anonymity 
manipulations in costly punishment studies are mixed, and Chapter 2 of this thesis found that 
in a hypothetical scenario, individuals were insensitive to the reputational benefits from 
punishment. In fact, Study 2 suggested that participants would actually refuse to punish a 
social defector lest their own actions be seen in a negative light. So, perhaps the reputational 
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benefits seen in Chapters 3 & 4 are only taken into account when they have tangible results, 
for example ensuring one is treated fairly in future encounters by the target of punishment 
(Barclay, 2006; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995), to attract a sexual partner (Farthing, 2005), 
or to directly attract new cooperative partner members (Individuals like a punishment 
environment, Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). 
7.10.2 Measuring dominance 
An alternative explanation for the lack of predicted results is that our measure was not an 
accurate measure of dominance in a group. InDegree centrality is a measure of how often an 
individual is identified by others in the group and is considered a measure of 
prestige/dominance (Scott, 2007) insomuch as it indicates that an individual is known to 
many individuals and that their behaviour is under observation (see, Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Rege, 2008). We assumed that because participants should be able to accurately assess 
their group position (Anderson et al., 2008; Anderson, Srivastava, et al., 2006; Cummins, 
1996a), that the general social feeling of popularity and social position would affect 
behaviour. However a dominant position alone may not affect behaviour; for example Maner 
and Mead (2010) found that behaviour is the result of an interaction between personality 
(specifically, those on the dominance/motivation axis) and a dominant position.  
Thus, while an individual might have been prestigious in the network, they may not 
themselves have had a ‘dominant’ personality. Equally, we did not explicitly ask participants 
to, for example, guess their position and our prediction hinges on them being aware they 
occupy a dominant position. However, it should be noted that the cooperation results from 
Study 9 do support the suggestion that the InDegree measure accurately reflected dominance, 
as the patterns of proposer behaviour were those we predicted to would be expected of 
dominant individuals. Furthermore, our own measure of dominance in Study 9 did correlate 
strongly with network position. 
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7.10.3 Future directions 
Many of the questions posed above could be addressed with one or two additional studies. 
Because Study 9 & 10 cannot be directly compared, a further study might use a between-
group design, where half of the participants face a threat to reputation, and the other half do 
not. The issue that prevented such an experiment was sample size. Study 9 & 10 took 
advantage of a closed network of participants who, as part of their formal education, would 
spend a week in close proximity to one another away from the University. As this was an 
opportunistic sample, it was not possible to recruit into the study and the field-course has 
attracted fewer students in recent years. 
We had expected that reputation would provide a good motivator for behaviour; however this 
was not the case. Therefore, a future study may wish to include additional game mechanisms, 
such as a retaliation round, which would provide direct consequences for punishment 
decisions.  This was considered, but the test environment made such an addition unfeasible. 
The lack of a computer network with which to run real-time calculations, the time it would 
have taken to run calculations by hand in real time, and the low sample size would have made 
a ‘strategy method retaliation round’ the only viable solution. To our knowledge, such a 
method has never been used before, and it would have added an extra layer of complexity to 
an already somewhat complicated set of instructions. Fundamentally, compromises had to be 
made between maximum data collection and over-exploiting the goodwill of students, who 
were sacrificing their report-writing/free time to take part. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
social relationships do affect behaviour in economic games (Haan, Kooreman, & Riemersma, 
2006), so should these limitations be overcome, investigating the effects of social position 
within a closed informal network is a clear area for future work. 
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7.10.4 General conclusion  
Dominance, in our opinion, provides two important mechanisms that might explain the 
evolution of costly punishment on an individual level. Firstly, it explains how an individual 
can punish. Without listing the literature again, dominant individuals intrinsically have, or 
can obtain more, resources (indeed, this is the definition of dominance), their social position 
or physical formidability allows them to punish effectively while expending few resources, 
and these same characteristics diminish the threat of retaliation. In addition, because 
individuals do like punishers, or more likely, like someone else punishing defectors, the 
positive associations this invites leads to more social allies and resources for the dominant 
individual.  
Secondly, dominance explains why an individual should engage in punishment. In the first 
place,, punishment of conspecifics to maintain position is part of a dominant individual’s 
behavioural repertoire across taxa (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995) and this is also very much 
present in humans (Barash & Lipton, 2011; Maner & Mead, 2010). Dominant individuals 
might be more sensitive to norm violations (Brosnan, 2011; Lammers et al., 2010), as in any 
group-living animal, violations take the form of the resources allocation ‘rules’ of a 
dominance hierarchy itself (Cummins, 2005). Also, as demonstrated by Chapter 5 (Study 8) 
individual will punish more when they benefit more from group success and thus it is in their 
best interest to punish free-riding to the extent that subordinates can simply free-ride on a 
dominant individuals punishment behaviour (Roberts, 2013).  
What the current chapter suggests however is that while dominance might explain both the 
how and why individuals engage in punishment, the latter may be more important than the 
former. Thus, costly punishment it is not so much a case of “with great power comes great 
responsibility” as “to the victor, the spoils”. 
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8 General Discussion 
8.1 Research question  
The thesis aimed to investigate an alternative explanation for the evolution of costly 
punishment; that punishment and its associated emotions have an evolutionary origin in 
dominance and status contests. The studies of this thesis support this claim: Chapter 3 
demonstrated that when asked to engage in punishment, the decisions made by participants 
were affected by the possibility of acquiring a ‘dominant’ reputation, and that dominance as 
an individual-difference was a strong predictor of punishing; Chapter 4 showed that when 
observing costly punishment, participants perceived punishment to be a dominant behaviour; 
Chapter 5 found that when predicting the outcomes of punishment scenarios, participants 
consistently made decisions based around the dominance of those involved; and Chapter 6 
found that, when placed in a position simulating dominance, participants were more likely to 
engage in punishment. Finally, Chapter 7 found some evidence that being central in a group 
affected sensitivity to unfairness. 
The findings of the thesis suggests that a dominant position and the social ‘rules’ of 
behaviour that govern dyadic dominance relationships and wider hierarchies (see Cummins, 
1996a) played a role in the evolution of costly punishment and the concepts of fairness that 
spark its occurrence. However, it will be important to analyse how strong a role this was. 
Dominance must a) be shown to offer a coherent explanation for costly punishment 
behaviour and b) it must also be evident that dominance is directly related to punishment 
decision-making, as opposed to simply allowing its occurrence. 
8.1.1 Dominance and proximate punishment behaviour   
The studies in the thesis show that the inherent advantages of a high dominance rank have a 
strong proximate impact on punishment. Chapter 2 posited that a dominant position could 
 General Discussion 
 
288 
 
reduce the cost of punishment to an individual, and as a result dominant individuals should 
punish more. This was found to be the case.  In Studies  7 & 8 (Chapter 6), when given one 
advantage of a dominant position, more resources, ‘dominant’ participants punished more 
severely and more frequently than those not in a dominant position. Furthermore, when this 
dominant position was stable and as a result the benefits from group cooperation were 
predictable, participants in this position punished even more frequently and severely. Equally, 
when participants were asked to consider the status of characters in a punishment scenario in 
Studies 5 & 6 (Chapter 5), not only were dominants expected to be more successful than 
subordinates, but the latter were expected to face more retaliation than the former. Perhaps 
because of this, and contrary to some research (Bering, 2008) but supported by others 
(Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011), Studies 1 & 2 (Chapter 3) showed that participants were less 
willing to punish when there was an audience and groups were stable.  
Such a result may seem to contradict the results of 7 & 8 (Chapter 6), but the difference 
actually further supports the role of dominance in the proximate decision to punish. In the 
studies reported in Chapter 6, the mechanics of the games gave participants an incentive to 
punish and removed the possibility of retaliation, both advantages of a dominant position. As 
a result participants in this position punished more because the benefits were higher and the 
costs were lower for them respectively. However the studies in Chapter 3 asked participants 
to imagine themselves in a ‘real-life’ scenario’ and retaliation is a social reality (see also 
Chapter 5, and see Barash & Lipton, 2011). This was factored into the cost and resulted in an 
unwillingness to punish when participants would ‘meet’ the target of punishment again. 
While the studies in Chapter 3 & 6 used two different methods, the results are comparable to 
economic games where retaliation is and is not possible (Nikiforakis, 2008). 
The fact that punishment decision-making is affected by costs directly associated with 
dominance (see Chapter 1 and 2) has ramifications for any benefits the behaviour may 
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generate, through for example, reputation and signalling. Study 2 (Chapter 3) and 4 (Chapter 
4) showed that participants only responded to an individual if that person actually engaged in 
punishment; in Study 4 the attempt at punishment was seen as sufficient for the signal to be 
honest, and in Study 2 participants only responded positively to a person who actually 
punished, regardless of any ‘cheap signal’ of a desire to punish (see Boyd et al., 2010). 
Indeed,  Chapter 4 showed that participants treated costly punishment as a unique form of 
aggression in the sense that punishers were both well liked and thought of as dominant  
(Study 3). Study 4 showed, in terms of dominance at least, the greater the (potential) cost of 
punishment, the stronger the signal (see,  Nelissen, 2008); punishers were seen as more 
dominant when the target of punishment was unknown to the punisher and thus posed a 
potentially greater threat. 
Nevertheless, while punishment may be a costly signal, Chapter 5 demonstrated that any 
indirect benefits from such a signal were mediated by dominance. While Study 5 found that 
only dominant individuals were seen as being able to punish successfully, Study 6 showed 
that participants perceived that potential punishers would either punish successfully or would 
not try. Not only were subordinates not expected to attempt punishment at all, but any 
reputational benefits from punishment were shown to be mediated by its success. Thus 
whether there are indirect benefits from costly punishment are generated from signalling, as 
proposed by Gintis et al. (2001) and Nelissen (2008) or from indirect reciprocity and 
reputation in general, as proposed by Barclay (2006) and  Panchanathan and Boyd (2004), 
these benefits are only available to dominant individuals. 
The proximate effects of dominance also have ramifications for Spite (Leibbrandt & López-
Pérez, 2011) and Strong Reciprocity (Gintis, 2000) theories of punishment. A Spite theory 
suggests that the motivation for costly punishment is to reduce the relative fitness of others in 
the environment, and even if this is the case, the results of the studies in Chapters 5 show 
 General Discussion 
 
290 
 
participants believe only dominant individuals would actually engage in punishment. Equally, 
as shown by the studies in Chapter 6, individuals might have been spiteful insomuch as their 
punishment harmed others at a cost to themselves, but only participants with additional 
resources behaved in such a way. Alternatively, even if humans really have a group-selected 
other-regarding preference for the well-being of others (Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000), the studies in Chapter 3 showed that when asked to imagine 
a ‘real world’ scenario individuals are actually very unwilling to punish unfairness (for a 
economic example, see Pedersen et al., 2013), Chapter 5 showed that only dominants are 
predicted to intervene at all, and Chapter 6 showed intervention only happens when the net 
cost is low and punishment is selfishly beneficial. In fact, one reason only marginal effects of 
dominance were found in Chapter 7 is because there was no direct selfish incentive to punish 
unfairness.   
In sum, a great deal of previous experimental evidence shows that punishment is affected by 
the proximate costs and benefits of the behaviour (see Chapter 1), and a number of models 
have suggested that heterogeneity in the cost of punishment is vital to its evolutionary 
stability (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Frank, 1996). The interpretation of the past research 
literature offered in Chapter 2 and, more importantly, the results of the current studies 
demonstrate that dominance presents a coherent and logical explanation for proximate 
variation in punishment behaviour. At the very least, when future research attempts to 
investigate punishment, dominance much be considered as an individual difference that has 
important ramifications for behaviour.   
8.1.2 Dominance and the origins of costly punishment  
The previous paragraph suggests that dominance is an important determinant of punishment 
behaviour, but the interpretation it offers can be taken as somewhat narrow and static, as the 
very fact that participants were making judgements about status, retaliation, future 
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interactions etc. suggests  that dominance and status retaliations are part of the social 
reasoning surrounding punishment. Indeed, dominance and status play an important role in 
general social interactions, for example mate choice and competition, (Buss, 1989; 
Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013) or when following suggestions and/or advice (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001; Nelissen & Meijers, 2011). Therefore it is important to understand how this 
state of affairs has come about. 
This thesis does not just suggest that dominance affects  punishment by lowering the costs, 
but that the behaviour  has an evolutionary origin in dominance and in the cognition require 
to navigate social relationships and dominance hierarchies (Byrne & Whiten, 1997; 
Cummins, 1996a, 2005; Erdal & Whiten, 1994). If this is true, there should be evidence that 
punishment behaviour by participants and the judgements of punishers by participants were 
explicitly affected by dominance and status, i.e. the pattern of results should indicate 
participants that were reasoning about dominance as opposed to, for example, just the 
proximate outcomes. The studies do show such patterns. 
Firstly, the results suggest that punishment is itself a signal of dominance. The studies in 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that punishers are seen as dominant and, interestingly Study 4 
showed that, while ratings of dominance were not affected by the success of punishment, the 
rank of the punishing group member was, i.e. participants were reasoning about the 
dominance relationships of the group based on the outcome of punishment.  That punishment 
might be a signal of dominance was also suggested by the finding in Study 4 as  ‘likability’ 
was not affected by the level of risk to the punisher, whereas dominance was. This would not 
be the case if it was an independent signal of pro-sociality alone, as likeability should have 
also increased with risk if this was the case. While there are advantages to associating with 
dominant individuals (Fessler et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 2011), there are also negative 
consequences in terms of consistent asymmetries in resource allocation and reciprocity 
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(Schino & Aureli, 2009; Sell, Tooby, et al., 2009). Thus, while costly punishment should 
generate positive regard as such behaviour does deter free-riding, its dominance origins make 
it a double-edged sword, and participant responses indicated this was part of their 
reasoning.After all, while it is beneficial to all that free-riders are removed, the more accurate 
version of the popular maxim is “the enemy of my enemy could still be my enemy”.   
Secondly, Chapter 5 found that dominants were predicted to be successful if they did attempt 
to punish, but also that participants expected dominants to punish: participants were not 
surprised that a dominant group member attempted to punish unfairness, whereas they were 
very surprised to read of a subordinate attempting to punish. Study 8 in Chapter 6 also 
showed that there are expectations of dominant individuals: it was found that the strategic use 
of costly punishment by dominant individuals was affected by reasoning about dominance 
relationships and resource monopolisation. While participants with additional resources did 
punish more in general, this effect was most apparent when groups were stable and when 
punishers overtly benefited at the expense of the group. Revolutionary coalitions are a 
constant threat to dominants in primate societies (Bissonnette et al., 2014) and it has been 
suggested that dominants need to balance their own monopolisation of resources with pros-
sociality in order to prevent this  (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Powers & Lehmann, 2014; 
Vehrencamp, 1983). In Study 8 therefore, the study mechanism interacted with the 
dominance-based reasoning of costly punishment to produce the result: though participants 
did not face the threat of a revolutionary coalition, they behaved as if this was possible, but 
only when it was made clear they were benefiting at the expense of others (i.e. the monopoly 
condition). This may be why there was only a marginal effect of dominance seen in Chapter 
7: although dominant individuals could have punished in Studies 9 & 10, there was no direct 
motivation to. 
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The fact that dominants are willing to punish ‘in the public good’ has ramifications for the 
evolution of leadership. It is useful for groups to have leaders: not only are they effective at 
coordinating cooperative behaviour (Gillet et al., 2010), but coordinated punishment 
(Schoenmakers et al., 2014; Traulsen et al., 2012), or punishment by a signal punisher 
(O'Gorman et al., 2009), can drastically reduce the waste caused by costly punishment. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that coordinated punishment can support its evolution (Boyd et 
al., 2010), Study 2 found that participants did not respond to a ‘cheap’ signal of a willingness 
to punish. Because dominants have a freedom of action (Van Vugt, 2006), the ability to force 
coordination (King et al., 2009), and a vested interest in maintaining cooperation (Chapter 6, 
see also, Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014), dominants might have been the force behind the 
initial coordination of punishment. Indeed, as reported by Guala (2012), in non-state 
societies, punishment when it does occur is highly coordinated, and dominant individuals do 
have a greater voice in decision making (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) and can act as 
mediators in conflicts (Diamond, 2012, Chapter 2).  
Furthermore, and in support of the above suggestion that dominants are expected to punish, 
the studies in Chapters 4 & 5 showed that punishment is seen a dominance contest. 
Specifically, not punishing was seen as subordinate act; characters that were seen as not 
punishing because the scenario description stated they did not punish, or because participants 
believed they would not, were seen as subordinate. This further supports the suggestion made 
in Chapter 2 and throughout the thesis, that punishment is not just made possible by 
dominance; the behaviour itself is a dominant behaviour. Indeed, this can be seen in everyday 
life. As a recent international example, while the decision of the UK government not to 
intervene in Syria may have been rationally correct, the initial reaction in some circles (as 
summarised by Anne Perkins of the Guardian, 2014), was that the lack of intervention was 
seen as an act of weakness by the UK. The fact that a failure to punish unfairness in an 
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unrelated conflict makes one seem ‘weak’ adds further support to the suggestion that 
punishment is not just something dominants can do, but something they are required to do, or 
to mis-quote Silk (2003), to remain dominant an individual should “practise random acts of 
costly punishment and senseless acts of third party intervention”. 
Finally, Study 6, where the rank of both punisher and the aggressor were manipulated, 
showed that participants believed the most retaliation would take place when individuals 
were of similar rank, as would be expected in a dominance hierarchy (Wilson, 1980, Chapter 
13). This was especially interesting as subordinates who punished a dominant were seen as 
being at less risk of retaliation than those involved in a subordinate/subordinate conflict, and 
supports the assertion made above that costly punishment behaviour may have evolved to 
appear to be in the public good to avoid revolutionary coalitions, and that dominants are 
sometimes expected to behave leniently with subordinates (see, Fiddick & Cummins, 2007). 
Fundamentally, the results of the empirical and theoretical parts of this thesis suggest that the 
instigation of an act of punishment by punishers and it interpretation by observers occur 
through the prism of dominance and status contests. 
8.2 Practical implications: costly punishment, dominance and leadership 
The hypothesis that that costly punishment has an evolutionary origin in dominance and 
status potentially has practical implications for every day society, specifically in leadership 
and defence of the common good. As discussed in greater detail in 6.11.3, as in the course of 
human evolution our greater social cognition allowed more coalitional conflicts, it became 
possible for subordinates to stop others becoming too dominant (Boehm, 1997; Gavrilets, 
2012; Gavrilets et al., 2008). It has been argued throughout this thesis that costly punishment 
might be the price of a dominant/leadership position; we will allow an individual priority 
access to resources as long as they appear to act in a pro-social fashion. The appearance of 
such a noblesse oblige has been shown theoretically (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Roberts, 
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2013) and experimentally (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007), and indeed it was demonstrated in 
Study 8 where dominants behaved in a pro-social fashion when it was made clear their 
priority of access to resources was at the expense of others. 
Unlike a Strong Reciprocity theory of punishment, which suggests that evolutionary 
pressures resulted in a change from the steep and tyrannical social structures of group-living 
primates to an other-regarding and egalitarian mind-set, a dominance-based approach to 
fairness suggests our apparent other-regarding behaviour is conditional on the suppressive 
power of conspecifics. Indeed, this suggestion is supported by the lurch towards despotism 
that occurred following the advent of agriculture (Betzig, 2014; Turchin et al., 2013): once 
our species was free from the constraints of an immediate return economy, allowing the 
monopolisation of long-term resources (Charlton, 1997), dominants no longer needed to act 
in quite such a pro-social fashion. 
Such an effect was reflected in the results of Study 8. Dominants behaved in a pro-social 
fashion only when it was made clear their priority of access to resources was at the expense 
of others. As discussed in more depth in 6.11.3, and in 8.2.2 this framing likely activated 
psychological mechanisms evolved both to gain the maximum from group cooperation and to 
avoid triggering revolutionary coalitions. However, if such pro-social behaviour is contingent 
on possible threats and benefits from the group, we can ask how individuals in a dominant 
position will behave when their private success is no longer directly linked to the public 
good. This has important real world ramifications for issues from banking reform to habitat 
destruction and climate change, as without either adequate reward or coercive threat, we 
cannot expect dominant individual or coalitions/organisations to simply act in the name of the 
common good. While those of us at the bottom of the social hierarchy may implicitly expect 
dominants to altruistically punish (Chapter 5), we may find that, as with Chapter 10, those 
who could punish in the name of the public good simply don’t. 
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Furthermore, by establishing the role that dominance plays in costly punishment, the specific 
advantages of a dominant position can be extrapolated to encourage more defence of the 
public good. For example, not recognising that punishment needs to be sufficiently costly to 
the target led an increase, rather than the expected decrease, in short-term child abandonment 
in an Israeli day-care centre (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a). More seriously, if individuals feel 
they are unable to punish effectively, other public good activities such as whistleblowing may 
simply not occur. Thisincludes behaviour by individuals, corporations and governments. It is 
not simply an attitude of ‘why bother?’ but potentially of the implicit sense of subordination 
that an inability to punish effectively represents, and thus an acceptance of ‘unfairness’.  
Equally, the case of Simon Singh mentioned in Chapter 2 highlights how public good can be 
derailed by the threat of retaliation. This is not an isolated case; science writer Ben Goldacre  
was sued for writing about AIDS denialism (See Chapter 10, Goldacre, 2010), and recently a 
friend of the author faced similar retaliation for his own science-based critique of the same 
movement (Myles Power, personal communication, and see Doctorow, 2014). Thus, one 
direct outcome would be to ensure anyone acting in the public good is protected as much as 
possible from retaliation by their target. 
8.3 Future directions 
The studies in this thesis have established that dominance plays an important role in 
proximate punishment behaviour. Moreover, they have shown that dominance makes an 
important contribution to explaining the evolutionary origins of costly punishment. However 
this is not to say that a dominance-theory of punishment is completely established, or that all 
possible aspects of dominance and status have been tested. Nevertheless, with dominance 
established as a valid testable hypothesis for the evolution and occurrence of costly 
punishment, there are a great number of avenues open for future research. The next section 
will detail a few of these possible avenues. 
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8.3.1 Dominance, punishment and retaliation 
Perhaps the most pressing area to research would be the use of retaliation to an act of costly 
punishment. Retaliation has been mentioned often during this thesis, but it was only tested 
directly by Studies 5 & 6, and tangentially by Study 10. This was a conscious decision, as 
retaliation is a down-steam effect of punishment, and it was important to establish dominance 
as a credible explanation before more elaborate work was undertaken. With the role of 
dominance established, there are a number of retaliation-based studies that could be 
undertaken specifically from a perspective of dominance.  
One possible future study would be to simulate the suggested effect of a dominant position, 
of allowing an individual to mitigate or avoid retaliation themselves, while being very able to 
dispense it. For example, one (identifiable) individual could be given a monopoly on 
retaliation in the same way one individual was given a monopoly on punishment in Studies 7 
& 8; or following the punishment mechanism employed by Nikiforakis et al. (2009), only one 
individual would be able to retaliate effectively.  One would expect that ‘subordinate’ 
participants would not punish the only, or only effective, retaliator, whereas the ‘dominant’ 
participant would be very willing to punish non-cooperation and, perhaps, even second-order 
free-riding.  Interestingly, this might help further ascertain the motive of punishment, for 
example in relation to spite: an individual who cannot be retaliated against, but can retaliate, 
may use this ability to simply lower the resources of others.  
Additionally, the disproportionate benefits mechanism from Study 8 could be added to such 
an experimental series. The results could be fascinating: would the ability to retaliate reduce 
the contributions by the dominant individual overall, or would it interact with benefit from 
group success as it did with Study 8? Equally, as suggested by a model by Roberts (2013), 
would a producer-scrounger pattern emerge, whereby others relied on the dominant to 
punish? Furthermore, would the noblesse oblige extend to not punishing second-order free-
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riding, or would the additional resources make second-order punishing both economical and 
practical? In fact, if spiteful behaviour was found without disproportionate benefit, would 
such a benefit increase encourage ‘pro-social’ behaviour as it did in Study 8? 
Such an experimental series could help explain how humans transitioned to a pool-
punishment (Traulsen et al., 2012) and institutionalised system of laws: it is in the interest of 
dominants to ‘encourage’ everyone to defend the public good, and especially so if dominants 
have the monopoly on retaliatory aggression. We know for instance that individuals will 
punish more in the presence of a motivated third party (Kim et al., 1998), and the consistency 
of law and order in a society has been linked to punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008). Thus, on 
the one hand, the selfish punishment motivations of dominants might subsequently allow to 
others to voluntarily punish as in the model by Boyd et al. (2010), and on the other it might 
be in the best interests of dominant to coerce other to punish in the public good. The private 
interest of dominants in maintaining group cooperation could be the genesis of the Hobbsian 
Leviathan. 
8.3.2 Punishment and usefulness: a test of prestige 
Dominance also covers individuals who are prestigious, and focusing on simulating the 
specific usefulness of an individual would open up a new way of investigating the role of 
dominance in costly punishment. Indeed, one of the criticisms that can be made of 
experiments that use dynamic group sorting (for example, Rand et al., 2011; Wang et al., 
2012) is that the costs are minimal and uniform, whereas dominant/prestigious individuals 
would likely find the process generally much cheaper. Masclet (2003), for example, used an 
ostracism mechanism as punishment, and the negative impact of ostracising a ‘useful’ 
individual could be implemented easily within such an experimental design by varying the 
within-subject costs for such ostracism; will only ‘cheap-to-remove’ (i.e. low social value) 
free riders be ostracised? Alternatively, in order to simulate the greater outside options and 
 General Discussion 
 
299 
 
lower search costs of dominants, some individuals might be given the ability to 
ostracise/sever ties more cheaply than others. While similar to effective punishment in 
principle, the ostracism mechanism is actually removing someone from a group, rather than 
removing resources; dominants can (potentially) afford to lose allies more than subordinates.  
Though in principle the costs in economic games and models can represent non-physical as 
well as physical costs, they rely on the infliction of direct costs on a target. The effect of 
prestige/dominance could be tested less abstractly by including mechanisms in which certain 
participants were actually useful to others. For example, an experiment could include a 
mixture of public good contribution dilemmas and puzzle rounds similar to the tasks used by 
Maner and Mead (2010), where some participants are known to have more clues to help solve 
a group problem. One would expect that participants would be very reluctant to ostracise 
individuals who possessed such additional knowledge for free-riding, even if it were 
cheap/free to do (Bowles & Gintis, 2004). Additionally, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) 
suggested that prestigious individuals face certain obligations; thus an extension to the 
previous experiment might be to add multiple ‘prestigious’ individuals to groups, only one of 
whom is needed for the ‘puzzle’ task. We might expect prestigious individuals to suddenly 
begin to behave much more cooperatively and punish free-riding more, compared both to 
other non-prestigious participants, and to prestigious individuals who do not face 
competition.  
8.3.3 Dominance, punishment and ally retention 
Gürerk et al. (2006) demonstrated that individuals prefer an environment where punishment 
is possible, and from that it was suggested that individuals prefer an environment where 
someone would punish. One of the arguments made for the indirect benefits of punishment 
throughout the thesis has been that it aids in the recruitment and retention of social allies. 
This too is eminently testable. A simple experiment would be to run a standard public goods 
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game with punishment, followed by a self-assorting by participants in future rounds after 
being provided with information about cooperative and punishment behaviour.  
An initial experiment would keep participants in the dark about the self-assorting to prevent 
any effect of competitive altruism (see Roberts, 1998), but such competition could be 
introduced in further iterations of the experiment, as could several rounds of group self-
assorting. A further extension would be to give the post-self-assorting public goods game a 
single-punisher mechanism, therefore making the choice of the ‘right’ dominant individual, 
based on their reputation, more important: individuals would be expected to choose a 
dominant with a reputation for fairness and defending the public good. Different levels of 
disproportional benefits for dominant could be added as a follow up and we might expect, as 
shown in a model by Powers and Lehmann (2014), to find a threshold at which individuals 
will no longer tolerate the (excessive) private sequestering of resources in return for 
protection. Finally, the last suggestion could be further extended by including either direct 
inter-group competition or a ‘risky’ environment where group extinction is possible; this 
would potentially test the limits of exchanging equality for security. 
8.3.4 Punishment and social network position 
Separately, a future study could also carry out a more in-depth investigation into the effect of 
social network position on punishment behaviour. One approach would be to extend the work 
carried out in Study 9 & 10 and apply the method to a larger organisation. In fact, many 
unsuccessful attempts were made to recruit the local orchestra of around 100 members, as 
this would have provided a large network with overlapping  informal (based on friendship 
etc) and semi-formal (based on skill, instrument etc) hierarchies. At the very least such a 
large network would provide a great deal more data to compare to punishment decisions in a 
punishment game similar to those run in Studies 9 & 10. Such an organisation would also 
provide a sufficient sample size allow experimental manipulation, for example the possibility 
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of reputational gain, or whether the proposer or receiver in the game was a close friend of the 
third party: one can envisage individuals playing repeated third party games where players 
are either anonymous, only known to the third party, or all are aware who is playing the game 
with them. 
Additionally, Fessler and Holbrook (2013) found that the presence of friends reduced the 
threats posed by potential aggressors, and I have suggested that social allies are another cost-
lowering advantage of a dominant position. Thus  individuals of different social distance to 
one another could be invited to the lab for other reasons, and at the time asked to fill out 
questionnaires similar to those of Fessler and Holbrook (2013). Alternatively, and in 
traditional social psychological fashion, participants might face a confederate behaving in an 
anti-social manner (for example, Kawakami et al., 2009). One may expect that individuals 
surrounded by close social allies will punish more than those surrounded by more distant 
associates, although additional factors such as the participants’ overall dominance would also 
likely affect any decision. 
8.3.5 Perceptions and expectations of dominance and punishment 
As noted by a number of researchers (for example Guala, 2012; Levitt & List, 2007), one of 
the challenges of an experimental economics approach is extrapolating ‘real-life’ behaviour 
from such an artificial environment. This is especially true for dominance, as while we can 
simulate a dominant position, developing an experiment that accounts for the social dynamics 
of everyday life would be difficult; indeed, one reason half the studies in this thesis used an 
experimental survey method was to avoid this problem; in comparison, explaining social 
position was simple and effective. As argued in Chapter 3, describing a social situation brings 
in many implicit assumptions and understandings that would be hard to evoke in an 
experimental environment. Therefore future studies could also make further use of this 
method. 
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Importantly, the survey method could be used to probe more deeply the general social 
cognition surrounding punishment behaviour in a social hierarchy. The ‘bar room’ scenarios 
as described in Chapters 4 & 5 could be expanded into more subtle situations and 
interventions. For example, would the most senior or popular member of a social group or, 
say, a group of students in a psychology department, be expected by participants to intervene 
in ‘unfair’ disputes between members or to stop (non-criminal) anti-social behaviour? 
Conversely, scenarios could be constructed where such individuals fail or refuse to intervene, 
with participant judgements of a) the status of dominant following this lack of action and b) 
how much they deserve their position being recorded. This could be seen in concert with the 
suggestions put forward in 8.6.2 and 8.6.3 in regards to the ‘usefulness’ of dominants and 
how, as suggested throughout this thesis, costly punishment might be both a signal and a 
justification of a dominant (and leadership) position. 
8.3.6 Punishment and dominance in a virtual environment 
Although useful, it would be unethical to run large naturalistic punishment studies on 
unsuspecting groups, for example in the vein of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif 
(1961)’s seminal Robbers Cave experiment. However, with modern computing other 
alternatives are potentially available. This thesis started with a description of a social 
defection in an early online environment, and the descendants of such games could provide 
an interesting study area. One such game, EVE online (CCP, 2003) has gained quite a 
reputation as it is completely player-led; outside an initial starting area there are no rules or 
regulations apart from those generated by the players. Indeed, EVE regularly makes headlines 
in the technology world due to Machiavellian manoeuvrings of players and their alliances. 
Importantly, there are real costs to such behaviour. Such costs are not only measured in time; 
although some items take months to build (LaLone, 2013), a recent conflict resulted in the 
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loss of in-games goods valued at $200,000 and represented the coordinated efforts of over 
2,000 unrelated individuals (Chalk, 2014; Purchese, 2014).  
While not a ‘real’ environment, simulated environments are becoming more viable as a 
research medium and are showing interesting results; for example Patil et al. (2014) recently 
demonstrated that participants make very different decisions in the classic ‘trolley’ moral 
dilemma when viewing a real-time virtual simulation on a computer than when reading the 
scenario on paper. And what are economic games but a simulated environment? Thus, an 
environment like EVE or another Massive Multiplayer Online (MMO) game, where 
coalitions are vital to success, betrayal and losses are meaningful and, importantly, where 
there is no central authority, would be fascinating for investigating hypotheses about 
dominance and costly punishment. While it is doubtful actual experiments could be run in 
such an environment, a great deal of qualitative data could be gathered about how individuals 
self-organise, make social decisions and enforce group-norms and group-beneficial 
behaviours. With such data, or even with historic date (if it exists), it would be easy to test 
hypotheses about the how the presence of punishers, dominants and leaders, and general 
social network strength, affect group survival.  
I will stop here, but the possibilities for further investigating the role of dominance in the 
evolution are wide and varied. As mentioned above there are many facets that could be 
tested; the effect of dominance on retaliation, the market value of a dominant individual 
within a group and their ability to attract social partners, as well as the effect of ‘every day’ 
informal social hierarchies on behaviour. This includes more general research into how 
naturalistic or manipulated dominance affects the appraisal of social situations. The latter 
especially could result in interdisciplinary research between the evolutionary psychological 
perspective and general social psychology, which has its own theories about dominance, 
status and social behaviour.  
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Finally, the results of this thesis make an important general point about the validity of both 
theoretical models and practical economic experiments. As argued in Chapter 2 and through 
the empirical chapters, the characteristics of a dominant position correspond to many of the 
factors that have been experimentally and theoretically shown to affect the occurrence and 
evolution of punishment: thus, when any future studies identify values and mechanisms that 
seem to allow costly punishment or other cooperative behaviour to occur or evolve, the 
strongest effort should be made to establish how these would be represented in everyday life.  
8.4 Shadow of the Leviathan: dominance and the evolution of costly punishment 
The thesis has presented both theoretical and experimental evidence that dominance has 
played a key role in the evolution of costly punishment. Firstly, dominants are the only 
individuals that can take part in confrontational behaviour, pro-social or otherwise, because 
they have the physical or social strength to mitigate many of its costs (Chapter 5, and 
Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995). Secondly, because of the priority of access to resources 
dominants enjoy, it is in their best interest to impose distribution ‘rules’ on conspecifics and 
maintain a dominant position (Chapter 5 and 6, and Cummins, 1996a). Thirdly, as human 
social cognition increased and conflicts relied more on coalitions and alliances (Gavrilets et 
al., 2008; Pietraszewski et al., 2014), ideas of ‘fairness’ were extended to associates 
(Brosnan, 2011), to help support and recruit social allies (Chapter 3 & 4). Finally, because of 
the threat of revolutionary collations (which have a long evolutionary history, Bissonnette et 
al., 2014), it is in dominant’s best interest to engage in ‘altruistic’ punishment as a 
justification for their monopolisation of resources (Chapter 6, and Gavrilets & Fortunato, 
2014).  
Thus, the hypothesis put forward here is that costly punishment is fundamentally a tool used 
by dominants to maintain their social position, whether by preventing the rise of a social 
challenger, or by behaving in a manner that would help recruit and maintain social allies as 
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they provide protection from harm. However this protection is in exchange for acceptance of 
a dominants priority of access to resources. While changes in the ecology of early human 
societies, still present in non-state societies today, may have suppressed overt dominant 
behaviour, the theoretical and experimental evidence presented here suggests that dominance 
is still very much a part of costly punishment. The costly punishment of anti-social behaviour 
is a strong force for encouraging cooperation and other pro-social behaviour and this has led 
many to suggest we do have a fundamental other-regarding preference, but this thesis argues 
that in fact it is fundamentally grounded in self-serving, dominance-based, instincts. 
Hobbes (1651/1996) proposed that society can only exist if some entity can curtail the baser 
instincts of man, and we continue to seek “some kind of talisman, a benevolent tyrant or a 
magical new technology, that can shelter us from power and crime and protect us from each 
other” (Gray, 2013). Costly punishment, and the instinct to enforce fairness and cooperation 
between one-another, seems to collectively grant us this desire. However, much like Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, costly punishment can only occur when there exists someone who is able and 
willing to impose their will on others without fear of the cost or reprisal. The shadow of this 
Leviathan extends across our species’ evolutionary history and, as this thesis states, the 
shadow originates in the dominance and status contests of our ancestors.  Only by 
appreciating this origin will be able to better understand costly punishment and both when 
and why individuals will act in defence of the public good. 
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10 Appendix: vignettes and instructions 
10.1 Appendix A: chapter 3 
10.1.1 Study 1 scenario 
Part 1: You have been placed in a student work group of 5 people including yourself to 
prepare a presentation for a course module. You have also been informed this [will be your 
work group for all subsequent group assignments for the rest the year / this will be your work 
group for this project only] 
 
Tasks needed to complete the presentation have been discussed and divided by the group 
between its members as equally as possible and the deadline is two weeks from its 
announcement. The presentation is worth 50% of the marks for that particular module, 
meaning failing the presentation completely would most likely mean failing the module. 
However, not long before the presentation needs to be given one member informs the group 
they have done nothing in the past weeks. Their lack of work had nothing to do with any 
personal or family problems and they have completed all individual assignments on time. 
Despite this, the presentation is a success and the group receives a good passing grade. 
 
After session is over, [you let it be known openly to the course that you will / you tell the 
group  that you will / you decide to privately] approach the tutor inform them that one 
member of the group did nothing for the presentation and demand the person’s mark be 
reduced. 
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Part 2: In fact, before you have a chance to do anything another group member, Avery, tells 
the group they are not happy with the situation, and will inform the tutor about the person 
who did not contribute to the presentation. 
10.1.2 Study 2 scenario 
At the beginning of term you entered a university-wide competition to win a two-week alpine 
skiing holiday and have been informed you were among 20 students to win the prize. 
Winners will stay in one of four chalets close to one another (5 students to each) and have the 
opportunity to both participate in excursion and events organised by the university and to 
explore/travel/ around the area, as well as ski, as you see fit.  
You realise you do not know anyone else who won but are nevertheless excited. After 
attending a meeting concerning the trip you are relieved to hear no one knows one another 
and realise this will be a good opportunity to meet people outside your course and activity 
groups 
Around a week into the trip there is tension in your cottage as another house-mate, Charlie, is 
not doing their fair share of the cleaning and household tasks: In fact they repeatedly leave 
the kitchen a mess and rarely clean up after themselves. One evening you bump into another 
house-mate, Alex, in the lounge who [Reveals they too are angry at the way Charlie is 
behaving and believes you should both confront Charlie about their behaviour next time you 
are all in the same room / Reveals they don’t really mind that Charlie is leaving a mess and 
that it would create needless tension to bring it up during this trip / Tells you about the 
fantastic bar/restaurant they came across earlier in the day]. 
A few days later you, Charlie and Alex are in the lounge together and you decide it’s time to 
confront Charlie about his behaviour. You tell him calmly that while it is a holiday you think 
it’s unfair they not only don’t help to keep the place clean, but won’t even clean up the mess 
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they themselves create. You look to Alex, who [tells Charlie they agree with everything you 
say, and that they think Charlie should do more around the cottage / says nothing and looks 
away]. 
10.2 Appendix B: chapter 4 
10.2.1 Study 3 scenario 
10.2.1.1 Example of the ‘newspaper article’ stimuli 
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10.2.1.2 Third Party Punishment condition 
A have-a-go hero was today praised by the local community for his bravery in foiling the 
attempted mugging of an elderly gentleman late on Tuesday evening. Harold White, aged 77, 
was walking home alone after visiting a friend and must have seemed a tempting target that 
night. Having confronted his intended victim, the mugger forced Mr White into an alley way 
off the main street and demanded he hand over any valuables he had. Thankfully help was at 
hand. A local man, John Taylor (pictured), interrupted the assault, causing the assailant to 
flee the scene. Speaking to the press, Mr Taylor, who is 5’10’’ had this to say about the 
ordeal 
“I was walking home after a cinema trip and saw two men arguing 
ahead of me. Suddenly the younger one wrestled the other into the 
alley nearby. [I box mainly for the exercise, but I can defend myself 
so / I’ve never been in a fight in my life but]  I knew I had to do 
something” 
“I demanded the guy leave Harold alone, we exchanged words and he 
refused. We struggled and I knocked him to the ground. He got up and 
ran off, and I called the police” 
Police have praised John’s bravery in preventing a crime being committed but reiterated they 
advise the public against such actions and to instead call the police. They continue that while 
in this case no weapon was involved, Mr Taylor potentially placed himself in danger by 
becoming directly involved. 
The assailant, described as muscular and around 6
ft 
in height, is now being hunted by police 
with local hospitals and clinics being asked to report anyone arriving with broken nose or 
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similar injury. Anyone with information that may be relevant to the case should contact their 
local police station. 
10.2.1.3 Second party punishment scenario 
A local man was praised by the local community today for his bravery after fending off an 
attempted mugging on Tuesday evening. John Taylor (pictured) was walking home alone 
after a trip to the cinema with friends and must have seemed a tempting target that night. The 
unidentified assailant confronted Mr Taylor sometime after 11pm. Mr Taylor had this to say 
about the ordeal  
“I was walking home after seeing a film and suddenly this guy stepped 
out in front of me and demanded I give him my wallet and phone. [I 
box mainly for the exercise, but I can defend myself so / I’ve never 
been in a fight in my life but] I wasn’t going to just hand over my 
things”  
“I demanded the guy leave me alone, we exchanged words and he 
refused. We struggled and I knocked him to the ground. He got up and 
ran off and I called the police” 
Police have praised Mr Taylor’s bravery in defending himself but reiterated they advise the 
public against such actions. They continue that while in this case no weapon was involved, 
Mr Taylor potentially placed himself in danger by escalating the confrontation with his 
attacker. 
The assailant, described as muscular and around 6
ft 
in height, is now being hunted by police 
with local hospitals and clinics being asked to report anyone arriving with broken nose or 
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similar injury. Anyone with information that may be relevant to the case should contact their 
local police station 
10.2.1.4 ‘Bar fight’ scenario 
Today the clean-up began after a fight broke out early on Saturday evening. Police were 
called after two men began brawling outside a local bar, breaking tables and knocking over 
passers-by as they went. Eye witnesses report hearing raised voices from the two people 
involved before the fight broke out. As yet there is no information as to what caused the 
altercation and footage from the bar’s CCTV cameras does not appear to suggest either man 
was drunk. By the time police arrived the fight had subsided and one of those involved; Mr 
John Taylor was arrested. He had this to say 
“I don’t really know what happened. It was early in the afternoon and 
I got into an argument with this random person. Not even sure what it 
was about now. The whole thing was stupid”  
“Not sure who started anything physical. [I box mainly for the 
exercise, but I can defend myself so / I’ve never been in a fight in my 
life]. We struggled and I knocked him to the ground. He got up and his 
friends lead him away” 
Police later released John and are seeking witnesses to help identify the other man involved, 
described as muscular and around 6
ft 
in height. Local hospitals and clinics being asked to 
report anyone arriving with broken nose or similar injury and anyone with information that 
may be relevant should contact their local police station. 
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10.2.1.5 ‘Flash mob’ scenario  
The flash-mob phenomena arrived here yesterday as the city centre was ground to a halt by a 
recreation of the famous Radiohead music video to the hit signal “Just”. For those who don’t 
know, a flash mob is a random collection of individuals who, after signing up to a website, 
receive instructions guiding them to a specific place at a specific time. Once the signal is 
given each person carries out a pre-arranged action: from a song and dance number to 
stripping naked, or in this case lying on the floor. The mob dispersed before any comments 
from the participants could be obtained.  But one onlooker, John Taylor, (Pictured), [a keen 
amateur boxer / who was on his way home from a hair salon] had this to say 
“It was all a little surreal really. One minute the centre is filled with 
people the next half are lying on the floor” 
“I could see some people were confused nervous initially, but it’s just 
a bit of a fun. And I think everyone eventually saw the funny side of it. 
Certainly made the day more eventful” 
City officials say that while there is nothing illegal in what the mob did, in future they would 
prefer some notice of future events in case other members of the public are worried by the 
spectacle and overload the police with calls. 
10.2.2 Study 4 scenario 
You are sitting alone in a local bar when a group of people arrive together and sit at a table in 
front of you nearby. The bar is quite full and they soon realise there are more of them than 
chairs with no opportunity to get more.  
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You see one of the standing people, a man in a GREY shirt, go over to one of the seated 
individuals and, un-humorously, forcefully demand the seated man gives up his seat. After a 
few seconds the seated man grudgingly gets up and stands away. 
Another member of the group, a man in a BLUE shirt, notices this taking place and turns to 
the male in the GREY shirt. He then however says nothing to the man in the GREY shirt 
before resuming his previous conversation [No intervention condition]. 
Another member of the group, a man in a BLUE shirt, notices this taking place and turns to 
the man in the GREY shirt, angrily berating him for making the seated guy move. After a 
pause, the man in the GREY shirt stares at him and laughs before turning away and starting 
a conversation with the person next to him [Unsuccessful intervention condition]. 
Another member of the group, a man in a BLUE shirt, notices this taking place and turns to 
the man in the GREY shirt, angrily berating him for making the seated guy move. After a 
pause, the man in the GREY shirt gets up and returns to the other standing people and the 
other man returns to his seat [Successful intervention condition]. 
10.3 Appendix C: chapter 5  
10.3.1 Study 5 scenario 
You have been part of a university sports team for around a year. Following a practice 
session you and a number of other team members have gone to a local bar. You and the team 
regularly go to the same bar after practice and the staff always seem happy to have you all 
there. 
Once you arrive, the team claims the one remaining free table. However, as the bar is quite 
full, there are not enough chairs for everyone. You and a number of others therefore have to 
stand. 
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Nearby, two strangers are sitting at another table and after a few minutes one of them heads 
to the bar to order drinks. Seeing this, one of standing members of your team goes over to the 
table and proceeds to take the now vacant chair. They laugh off the protests of the other 
stranger, daring them to take it back, and return to your team’s table with the chair. 
You see that another member of your team, who is [popular/unpopular] in the team and the 
[most/least] skilled member, has also noticed this interaction. Standing up, this person angrily 
berates the chair-taker, and tells them they “won’t tolerate this behaviour” and will “[beat the 
crap out of them / make sure they never represent the team competitively again]” if the chair 
isn’t returned and should they ever do anything like this in the future. 
10.3.2 Study 6 scenario 
You have been part of a local sports team for around a year. Following a practice session you 
and a number of other team members have gone to a local bar. You and the team regularly go 
to the same bar after practice and the staff always seem happy to have you all there. 
 
Once you arrive, the team claims the one remaining free table. However, as the bar is quite 
full, there are not enough chairs for everyone. You and a number of others therefore have to 
stand. Nearby, two strangers are sitting at another table and after a few minutes one of them 
heads to the bar to order drinks. Seeing this, one of standing members of your team, who is 
[popular/unpopular] in the team and considered to be one of the [most/least] skilled member, 
goes over to the table and proceeds to take the now vacant chair. They laugh off the protests 
of the other stranger, daring them to take it back, and return to your team’s table with the 
chair. 
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As the ‘chair-taker’ returns, you see that another member of your team, someone who is quite 
is [also] [popular/unpopular] in the team and [also] one of the [most/least] skilled members, 
has also noticed this interaction. They seem to be very agitated by it. 
10.4 Appendix D: chapter 6 
10.4.1 Study 7 participant instructions and comprehension questions 
10.4.1.1 Contribution round instructions  
In each round in stage 1, each participant will receive 20 points and will have the opportunity 
to contribute between 0-20 of these points to the group pot (see screen below). Any points 
you do not contribute will be kept by you 
 
Once all participants have made their contribution decisions, they will be added together and 
the total will be multiplied by 2. This total will then be divided equally between all 
participants. (see screen below) 
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“You” contributed 8 points, Player 1 contributed 15 points, Player 2 contributed 5 points and 
Player 3 contributed 14 points. 8+15+5+14=42, 42*2=84, 84/4=21, so each participant 
received 21points from the group pot. As “you” kept 12 points for yourself, your total for that 
round is 33 (12+21=33).  
The round is now over. Any points you earned will be added to your overall total and are 
‘safe’. Before the next round begins, the groups will be randomised again. You will play 
between 5 and 10 rounds. Beyond Round 5 there is a 75% chance the game will continue to 
the next round. 
Using the information provided, please answer the questions below to ensure your have 
understood the instructions 
1) How many points are you allocated at the beginning of each round ______________ 
2) By how much is the Group Pot multiplied by before being divided    ______________  
3)  
  Contributions 
Player 1: 7 
Player 2: 14 
Player 3:  3 
Player 4: 16 
What is the total pot before it is multiplied    ___________ 
The total pot after it is multiplied         ___________ 
How many points will each player receive       __________  
from the pot?  
What is Player 4’s total score for this round?  __________ 
What is Player 1’s total score for this round? __________ 
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10.4.1.2 Punishment round instructions 
 In stage two, the rounds will proceed as in stage 1.  In addition however, a random member 
of the group will be able to assign ‘deduction’ points to other group’s members. After the 
contribution part of the round, one randomly selected group member will see the screen 
below 
[As the player with the ability to assign deduction points, you will also gain an additional 
[50% / 25% / 10%] of the group pot (see screen below). For instance, here the total pot is 93 
points, so in addition to your share of 23 points, you will get an additional [46/23/9] points. 
These points are NOT taken from any other player] 
 
If selected you will be asked to assign between 0-20 deduction points to one player if you so 
wish (assigning 0 if you do not wish to assign any).  
Each point assigned to the selected player will remove one of their points 
Each point you assign as a deduction point will remove one of your points 
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Once this decision has been made the round ends and the player who had deduction points 
assigned to them will be told how many points they had deducted (as above). The round is 
now over. As with Stage 1, the groups will be randomised before the next round to begins. 
You will play between a 5 and 10 rounds. Beyond Round 5, there is a 75% chance the game 
will continue to the next round. Using the information provided, please answer the questions 
below to ensure your have understood the instructions. 
1) What is the maximum number of deduction points you can assign    ______________            
to another 
2) For deduction point you assign, how many points are removed         ______________       
from the player you assign them to? 
3) For deduction point you assign, how many points are removed          _____________        
from your score for that round? 
4)  
  Contribution  Total Score 
Player 1: 7  28 
Player 2: 12  33 
Player 3:  15  36 
You:  9  30 
 If you assign Player 1 FIVE deduction points   ___________ 
what will their new Total Score be?  
If you assign Player 2 SEVEN deduction            __________ 
points, what will your Total Score be? 
The total group pot was 86. As the                   ___________  
deducting player, how many  additional                                     
points will you received from the group pot? 
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10.4.2 Study 8: participant instructions and comprehension questions 
10.4.2.1 Contribution round 
At the start of each round each participant will receive 20 
points and will have the opportunity to contribute 
between 0-20 of these points to the group pot (see screen 
to the right). Any points you do not contribute will be 
kept by you 
 
Once all participants have made their group pot contribution decisions, they will be added 
together and the total will be multiplied by 2. [25% of this total will then be removed (more 
on this in a moment)].  This [the remaining] total will 
then be divided equally between all participants (see 
screen bottom/right) 
 
“You” contributed 8 points, Player 1 contributed 15 
points, Player 2 contributed 5 points and Player 3 
contributed 14 points. 8+15+5+14=42, 42*2=84, 
84/4=21, so each participant received 21points from the 
group pot. As “you” kept 12 points for yourself, your 
total for that round is 33 (12+21=33).  
 
PLEASE NOTE that the ‘player 1’ etc labels are 
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arbitrarily assigned at this screen by the computer. That is to say, in the next round, anyone 
could be ‘player 1’ etc 
10.4.2.2 Punishment round instructions 
For three of the four players in each group, the round 
ends at the previous screen. However, one player will 
be able to assign ‘deduction’ points to other group’s 
members. This randomly selected group member will 
see the following screen (right) 
[If selected, you will be asked if you would like to 
assign up to 20 ‘deduction points’ to one player 
(assigning 0 if you do not wish to assign any)] 
[If you are the player with the ability to assign 
deduction points, you will also gain an additional 
25% of the group pot (see screen to the right). For 
instance, here the total pot is 92 points, so in addition to 
your share of 23 points, you will get an additional 23 
points. These points are NOT taken from any other 
player] 
 
[If you are the player with the ability to assign deduction points, you will also be given the 
25% of the group pot that was previously removed (see screen to the right). So in addition to 
your share of the group pot (15), the points you kept (10), you will get an additional 20 
points, giving you 45 points] 
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Each deduction point assigned to the selected player will deduct one of their points 
Each point you assign as a deduction point will ‘cost’ you one of your points 
 
Once this decision has been made the round ends. The player who had deduction points 
assigned to them will be told how many points they had deducted but NOT who assigned 
them (right). The round is now over and any points you have are ‘safe’ and added to your 
total. 
Note, the person selected to have the ability to assign deduction points [WILL 
KEEP THIS ROLE for the duration of the game / IS RANDOMLY ASSIGNED 
each round] 
 
You will play between 6 and 12 rounds. Beyond Round 6, there is a 75% chance the game 
will continue to the next round. [In every subsequent round you will be in a group with the 
same individuals / Before the start of each new round, the groups will again be randomly 
assigned, so it is unlikely you will play against the same group of individuals twice] 
 
Using the information provided, please answer the questions below to ensure your have 
understood the instructions. Remember you will also play a few practice rounds to get used to 
how the game is played 
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1) How many points are you allocated at the beginning of each round               
______________ 
2) By how much is the Group Pot multiplied by before being divided    ______________    
equally between all players 
3) What is the maximum number of deduction points you can assign              
______________  to another player 
4) If you assigned 4 deduction points to another player, how many             
_____________ points would be deducted from that player? 
5) If you assigned 9 deduction points to another player, how many            
_____________ points would be removed from your own score? 
 
6) In this game, do you  (circle your response) 
a. Play with the same players each round, or 
b. Play with random players each round 
 
7) The player randomly assigned to be able to allocate deduction points (circle your 
response)... 
a. Keeps this role for the whole game, or 
b. The role is randomly assigned at the start of the next round 
Please also indicate: 
Age: ___________  Sex: _____________  Nationality: ____________ 
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10.5 Appendix E 
10.5.1 Social network questionnaire – Study 9 & 10 used identical questionnaires  
You will now be asked some questions about your relationship with the other students on this 
field course. 
The questions are designed to reflect your opinion, so there are no right or wrong answers. To 
maintain participant anonymity and confidentiality, once data collection is complete, the list 
of names and numbers will be removed. Thus, as stated above, once data collection is 
complete, there will be no way of identifying you or any other participant. Please answer as 
honestly as you can. 
For example, 
Question: "Which people have you never met before today"  
Answer: 1, 24, 17 
Once again, please be assured all information will be kept anonymous and confidential 
1) What is your number on the sheet  _______________ 
2) Who would you say are your closest friends on this field course? _______________ 
3) Who do you think are the most influential members of this field course 
_______________ 
4) Who did you socialise most with during this trip? _______________ 
5) If you were going for an average evening out, who would you be going with from this 
field trip? _______________ 
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10.5.2 Study 9 participant instructions 
During this game you will fill out information for both the Proposer and Third-party roles and 
will be randomly matched into groups of three once your information has been collected.  
For example, your Proposer data will be matched to the Third-Party decisions of another and 
to a Receiver, your Third-party data will be matched to a Receiver and a Proposer, and you 
will be the receiver for the Proposer and Third-Party data of others. 
You will be given a score card for both the Proposer and Third-Party role. As well as your 
decisions, please ensure you write the last 4 digits of your student ID number (or surname if 
you can’t remember). This information is for experimenter use only and you cannot be 
identified by other participants. 
Next to where it says “round number” please indicate the order in which you completed the 
Proposer and Third-Party score cards: Write 1 on the card you did first, and 2 on the card you 
did second. 
Once you have filled out the first card it will be collected in and the second will be handed 
out. Once this is done the experiment is over and you may collect your thank you chocolate 
The Proposer role  
As the Proposer, you have an allocation 
of 20 points. You must decide how 
many points (if any) to send to an 
anonymous Receiver. You may choose 
to send any whole number amount 
between 0 (no points sent to the 
receiver) and 10 points. 
Student ID no: 
____________ 
(Last 4 digits)
Role: Proposer 
Study Code: 
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Any points you do not send will be yours and added to your total earnings 
for the experiment 
As mentioned above, a Third-Party will randomly assigned to your decision (See next page). 
They will have the opportunity to assign ‘deduction point’s to you. Each deduction point they 
assign you will either remove THREE points from your total or ONE point. We will ask 
you to make you ‘send’ decision for both potential deduction schemes (see score card for 
clarity). 
Whether your group uses the THREE points or ONE point deduction scheme will be decided 
at random. 
The Receiver role 
The decisions you make as a Proposer will determine how many points the Receiver assigned 
to you will receive. Equally, what you receive as a ‘Receiver’ will be affected by the Proposal 
decisions of others. 
You will not have anything to do for this role. 
The Third-Party  
When making a decision as the Third-Party, you will have an allocation of 10 points.  
You have the choice assign the Proposer ‘deduction points’.  Each deduction point you assign 
will ‘cost’ you one of your points.  
Any of the 10 points you don’t ‘spend’ on deduction points will be kept by you 
Each deduction point you assign to the Proposer will either remove THREE of their points 
OR ONE of their points. We will ask you to make decisions for both deduction schemes. As 
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mentioned above, whether your group uses the THREE points or ONE point deduction 
scheme will be decided at random. 
These decisions will affect the Proposer’s points only. 
As you do not know how many (if any) points the Proposer will send, you will be asked to 
enter how many deduction points you would allocate in response to a given number of points 
sent by the Proposer. For each possible amount if points sent by the proposer you can assign 
between 0-10 deduction points (See example below). 
Think of it like this, you are indicating that: 
If the Proposer sent 3 points to the Receiver, you would wish to assign them ____ 
deduction points in response. However if the Proposer sent 10 points to the Receiver, 
you would wish to assign them _____ deduction points etc 
 
 
 
Student ID no: 
____________ 
(Last 4 digits) 
Role: Third-Party 
Study Code:________ 
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10.5.3 Study 10 participant instructions 
  
You are about to take part in a “third party interaction game”  
Normally, this game involves groups of three with each person taking a different role. One 
person takes the role of The Proposer, one person takes the role of The Receiver, and one 
person takes the role of The Third Party 
The game goes as follows 
1) The Proposer: The Proposer is given an 
allocation of 20 points. They can choose, if 
they wish, to send between 0-10  of these 
points to the Receiver. The Proposer keeps 
any points they do not send. 
 
2) The Receiver: The Receiver plays no active 
role in the game.  
 
3) The Third Party: The Third Party is given an 
allocation of 10 points and observes how many 
points, if any, the Proposer sends to the 
Receiver. If they so choose, the Third Party 
can assign up to 10 deduction points to the Proposer (4). Each deduction point ‘costs’ 
the Third Party 1 of their points, and removes 3 of the Proposer’s total. For example 2 
deduction points would remove 6 points from the Proposer’s total, and leave the Third 
Party with 8 points. Any points the Third Party does not assign are kept by them  
 
So, the number of points (and therefore £) each person gets is based on the following 
a) The Proposer: The amount of points they kept, minus any deductions by the Third 
Party 
b) The Receiver: The amount of points they received from the Proposer 
c) The Third Party: The amount of points they did not spend on deduction points 
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Because we’re a small group, the game you will 
be playing will be a little different; because here 
you will be making decision as the Proposer 
AND the Third Party. 
Today 
Normally this sort of game is done at a 
computer, but because that’s not possible, you will all make Proposer and Third Party 
decisions at the same time. 
Once the cards (Right and below) have been taken in, these proposals will be randomly 
matched to someone else in the group 
You will play a version of the Third Party interaction game using what is known as the 
“Strategy” Method. Essentially, you will make decisions in all roles.  
In a moment you will be given a score card like the ones shown above and to the right, which 
asks you to make both Proposer and Third Party decisions. 
Once you have made the decisions, these will be randomly matched by computer after the 
experiment.  
1) Proposer: You have 30 points 
and can send between 0-15 
points to the Receiver 
2)  Third Party: You have been given an allocation of 10 points. You may assign 
between 0-10 of these points to the Proposer as ‘deduction’ points. 
Remember, you can assign between 0-10 points for EACH option below 
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So, the total amount of points you can earn during the experiment depends on 
a) The points you kept when making your Proposer decision, minus any deduction 
points you were assigned by a Third Party 
b) The points sent to you BY a Proposer you were matched with 
c) The points you did not spend as deduction points AS the Third Party, once your 
decisions were matched to a Proposer 
 
There’s more! 
Because it takes time to match everyone together and work out everyone’s points, those 
chosen to receive their points as £ will be told after dinner tomorrow. 
When you receive your money, you WILL BE TOLD who your Proposer was and how much 
they sent you, and who your Third Party was and how many deduction points they assigned 
to you. The decisions will also go up on the classroom whiteboard. 
 
THIS MEANS YOUR DECISIONS ON THE SCORE CARDS ARE NOT 
ANONYMOUS 
